Francesco Romeo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Francesco Romeo has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Angelo Furfaro
University of Calabria
6 shared publications - Francesco Aurelio Pironti
University of Calabria
6 shared publications - Francesco Blefari
University of Calabria
6 shared publications - Matteo Lupinacci
University of Calabria
6 shared publications - Carmelo Felicetti
University of Calabria
3 shared publications - Luigi Arena
University of Calabria
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Networks
- Vol. 290
ICSLure: A very high interaction honeynet for PLC-based industrial control systems
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Networks
- Vol. 290
Open AccessICSLure: A very high interaction honeynet for PLC-based industrial control systems
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 5-23
The Dark Side of LLMs: Agent-based Attack Vectors for System-level Compromise
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 5-23
The Dark Side of LLMs: Agent-based Attack Vectors for System-level Compromise
- Open Access
- 14 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
ICSLure: A Very High Interaction Honeynet for PLC-based Industrial Control Systems
The security of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) is critical to ensuring the safety of industrial processes and personnel. The rapid adoption of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) technologies has expanded system functionality but also increased the attack surface, exposing ICSs to a growing range of cyber threats. Honeypots provide a means to detect and analyze such threats by emulating target systems and capturing attacker behavior. However, traditional ICS honeypots, often limited to software-based simulations of a single Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), lack the realism needed to deceive sophisticated adversaries. In this work, we introduce a modular honeynet framework named ICSLure.The framework has been designed to emulate realistic ICS environments. Our approach integrates physical PLCs interacting with live data sources via industrial protocols such as Modbus/Profinet RTU, along with virtualized network components including routers, switches, and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The system incorporates comprehensive monitoring capabilities to collect detailed logs of attacker interactions. We demonstrate that our framework enables coherent and high-fidelity emulation of real-world industrial plants. This high-interaction environment significantly enhances the quality of threat data collected and supports advanced analysis of ICS-specific attack strategies, contributing to more effective detection and mitigation techniques.
- 14 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessICSLure: A Very High Interaction Honeynet for PLC-based Industrial Control Systems
The security of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) is critical to ensuring the safety of industrial processes and personnel. The rapid adoption of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) technologies has expanded system functionality but also increased the attack surface, exposing ICSs to a growing range of cyber threats. Honeypots provide a means to detect and analyze such threats by emulating target systems and capturing attacker behavior. However, traditional ICS honeypots, often limited to software-based simulations of a single Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), lack the realism needed to deceive sophisticated adversaries. In this work, we introduce a modular honeynet framework named ICSLure.The framework has been designed to emulate realistic ICS environments. Our approach integrates physical PLCs interacting with live data sources via industrial protocols such as Modbus/Profinet RTU, along with virtualized network components including routers, switches, and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The system incorporates comprehensive monitoring capabilities to collect detailed logs of attacker interactions. We demonstrate that our framework enables coherent and high-fidelity emulation of real-world industrial plants. This high-interaction environment significantly enhances the quality of threat data collected and supports advanced analysis of ICS-specific attack strategies, contributing to more effective detection and mitigation techniques.
- Open Access
ICSLure: A Very High Interaction Honeynet for PLC-based Industrial Control Systems
The security of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) is critical to ensuring the safety of industrial processes and personnel. The rapid adoption of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) technologies has expanded system functionality but also increased the attack surface, exposing ICSs to a growing range of cyber threats. Honeypots provide a means to detect and analyze such threats by emulating target systems and capturing attacker behavior. However, traditional ICS honeypots, often limited to software-based simulations of a single Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), lack the realism required to engage sophisticated adversaries. In this work, we introduce a modular honeynet framework named ICSLure. The framework has been designed to emulate realistic ICS environments. Our approach integrates physical PLCs interacting with live data sources via industrial protocols such as Modbus and Profinet RTU, along with virtualized network components including routers, switches, and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The system incorporates comprehensive monitoring capabilities to collect detailed logs of attacker interactions. We demonstrate that our framework enables coherent and high-fidelity emulation of real-world industrial plants. This high-interaction environment significantly enhances the quality of threat data collected and supports advanced analysis of ICS-specific attack strategies, contributing to more effective detection and mitigation techniques.
Open AccessICSLure: A Very High Interaction Honeynet for PLC-based Industrial Control Systems
The security of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) is critical to ensuring the safety of industrial processes and personnel. The rapid adoption of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) technologies has expanded system functionality but also increased the attack surface, exposing ICSs to a growing range of cyber threats. Honeypots provide a means to detect and analyze such threats by emulating target systems and capturing attacker behavior. However, traditional ICS honeypots, often limited to software-based simulations of a single Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), lack the realism required to engage sophisticated adversaries. In this work, we introduce a modular honeynet framework named ICSLure. The framework has been designed to emulate realistic ICS environments. Our approach integrates physical PLCs interacting with live data sources via industrial protocols such as Modbus and Profinet RTU, along with virtualized network components including routers, switches, and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The system incorporates comprehensive monitoring capabilities to collect detailed logs of attacker interactions. We demonstrate that our framework enables coherent and high-fidelity emulation of real-world industrial plants. This high-interaction environment significantly enhances the quality of threat data collected and supports advanced analysis of ICS-specific attack strategies, contributing to more effective detection and mitigation techniques.
- 9 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-40
ARCeR: An Agentic RAG for the Automated Definition of Cyber Ranges
- 9 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-40
ARCeR: An Agentic RAG for the Automated Definition of Cyber Ranges
- Open Access
ARCeR: an Agentic RAG for the Automated Definition of Cyber Ranges
The growing and evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats necessitates the development of supporting tools and platforms that allow for the creation of realistic IT environments operating within virtual, controlled settings as Cyber Ranges (CRs). CRs can be exploited for analyzing vulnerabilities and experimenting with the effectiveness of devised countermeasures, as well as serving as training environments for building cyber security skills and abilities for IT operators. This paper proposes ARCeR as an innovative solution for the automatic generation and deployment of CRs, starting from user-provided descriptions in a natural language. ARCeR relies on the Agentic RAG paradigm, which allows it to fully exploit state-of-art AI technologies. Experimental results show that ARCeR is able to successfully process prompts even in cases that LLMs or basic RAG systems are not able to cope with. Furthermore, ARCeR is able to target any CR framework provided that specific knowledge is made available to it.
Open AccessARCeR: an Agentic RAG for the Automated Definition of Cyber Ranges
The growing and evolving landscape of cybersecurity threats necessitates the development of supporting tools and platforms that allow for the creation of realistic IT environments operating within virtual, controlled settings as Cyber Ranges (CRs). CRs can be exploited for analyzing vulnerabilities and experimenting with the effectiveness of devised countermeasures, as well as serving as training environments for building cyber security skills and abilities for IT operators. This paper proposes ARCeR as an innovative solution for the automatic generation and deployment of CRs, starting from user-provided descriptions in a natural language. ARCeR relies on the Agentic RAG paradigm, which allows it to fully exploit state-of-art AI technologies. Experimental results show that ARCeR is able to successfully process prompts even in cases that LLMs or basic RAG systems are not able to cope with. Furthermore, ARCeR is able to target any CR framework provided that specific knowledge is made available to it.