Yigit Yalin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yigit Yalin has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ege Yuceel
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Bilkent University, Ankara, Trkiye
1 shared publication - Muhammed Omer Sayin
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Bilkent University, Ankara, Trkiye
1 shared publication - Yuksel Arslantas
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Bilkent University, Ankara, Trkiye
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 June 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 70 (11) , 7523-7537
Convergence of Heterogeneous Learning Dynamics in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
In this article, we present new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the algorithms in this family are all uncoupled, rational, and convergent even in heterogeneous cases, e.g., where the dynamics may differ in terms of learning rates, full, none or temporal access to opponent actions, and model-based versus model-free learning. The convergence of heterogeneous dynamics is of practical interest especially in competitive environments since agents may have no means or interests in following the same dynamic with the same parameters. We prove that any mixture of such asymmetries does not impact the algorithms’ convergence to equilibrium (or near equilibrium if there is experimentation) in zero-sum games with repeated play and in zero-sum (irreducible) stochastic games with sufficiently small discount factors.
- 2 June 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 70 (11) , 7523-7537
Convergence of Heterogeneous Learning Dynamics in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
In this article, we present new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the algorithms in this family are all uncoupled, rational, and convergent even in heterogeneous cases, e.g., where the dynamics may differ in terms of learning rates, full, none or temporal access to opponent actions, and model-based versus model-free learning. The convergence of heterogeneous dynamics is of practical interest especially in competitive environments since agents may have no means or interests in following the same dynamic with the same parameters. We prove that any mixture of such asymmetries does not impact the algorithms’ convergence to equilibrium (or near equilibrium if there is experimentation) in zero-sum games with repeated play and in zero-sum (irreducible) stochastic games with sufficiently small discount factors.