YQYinhao Qi

Yinhao Qi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yinhao Qi has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    CMD-EPD: A Graph Contrastive Learning Framework with Multi-Dimensional Fusion for Ethereum Phishing Detection

    by Chuyi Yan, Yinhao Qi, Xueying Han, Junrong Liu, Dan Du, Zhigang Lu, Meng Shen, Yuling Liu

    The burgeoning prevalence of Ethereum phishing behavior has iCSUR-2025-0155mposed substantial constraints on the advancement of blockchain finance, resulting in losses of more than $7.7 billion to date, so it is urgent to detect it in time. Currently, available detection methods usually focus on the spatial features within transaction graphs. These methods often employ shallow mining techniques on small samples. As a result, they may overlook certain aspects of interaction patterns, such as temporal behavior. Additionally, their data mining capability is limited due to the small sample sizes. In this study, we propose a graph contrastive learning framework to enrich features of accounts behavior patterns with restricted samples to overcome these limitations. Firstly, we construct an Ethereum interaction graph with the multi-graph involving more temporal information centered with labeled nodes and lighten it with our strategy. Secondly, to comprehensively characterize the accounts pattern, we design the encoder part with the GAT-LSTM model based on attention mechanism fusing statistical features , fine-grained temporal behavioral features and graph structural semantic features . Thirdly, to moderate the sparsity of phishing nodes, we employ data augmentation and contrastive learning to fully mine sparse node information. Moreover, we carried out an in-depth experimental evaluation. The CMD-EPD approach, boasting an F 1 -score of 0.87, outperformed all comparison methods. We also executed a thorough case study to analyze phishing accounts phenomenological indicators which back up the superiority of our framework.

  • Open Access

    Sysalign: protect system calls via semantic alignment of critical paths and syscall sequences

    by Yinhao Qi, Chen Zhang, Xinghu Han, Xiaobo Yang, Tian Tian, Bo Jiang, Zhigang Lu

    System call security is crucial for host-based intrusion detection, as security-sensitive system calls (e.g., execve, mprotect) play a vital role in completing attacks. However, existing defense methods face significant limitations. Static analysis and system call filtering cannot prevent the malicious use of necessary syscalls, while runtime methods based on control-flow, syscall sequences, or parameter integrity are vulnerable to sophisticated attacks, such as data-only attacks, that mimic benign execution patterns. In this paper, we propose a novel contrastive learning framework, SysAlign, for system call security that ensures the semantic consistency between a system call’s macro-level and micro-level intents. SysAlign learns the macro-level intent by the sequence of system calls, which reflects the broader objective of a program phase. The micro-level intent is derived from the specific execution path, capturing the detailed execution context of system calls. Malicious system calls disrupt this consistency, leading to a detectable misalignment between the two intents. To minimize the overhead, we efficiently represent micro-level intent using critical points instead of tracking full execution paths. These points are extracted via dominator tree analysis on the program’s over-approximated control-flow graph, effectively balancing rich semantics with performance. Additionally, to address the scarcity of attack data, our framework incorporates a tailored negative sampling strategy, enhancing the model’s robustness. We evaluated SysAlign on real-world applications, including Nginx, NullHttpd, cURL, and SQLite3. The results demonstrate that our method effectively detects a diverse range of malicious system call behaviors, including those resulting from control-flow hijacking and data-only exploits. Our approach achieves an F1-score exceeding 96% with a performance overhead below 7%. This work presents a practical and effective advancement in system call security, significantly outperforming existing techniques.

  • SlotITD: Insider Threat Detection Method Using Slot-Based Heterogeneous Graph Neural Network

    by Chen Zhang, Yinhao Qi, Yan Zhu, Bo Jiang, Zhigang Lu, Tao Guo

  • ATHITD: Attention-based temporal heterogeneous graph neural network for insider threat detection

    by Yinhao Qi, Chuyi Yan, Zehui Wang, Chen Zhang, Song Liu, Zhigang Lu, Bo Jiang


  • Open Access

    PathWatcher: A path-based behavior detection method for attack detection and investigation

    by Zehui Wang, Hao Li, Yinhao Qi, Wei Qiao, Song Liu, Chen Zhang, Bo Jiang, Zhigang Lu