LZLiang Zhao

Liang Zhao

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Liang Zhao has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    UP TO 50% OFF: Efficient Implementation of Polynomial Masking

    by Jorge Andresen, Paula Arnold, Sebastian Berndt, Thomas Eisenbarth, Sebastian Faust, Marc Gourjon, Eric Landthaler, Elena Micheli, Maximilian Orlt, Pajam Pauls, et al.

    While passive probing attacks and active fault attacks have been studied for multiple decades, research has only started to consider combined attacks that use both probes and faults relatively recently. During this period, polynomial masking became a promising, provably secure countermeasure to protect cryptographic computations against such combined attacks. Unlike other countermeasures, such as duplicated additive masking, polynomial masking can be implemented using a linear number of shares, as shown by Berndt et al. at CRYPTO ’23. Based upon this fact, Arnold et al. noted at CHES ’24 that polynomial masking is particularly well-suited for parallel computation. This characteristic is especially effective in scenarios involving multiple circuits with identical structures, such as the 16 SBoxes in AES. Just recently, Faust et al. showed at CHES ’25 that one can also incorporate the technique of packed secret sharing into these masking schemes, given that the state-of-the-art polynomial masking scheme is secure against combined attacks.In this work, we present provably secure advancements regarding this state-of-the-art scheme in both computational and randomness efficiency, reducing the randomness complexity by up to 50% and the computational complexity even more by going from a quadratic term to a linear one for many parameters. Moreover, we present the first implementation of a polynomial masking scheme against combined attacks along with an extensive experimental evaluation for a wide range of parameters and configurations as well as a statistical leakage detection to evaluate the security of the implementation on an Arm Cortex-M processor. Our implementation is publicly available to encourage further research in practical combined resilience.


  • Open Access

    All-You-Can-Compute: Packed Secret Sharing for Combined Resilience

    by Sebastian Faust, Maximilian Orlt, Kathrin Wirschem, Liang Zhao

    Unprotected cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to implementation attacks, such as passive side-channel attacks and active fault injection attacks. Recently, countermeasures like polynomial masking and duplicated masking have been introduced to protect implementations against combined attacks that exploit leakage and faults simultaneously. While duplicated masking requires O (t · e) shares to resist an adversary capable of probing t values and faulting e values, polynomial masking requires only O (t · e) shares, which is particularly beneficial for affine computation. At CHES’24, Arnold et al. showed how to further improve the efficiency of polynomial masking in the presence of combined attacks by embedding two secrets into one polynomial sharing. This essentially reduces the complexity of previous constructions by half. The authors also observed that using techniques from packed secret sharing (Grosso et al., CHES’13) cannot easily achieve combined resilience to encode an arbitrary number of secrets in one polynomial encoding. In this work, we resolve these challenges and show that it is possible to embed an arbitrary number of secrets in one encoding and propose gadgets that are secure against combined attacks. We present two constructions that are generic and significantly improve the computational and randomness complexity of existing compilers, such as the laOla compiler presented by Berndt et al. at CRYPTO’23 and its improvement by Arnold et al. For example, for an AES evaluation that protects against t probes and e faults, we improve the randomness complexity of the state-of-the-art construction when t + e > 3, leading to an improvement of up to a factor of 2.41.