Jules Baudrin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jules Baudrin has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Léo Perrin
INRIA, Paris, France
3 shared publications - Gregor Leander
Ruhr University Bochum
2 shared publications - Lukas Stennes
Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
2 shared publications - Patrick Felke
University of Applied Sciences Emden/Leer, Emden, Germany
2 shared publications - Patrick Neumann
Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
2 shared publications Anne Canteaut
INRIA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 530-565
Transistor: a TFHE-Friendly Stream Cipher
- 17 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 530-565
Open AccessTransistor: a TFHE-Friendly Stream Cipher
- Open Access
- 10 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 93 (8) , 3243-3281
Commutative cryptanalysis as a generalization of differential cryptanalysis
Recently, Baudrin et al. analyzed a special case of Wagner’s commutative diagram cryptanalysis, referred to as commutative cryptanalysis. For a family $$(E_k)_k$$ of permutations on a finite vector space G, commutative cryptanalysis exploits the existence of affine permutations $$A,B :G \rightarrow G$$ , $$I \notin \{A,B\}$$ such that $$E_k \circ A (x) = B \circ E_k(x)$$ holds with high probability, taken over inputs x, for a significantly large set of weak keys k. Several attacks against symmetric cryptographic primitives can be formulated within the framework of commutative cryptanalysis, most importantly differential attacks, as well as rotational and rotational-differential attacks. Besides, the notion of c-differentials on S-boxes can be analyzed as a special case within this framework. We discuss the relations between a general notion of commutative cryptanalysis, with A and B being arbitrary functions over a finite Abelian group, and differential cryptanalysis, both from the view of conducting an attack on a symmetric cryptographic primitive, as well as from the view of a theoretical study of cryptographic S-boxes.- 10 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 93 (8) , 3243-3281
Open AccessCommutative cryptanalysis as a generalization of differential cryptanalysis
Recently, Baudrin et al. analyzed a special case of Wagner’s commutative diagram cryptanalysis, referred to as commutative cryptanalysis. For a family $$(E_k)_k$$ of permutations on a finite vector space G, commutative cryptanalysis exploits the existence of affine permutations $$A,B :G \rightarrow G$$ , $$I \notin \{A,B\}$$ such that $$E_k \circ A (x) = B \circ E_k(x)$$ holds with high probability, taken over inputs x, for a significantly large set of weak keys k. Several attacks against symmetric cryptographic primitives can be formulated within the framework of commutative cryptanalysis, most importantly differential attacks, as well as rotational and rotational-differential attacks. Besides, the notion of c-differentials on S-boxes can be analyzed as a special case within this framework. We discuss the relations between a general notion of commutative cryptanalysis, with A and B being arbitrary functions over a finite Abelian group, and differential cryptanalysis, both from the view of conducting an attack on a symmetric cryptographic primitive, as well as from the view of a theoretical study of cryptographic S-boxes. - Open Access
- 8 December 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2023 (4) , 299-329
Commutative Cryptanalysis Made Practical
About 20 years ago, Wagner showed that most of the (then) known techniques used in the cryptanalysis of block ciphers were particular cases of what he called commutative diagram cryptanalysis. However, to the best of our knowledge, this general framework has not yet been leveraged to find concrete attacks.In this paper, we focus on a particular case of this framework and develop commutative cryptanalysis, whereby an attacker targeting a primitive E constructs affine permutations A and B such that E ○ A = B ○ E with a high probability, possibly for some weak keys. We develop the tools needed for the practical use of this technique: first, we generalize differential uniformity into “A-uniformity” and differential trails into “commutative trails”, and second we investigate the commutative behaviour of S-box layers, matrix multiplications, and key additions.Equipped with these new techniques, we find probability-one distinguishers using only two chosen plaintexts for large classes of weak keys in both a modified Midori and in Scream. For the same weak keys, we deduce high probability truncated differentials that can cover an arbitrary number of rounds, but which do not correspond to any high probability differential trails. Similarly, we show the existence of a trade-off in our variant of Midori whereby the probability of the commutative trail can be decreased in order to increase the weak key density. We also show some statistical patterns in the AES super S-box that have a much higher probability than the best differentials, and which hold for a class of weak keys of density about 2−4.5.
