MKMartin Knaack
Martin Knaack
*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Martin Knaack has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Max Klimm
TU Berlin
4 shared publications - Javier Cembrano
Department of Industrial Engineering, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 159, 584-603
On the strategyproof allocation of items under a budget constraint
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 159, 584-603
Open AccessOn the strategyproof allocation of items under a budget constraint
- Open Access
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Programming
- p. 1-24
Generalized assignment and knapsack problems in the random-order model
We study different online optimization problems in the random-order model. There is a finite set of bins with known capacities and a finite set of items arriving in uniform random order. Upon arrival of an item, its size and its value for each of the bins is revealed and it has to be decided immediately and irrevocably to which bin the item is assigned, or whether the item is rejected. In this setting, an algorithm is $$\alpha $$ -competitive if the total expected value of all items assigned to the bins is at least an $$\alpha $$ -fraction of the total value of an optimal assignment that knows all items beforehand. We give an algorithm that is $$\alpha $$ -competitive with $$\alpha = (1-\ln 2 )/2 \approx 1/6.52$$ improving upon the previous best algorithm with $$\alpha \approx 1/6.99$$ for the generalized assignment problem and the previous best algorithm with $$\alpha \approx 1/6.65$$ for the integral knapsack problem. We then study the fractional knapsack problem where we have a single bin and it is also allowed to pack items fractionally. For that case, we obtain an algorithm that is $$\alpha $$ -competitive with $$\alpha = 1/e \approx 1/2.71$$ improving on the previous best algorithm with $$\alpha = 1/4.39$$ . We further show that the competitive ratio of 1/ e is best-possible for randomized algorithms in this model.- 12 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Programming
- p. 1-24
Open AccessGeneralized assignment and knapsack problems in the random-order model
We study different online optimization problems in the random-order model. There is a finite set of bins with known capacities and a finite set of items arriving in uniform random order. Upon arrival of an item, its size and its value for each of the bins is revealed and it has to be decided immediately and irrevocably to which bin the item is assigned, or whether the item is rejected. In this setting, an algorithm is $$\alpha $$ -competitive if the total expected value of all items assigned to the bins is at least an $$\alpha $$ -fraction of the total value of an optimal assignment that knows all items beforehand. We give an algorithm that is $$\alpha $$ -competitive with $$\alpha = (1-\ln 2 )/2 \approx 1/6.52$$ improving upon the previous best algorithm with $$\alpha \approx 1/6.99$$ for the generalized assignment problem and the previous best algorithm with $$\alpha \approx 1/6.65$$ for the integral knapsack problem. We then study the fractional knapsack problem where we have a single bin and it is also allowed to pack items fractionally. For that case, we obtain an algorithm that is $$\alpha $$ -competitive with $$\alpha = 1/e \approx 1/2.71$$ improving on the previous best algorithm with $$\alpha = 1/4.39$$ . We further show that the competitive ratio of 1/ e is best-possible for randomized algorithms in this model. - 4 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 341-354
Generalized Assignment and Knapsack Problems in the Random-Order Model
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 341-354
Generalized Assignment and Knapsack Problems in the Random-Order Model
- Open Access
Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic Agents
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by strategic agents who aim to maximize the total value of their items in the knapsack. This is a natural setting, e.g., when agencies select projects for funding, companies select products for sale in their shops, or hospitals schedule MRI scans for the day. A mechanism governing the packing of the knapsack is strategyproof if no agent can benefit from hiding items controlled by them to the mechanism. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof and $α$-approximate in the sense that they always approximate the maximum value of the knapsack by a factor of $α\in [0,1]$. First, we give a deterministic mechanism that is $\frac{1}{3}$-approximate. For the special case where all items have unit density, we design a $\frac{1}φ$-approximate mechanism where $1/φ\approx 0.618$ is the inverse of the golden ratio. This result is tight as we show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism with a better approximation exists. We further give randomized mechanisms with approximation guarantees of $1/2$ for the general case and $2/3$ for the case of unit densities. For both cases, no strategyproof mechanism can achieve an approximation guarantee better than $1/(5φ-7)\approx 0.917$.Open AccessPacking a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic Agents
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by strategic agents who aim to maximize the total value of their items in the knapsack. This is a natural setting, e.g., when agencies select projects for funding, companies select products for sale in their shops, or hospitals schedule MRI scans for the day. A mechanism governing the packing of the knapsack is strategyproof if no agent can benefit from hiding items controlled by them to the mechanism. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof and $α$-approximate in the sense that they always approximate the maximum value of the knapsack by a factor of $α\in [0,1]$. First, we give a deterministic mechanism that is $\frac{1}{3}$-approximate. For the special case where all items have unit density, we design a $\frac{1}φ$-approximate mechanism where $1/φ\approx 0.618$ is the inverse of the golden ratio. This result is tight as we show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism with a better approximation exists. We further give randomized mechanisms with approximation guarantees of $1/2$ for the general case and $2/3$ for the case of unit densities. For both cases, no strategyproof mechanism can achieve an approximation guarantee better than $1/(5φ-7)\approx 0.917$.