Pedro Jara-Moroni
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Pedro Jara-Moroni has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gonzalo Méndez-Vogel
Department of Engineering Sciences, Universidad Andres Bello, Autop. Concepción - Talcahuano 7100, Concepción, Chile
2 shared publications - Eduardo Zúñiga-Leyton
School of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering and Sciences, Diego Portales University, Santiago, Chile
1 shared publication Jorge Zamorano
1 shared publication- Jorge Zamorano
Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Universidad de Santiago de Chile (USACH), Santiago 9170124, Chile
1 shared publication - Leonardo J. Basso
Industrial Engineering Department, Universidad de Chile, Chile
1 shared publication - Rabah Amir
Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 348-366
Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 348-366
Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry
- 22 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Waste Management
- Vol. 213, 115360
Overflow-aware recycling bin location with random utilities: A case study of the commune of Estación Central, Chile
- 22 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Waste Management
- Vol. 213, 115360
Overflow-aware recycling bin location with random utilities: A case study of the commune of Estación Central, Chile
- 27 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Operations Research
- Vol. 185
Maximum capture location problem with random utilities and overflow penalties
- 27 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Operations Research
- Vol. 185
Maximum capture location problem with random utilities and overflow penalties
- 6 July 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (4)
The Role of Endogenous Timing in Public Goods Provision and Its Implications for Welfare
This article analyzes the provision of public goods in a two‐player game setting, employing the Game with Observable Delay (GOD) framework to investigate how endogenous timing influences contribution strategies and welfare outcomes. Our analysis shows that, for both symmetric and asymmetric valuation cases, the endogenous timing outcome leads to simultaneous play. This result arises from players' strong aversion to the follower position, driven by the leader's free‐riding incentives. The outcome is good for welfare, since in both the symmetric and asymmetric cases, simultaneous play leads to greater total contributions compared to the sequential equilibrium. If the framework for contributions was of the Game with Action Commitment type, the outcome would be simultaneous, leading to an inferior welfare result. These findings indicate that fostering environments with a structure akin to the GOD could strategically encourage players to maximize their contributions and improve welfare outcomes in public goods scenarios.
- 6 July 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (4)
The Role of Endogenous Timing in Public Goods Provision and Its Implications for Welfare
This article analyzes the provision of public goods in a two‐player game setting, employing the Game with Observable Delay (GOD) framework to investigate how endogenous timing influences contribution strategies and welfare outcomes. Our analysis shows that, for both symmetric and asymmetric valuation cases, the endogenous timing outcome leads to simultaneous play. This result arises from players' strong aversion to the follower position, driven by the leader's free‐riding incentives. The outcome is good for welfare, since in both the symmetric and asymmetric cases, simultaneous play leads to greater total contributions compared to the sequential equilibrium. If the framework for contributions was of the Game with Action Commitment type, the outcome would be simultaneous, leading to an inferior welfare result. These findings indicate that fostering environments with a structure akin to the GOD could strategically encourage players to maximize their contributions and improve welfare outcomes in public goods scenarios.