Tianrui Qin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Tianrui Qin has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cheng-Zhong Xu
State Key Laboratory of IoTSC, University of Macau, Macau, Macao
2 shared publications - Kejiang Ye
Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications - Xitong Gao
Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications - Xuan Wang
Anhui Key Lab of CSSAE, National University of Defense Technology, Hefei, China
2 shared publications - Juanjuan Zhao
Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication - Xianghuan He
University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery From Data
- Vol. 20 (1) , 1-23
Flareon: Stealthy All2all Backdoor Injection via Poisoned Augmentation
Open source software supply-chain attacks, once successful, can exact heavy costs in mission-critical applications. As open source ecosystems for deep learning flourish and become increasingly universal, they present attackers previously unexplored avenues to code-inject malicious backdoors in deep neural network models. This article proposes Flareon , a small, stealthy, seemingly harmless code modification that specifically targets the data augmentation pipeline with motion-based triggers. Flareon neither alters ground-truth labels, nor modifies the training loss objective, nor does it assume prior knowledge of the victim model architecture, training data, and training hyperparameters. Yet, it has a surprisingly large ramification on training—models trained under Flareon learn powerful target-conditioned (or “ all2all ”) backdoors. We also proposed a learnable variant of Flareon that is even stealthier in terms of added perturbations. The resulting models can exhibit high attack success rates for any target choices and better clean accuracies than backdoor attacks that not only seize greater control but also assume more restrictive attack capabilities. We also demonstrate the resilience of Flareon against a wide range of defenses. Flareon is fully open source and available online to the deep learning community.
- 8 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery From Data
- Vol. 20 (1) , 1-23
Open AccessFlareon: Stealthy All2all Backdoor Injection via Poisoned Augmentation
Open source software supply-chain attacks, once successful, can exact heavy costs in mission-critical applications. As open source ecosystems for deep learning flourish and become increasingly universal, they present attackers previously unexplored avenues to code-inject malicious backdoors in deep neural network models. This article proposes Flareon , a small, stealthy, seemingly harmless code modification that specifically targets the data augmentation pipeline with motion-based triggers. Flareon neither alters ground-truth labels, nor modifies the training loss objective, nor does it assume prior knowledge of the victim model architecture, training data, and training hyperparameters. Yet, it has a surprisingly large ramification on training—models trained under Flareon learn powerful target-conditioned (or “ all2all ”) backdoors. We also proposed a learnable variant of Flareon that is even stealthier in terms of added perturbations. The resulting models can exhibit high attack success rates for any target choices and better clean accuracies than backdoor attacks that not only seize greater control but also assume more restrictive attack capabilities. We also demonstrate the resilience of Flareon against a wide range of defenses. Flareon is fully open source and available online to the deep learning community.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1118-1127
On the Adversarial Robustness of Visual-Language Chat Models
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1118-1127
Open AccessOn the Adversarial Robustness of Visual-Language Chat Models