Lijun Cai
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lijun Cai has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aimin Yu
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Lixin Zhao
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
2 shared publications Dan Meng
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication- Dan Meng
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Huan Zhang
Institute of Information Engineering at Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Tao Leng
Intelligent Policing Key Laboratory of Sichuan Province, Sichuan Police College, Luzhou, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 29 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 1957-1972
DriftTrace: Combating Concept Drift in Security Applications Through Detection and Explanation
Concept drift refers to the deviation in data distribution over time, driven by dynamic changes in attackers or environments. This phenomenon poses a significant challenge for deploying machine learning models in cybersecurity. Existing approaches rely heavily on frequent retraining or distribution-level analyses, which are costly, labor-intensive, and often lack interpretability. To address these limitations, we propose DriftTrace, a novel system designed to detect, explain, and adapt to concept drift in security applications. Through comprehensive analysis, we uncover associations, consistencies, and diversities in security application features. Inspired by these findings, we detect drift at the sample level using a contrastive learning-based autoencoder, enabling fine-grained detection without requiring extensive labeling. For explanation, we employ a greedy feature selection strategy that links detection decisions to semantically relevant input features. To address data imbalance during adaptation, DriftTrace leverages sample interpolation techniques. We evaluate DriftTrace on Android malware datasets (Drebin and MalDroid2020) and a network intrusion dataset (IDS2018). Our system achieves an average detection F1 score of more than 0.94, which is superior to the advanced baseline TRANSCENDENT, and improves the explanation fidelity by an average of 76% compared with CADE. These results highlight the practicality of DriftTrace for security scenarios.
- 29 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 1957-1972
DriftTrace: Combating Concept Drift in Security Applications Through Detection and Explanation
Concept drift refers to the deviation in data distribution over time, driven by dynamic changes in attackers or environments. This phenomenon poses a significant challenge for deploying machine learning models in cybersecurity. Existing approaches rely heavily on frequent retraining or distribution-level analyses, which are costly, labor-intensive, and often lack interpretability. To address these limitations, we propose DriftTrace, a novel system designed to detect, explain, and adapt to concept drift in security applications. Through comprehensive analysis, we uncover associations, consistencies, and diversities in security application features. Inspired by these findings, we detect drift at the sample level using a contrastive learning-based autoencoder, enabling fine-grained detection without requiring extensive labeling. For explanation, we employ a greedy feature selection strategy that links detection decisions to semantically relevant input features. To address data imbalance during adaptation, DriftTrace leverages sample interpolation techniques. We evaluate DriftTrace on Android malware datasets (Drebin and MalDroid2020) and a network intrusion dataset (IDS2018). Our system achieves an average detection F1 score of more than 0.94, which is superior to the advanced baseline TRANSCENDENT, and improves the explanation fidelity by an average of 76% compared with CADE. These results highlight the practicality of DriftTrace for security scenarios.
- Open Access
- 22 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 2 (ISSTA) , 1280-1302
Pepper: Preference-Aware Active Trapping for Ransomware
Ransomware encrypts files on infected systems and demands a hefty ransom for decryption, posing a significant threat to both enterprises and individuals. However, existing methods fail to capture the encryption preferences of diverse ransomware families, lacking an efficient and systematic proactive defense method. In this paper, we propose Pepper , a preference-aware active ransomware trapping method, covering decoy file generation, deployment, and monitoring. Through examination of numerous ransomware families, we have identified two prevalent encryption preferences: encryption file preferences and encryption path preferences. Deploying decoy files aligned with ransomware’s encryption preferences within its preferred pathways provides an opportunity for efficient and early trapping of ransomware. Pepper combines a GNN-based recommendation model with expert insights to unveil the encryption file and path preferences across various ransomware families, guiding the generation and deployment of decoy files. Moreover, a decoy file monitor is designed to continuously monitor decoy file changes and promptly respond to anomalies. Extensive experiments show that Pepper achieves a 98.68% detection rate for ransomware, with an average file loss of 2.27. Moreover, it exhibits robustness in detecting unknown ransomware variants and does not interfere with regular users.
- 22 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 2 (ISSTA) , 1280-1302
Open AccessPepper: Preference-Aware Active Trapping for Ransomware
Ransomware encrypts files on infected systems and demands a hefty ransom for decryption, posing a significant threat to both enterprises and individuals. However, existing methods fail to capture the encryption preferences of diverse ransomware families, lacking an efficient and systematic proactive defense method. In this paper, we propose Pepper , a preference-aware active ransomware trapping method, covering decoy file generation, deployment, and monitoring. Through examination of numerous ransomware families, we have identified two prevalent encryption preferences: encryption file preferences and encryption path preferences. Deploying decoy files aligned with ransomware’s encryption preferences within its preferred pathways provides an opportunity for efficient and early trapping of ransomware. Pepper combines a GNN-based recommendation model with expert insights to unveil the encryption file and path preferences across various ransomware families, guiding the generation and deployment of decoy files. Moreover, a decoy file monitor is designed to continuously monitor decoy file changes and promptly respond to anomalies. Extensive experiments show that Pepper achieves a 98.68% detection rate for ransomware, with an average file loss of 2.27. Moreover, it exhibits robustness in detecting unknown ransomware variants and does not interfere with regular users.