Kathy Petroni
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Kathy Petroni has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Daniel Wolfenzon
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027, and NBER,
1 shared publication- Venky Nagar
University of Michigan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 19 April 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 46 (4) , 943-966
Governance Problems in Closely Held Corporations
A major governance problem in closely held corporations is the majority shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders. As a solution, legal and finance research recommends that the main shareholder surrender some control to minority shareholders via ownership rights. We test this proposition on a large data set of closely held corporations. We find that shared-ownership firms report a substantially larger return on assets and lower expense-to-sales ratios. These findings are robust to institutionally motivated corrections for endogeneity of ownership structure. We provide evidence on the presence of governance problems and the effectiveness of shared ownership as a solution in settings characterized by illiquidity of ownership.
- 19 April 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 46 (4) , 943-966
Governance Problems in Closely Held Corporations
A major governance problem in closely held corporations is the majority shareholders’ expropriation of minority shareholders. As a solution, legal and finance research recommends that the main shareholder surrender some control to minority shareholders via ownership rights. We test this proposition on a large data set of closely held corporations. We find that shared-ownership firms report a substantially larger return on assets and lower expense-to-sales ratios. These findings are robust to institutionally motivated corrections for endogeneity of ownership structure. We provide evidence on the presence of governance problems and the effectiveness of shared ownership as a solution in settings characterized by illiquidity of ownership.