Robert Herissone-Kelly
Research Subjects
Robert Herissone-Kelly has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ajinkya Deshmukh
All University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
1 shared publication- Justina Berškytė
University of Manchester
1 shared publication - Mihaela Popa-Wyatt
Philosophy Department, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
1 shared publication - Miriam Ronzoni
University of Manchester, UK
1 shared publication Thomas Chadwick
All University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (5) , 1-21
When are conceptual innovations empowering? The case of incels
We admit concepts like ‘sexual harassment’ into our collective hermeneutical pool, yet hesitate to do the same with the incel notion of ‘blackpill’ or ‘monkeybranching.’ Why this disparity? Incels present themselves as marginalized, and their own efforts to create new conceptual tools as legitimate responses to such marginalization. At face value, such a standpoint aligns with anti-oppression epistemologies, according to which we should take conceptual contributions from marginalized groups seriously. This raises the question whether the ‘incel standpoint’ warrants consideration, and whether our reluctance to do so is driven by an a priori moral condemnation of their political agenda. One response is to simply reject that incels are meaningfully marginalized. This paper takes a different approach. We accept that incels suffer marginalization in some important respects, yet suggest that it is nevertheless possible to distinguish, in a non-arbitrary way, genuine attempts to overcome what Miranda Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice from conceptual innovations which merely reinforce dominant ideologies, or even constitute forms of self-deception. Thus, it is possible to accept the marginalization of incels yet have good reasons to be sceptical about their conceptual and interpretive innovations. We do so, first, by putting forward a novel understanding of what hermeneutical empowerment consists in; second, by offering three criteria to assess conceptual engineering efforts. The two proposals, combined, enable a more robust (i.e. less arbitrary and less moralized) way to assess conceptual innovations. This approach can, in principle, apply to cases beyond that of incels.
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (5) , 1-21
Open AccessWhen are conceptual innovations empowering? The case of incels
We admit concepts like ‘sexual harassment’ into our collective hermeneutical pool, yet hesitate to do the same with the incel notion of ‘blackpill’ or ‘monkeybranching.’ Why this disparity? Incels present themselves as marginalized, and their own efforts to create new conceptual tools as legitimate responses to such marginalization. At face value, such a standpoint aligns with anti-oppression epistemologies, according to which we should take conceptual contributions from marginalized groups seriously. This raises the question whether the ‘incel standpoint’ warrants consideration, and whether our reluctance to do so is driven by an a priori moral condemnation of their political agenda. One response is to simply reject that incels are meaningfully marginalized. This paper takes a different approach. We accept that incels suffer marginalization in some important respects, yet suggest that it is nevertheless possible to distinguish, in a non-arbitrary way, genuine attempts to overcome what Miranda Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice from conceptual innovations which merely reinforce dominant ideologies, or even constitute forms of self-deception. Thus, it is possible to accept the marginalization of incels yet have good reasons to be sceptical about their conceptual and interpretive innovations. We do so, first, by putting forward a novel understanding of what hermeneutical empowerment consists in; second, by offering three criteria to assess conceptual engineering efforts. The two proposals, combined, enable a more robust (i.e. less arbitrary and less moralized) way to assess conceptual innovations. This approach can, in principle, apply to cases beyond that of incels.
- Open Access
- 15 May 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power
According to theorists of hermeneutical injustice, how we understand our social experiences is contingent on relations of hermeneutical power: the differential ability of groups to influence social meanings. On the prevailing understanding, privileged groups enjoy more hermeneutical power, at the expense of the marginalized. This paper argues that this obscures the sense in which we can possess different kinds of hermeneutical power. While marginalized groups are often excluded from shaping dominant understandings, they often participate in hermeneutical resistance (Medina 2012). Despite their advantages with respect to shaping mainstream understanding, privileged groups often lack this kind of resistant capacity. This paper suggests that hermeneutical power consists in hermeneutical authority––the ability to shape how others understand social life––and hermeneutical agency––the ability to interpret social life for oneself. This distinction helps us map the complexities of power and social interpretation more accurately and promises a deeper understanding of hermeneutical injustice.
- 15 May 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
Open AccessAgency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power
According to theorists of hermeneutical injustice, how we understand our social experiences is contingent on relations of hermeneutical power: the differential ability of groups to influence social meanings. On the prevailing understanding, privileged groups enjoy more hermeneutical power, at the expense of the marginalized. This paper argues that this obscures the sense in which we can possess different kinds of hermeneutical power. While marginalized groups are often excluded from shaping dominant understandings, they often participate in hermeneutical resistance (Medina 2012). Despite their advantages with respect to shaping mainstream understanding, privileged groups often lack this kind of resistant capacity. This paper suggests that hermeneutical power consists in hermeneutical authority––the ability to shape how others understand social life––and hermeneutical agency––the ability to interpret social life for oneself. This distinction helps us map the complexities of power and social interpretation more accurately and promises a deeper understanding of hermeneutical injustice.