Fengyu Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Fengyu Wang has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Di Shi
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM 88003, USA
1 shared publication - Praveen Verma
Klipsch School of Electrical and Computer Engineering New Mexico State University Las Cruces USA
1 shared publication - Yanzhu Ye
Research and Development Division Hitachi America Ltd California USA
1 shared publication - Ying Zhang
Oklahoma State University, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Impact of Solar Integration on Grid Security: Unveiling Vulnerabilities in Load Redistribution Attacks
Load redistribution (LR) attacks represent a practical and sophisticated form of false data injection (FDI) attacks, where the attacker manipulates grid data to influence economic operations of the grid through misleading security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) decisions. Traditionally, LR attack models operate under the assumption that generator measurements are secure and immune to tampering. However, the increasing integration of solar generation into power grids challenges this assumption, exposing new vulnerabilities. This paper proposes an enhanced load redistribution attack model, addressing new vulnerabilities introduced by the increasing integration of solar generation in power grids. The study demonstrates that manipulating solar generation data significantly disrupts grid economics, with peak impacts during periods of high solar generation.
Open AccessImpact of Solar Integration on Grid Security: Unveiling Vulnerabilities in Load Redistribution Attacks
Load redistribution (LR) attacks represent a practical and sophisticated form of false data injection (FDI) attacks, where the attacker manipulates grid data to influence economic operations of the grid through misleading security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) decisions. Traditionally, LR attack models operate under the assumption that generator measurements are secure and immune to tampering. However, the increasing integration of solar generation into power grids challenges this assumption, exposing new vulnerabilities. This paper proposes an enhanced load redistribution attack model, addressing new vulnerabilities introduced by the increasing integration of solar generation in power grids. The study demonstrates that manipulating solar generation data significantly disrupts grid economics, with peak impacts during periods of high solar generation.