Tetsuji Okazaki

In Japan in the 1920s, several financial crises and government policy led to bank mergers and the consolidation and expansion of branch networks. Using unique historical bank branch-level lending and deposit data, we show that branch banking integrated peripheral markets with the rest of the country, with large urban banks – those headquartered in Tokyo and Osaka – using deposit supply shocks in peripheral areas to fund lending in their core markets. While these findings support contemporary concerns about branch banking draining funds from peripheral markets, we argue that the export of liquidity by urban banks likely represented an efficient reallocation of credit, driven primarily by competition in funding markets. Faced with high-yielding lending opportunities in central prefectures, urban banks bid up deposit rates in peripheral areas, raising local banks’ funding costs. Local banks responded by lowering intermediation margins and reducing lending to traditional industries, which suggests that they shifted their lending to less risky and more efficient customers. We speculate that this competitive reallocation of capital across regions and sectors allowed banks to maintain a functional specialization in different customer segments, which may explain the continued coexistence of small relationship lenders and large integrated arm’s-length lenders in local banking markets.

We explore the role that large fires played in the early development of the Japanese fire insurance industry. Using a prefecture-level data set spanning 30 years, our econometric analysis shows that large fires led to an increase in new policies and policy renewals, consistent with historical narratives that insurance companies used these events to advertise their business. We also show that this subsequent surge in policies led to more small fires due to arson. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is more likely to have been due to moral hazard rather than adverse selection.