- 8 December 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2023 (4) , 299-329
Open AccessCommutative Cryptanalysis Made Practical
About 20 years ago, Wagner showed that most of the (then) known techniques used in the cryptanalysis of block ciphers were particular cases of what he called commutative diagram cryptanalysis. However, to the best of our knowledge, this general framework has not yet been leveraged to find concrete attacks.In this paper, we focus on a particular case of this framework and develop commutative cryptanalysis, whereby an attacker targeting a primitive E constructs affine permutations A and B such that E ○ A = B ○ E with a high probability, possibly for some weak keys. We develop the tools needed for the practical use of this technique: first, we generalize differential uniformity into “A-uniformity” and differential trails into “commutative trails”, and second we investigate the commutative behaviour of S-box layers, matrix multiplications, and key additions.Equipped with these new techniques, we find probability-one distinguishers using only two chosen plaintexts for large classes of weak keys in both a modified Midori and in Scream. For the same weak keys, we deduce high probability truncated differentials that can cover an arbitrary number of rounds, but which do not correspond to any high probability differential trails. Similarly, we show the existence of a trade-off in our variant of Midori whereby the probability of the commutative trail can be decreased in order to increase the weak key density. We also show some statistical patterns in the AES super S-box that have a much higher probability than the best differentials, and which hold for a class of weak keys of density about 2−4.5.
- Open Access
- 7 December 2022
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2022 (4) , 120-144
Practical Cube Attack against Nonce-Misused Ascon
Ascon is a sponge-based Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data that was selected as both one of the winners of the CAESAR competition and one of the finalists of the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization effort. As this competition comes to an end, we analyse the security of this algorithm against cube attacks. We present a practical cube attack against the full 6-round encryption in Ascon in the nonce-misuse setting. We note right away that this attack does not violate the security claims made by the designers of Ascon, due to this setting.Our cryptanalysis is a conditional cube attack that is capable of recovering the full capacity in practical time; but for Ascon-128, its extension to a key recovery or a forgery is still an open question. First, a careful analysis of the maximum-degree terms in the algebraic normal form of the Ascon permutation allows us to derive linear equations in half of the capacity bits given enough cube sums of dimension 32. Then, depending on the results of this first phase, we identify smaller-degree cubes that allow us to recover the remaining half of the capacity. Overall, our cryptanalysis has a complexity of about 240 adaptatively chosen plaintexts, and about 240 calls to the permutation. We have implemented the full attack and our experiments confirm our claims.Our results are built on a theoretical framework which allows us to easily identify monomials whose cube-sums provide linear equations in the capacity bits. The coefficients of these monomials have a more general form than those used in the previous attacks against Ascon, and our method enables us to re-frame previous results in a simpler form. Overall, it enables to gain a deeper understanding of the properties of the permutation, and in particular of its S-box, that make such state-recoveries possible.
- 7 December 2022
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- Vol. 2022 (4) , 120-144
Open AccessPractical Cube Attack against Nonce-Misused Ascon
Ascon is a sponge-based Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data that was selected as both one of the winners of the CAESAR competition and one of the finalists of the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization effort. As this competition comes to an end, we analyse the security of this algorithm against cube attacks. We present a practical cube attack against the full 6-round encryption in Ascon in the nonce-misuse setting. We note right away that this attack does not violate the security claims made by the designers of Ascon, due to this setting.Our cryptanalysis is a conditional cube attack that is capable of recovering the full capacity in practical time; but for Ascon-128, its extension to a key recovery or a forgery is still an open question. First, a careful analysis of the maximum-degree terms in the algebraic normal form of the Ascon permutation allows us to derive linear equations in half of the capacity bits given enough cube sums of dimension 32. Then, depending on the results of this first phase, we identify smaller-degree cubes that allow us to recover the remaining half of the capacity. Overall, our cryptanalysis has a complexity of about 240 adaptatively chosen plaintexts, and about 240 calls to the permutation. We have implemented the full attack and our experiments confirm our claims.Our results are built on a theoretical framework which allows us to easily identify monomials whose cube-sums provide linear equations in the capacity bits. The coefficients of these monomials have a more general form than those used in the previous attacks against Ascon, and our method enables us to re-frame previous results in a simpler form. Overall, it enables to gain a deeper understanding of the properties of the permutation, and in particular of its S-box, that make such state-recoveries possible.