MAMahyar Afshinmehr

Mahyar Afshinmehr

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Mahyar Afshinmehr has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    EFX Allocations Exist on Triangle-Free Multi-Graphs

    by Mahyar Afshinmehr, Arash Ashuri, Pouria Mahmoudkhan, Kurt Mehlhorn

    We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents, with a focus on limiting envy. A central open question in this area is the existence of EFX allocations-allocations in which any envy of any agent i towards any agent j vanishes upon the removal of any single good from j's bundle. Establishing the existence of such allocations has proven notoriously difficult in general, but progress has been made for restricted valuation classes. Christodoulou et al. [2023] proved existence for graphical valuations, where goods correspond to edges in a graph, agents to nodes, and each agent values only incident edges. The graph was required to be simple, i.e., for any pair of agents, there could be at most one good that both agents value. The problem remained open, however, for multi-graph valuations, where for a pair of agents several goods may have value to both. In this setting, Sgouritsa and Sotiriou [2025] established existence whenever the shortest cycle with non-parallel edges has length at least six, while Afshinmehr et al. [2025] proved existence when the graph contains no odd cycles. In this paper, we strengthen these results by proving that EFX allocations always exist in multi-graphs that contain no cycle of length three. Assuming monotone valuations, we further provide a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for computing such an allocation, which runs in polynomial time when agents have cancelable valuations, a strict superclass of additive valuation functions. Accordingly, our results stand as one of the only cases where EFX allocations exist for an arbitrary number of agents.

  • Open Access

    Approximate EFX and Exact tEFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Improved Algorithms

    by Mahyar Afshinmehr, Matin Ansaripour, Alireza Danaei, Kurt Mehlhorn

    We explore the fair distribution of a set of $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents, where each agent's costs are evaluated using a monotone cost function. Our focus lies on two fairness criteria: envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and a relaxed notion, namely envy-freeness up to the transfer of any item (tEFX). We demonstrate that a 2-approximate EFX allocation exists and is computable in polynomial time for three agents with subadditive cost functions, improving upon the previous $(2 + \sqrt{6})$ approximation for additive cost functions. This result requires extensive case analysis. Christoforidis et al. (IJCAI'24) independently claim the same approximation for additive cost functions; however, we provide a counter-example to their algorithm. We expand the number of agents to any number to get the same approximation guarantee with the assumption of partially identical ordering (IDO) for the cost functions. Additionally, we establish that a tEFX allocation is achievable for three agents if one has an additive 2-ratio bounded cost function, while the others may have general monotone cost functions. This is an improvement from the prior requirement of two agents with additive 2-ratio bounded cost functions. This allocation can also be extended to agent groups with identical valuations. Further, we show various analyses of EFX allocations for chores, such as the relaxations for additive $α$-ratio-bounded cost functions.


  • Open Access

    MMS Approximations Under Additive Leveled Valuations

    by Mahyar Afshinmehr, Mehrafarin Kazemi, Kurt Mehlhorn

    We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive leveled valuations. A valuation function is called leveled if and only if bundles of larger size have larger value than bundles of smaller size. The economics literature has well studied such valuations. We use the maximin-share (MMS) and EFX as standard notions of fairness. We show that an algorithm introduced by Christodoulou et al. ([11]) constructs an allocation that is EFX and $\frac{\lfloor \frac{m}{n} \rfloor}{\lfloor \frac{m}{n} \rfloor + 1}\text{-MMS}$. In the paper, it was claimed that the allocation is EFX and $\frac{2}{3}\text{-MMS}$. However, the proof of the MMS-bound is incorrect. We give a counter-example to their proof and then prove a stronger approximation of MMS.