Rohini Haridas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Rohini Haridas has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chenghong Gu
University of Bath
2 shared publications - Rohit Bhakar
Department of Electrical Engineering, Malaviya National Institute of Technology Jaipur, Jaipur, India
2 shared publications - Satish Sharma
Department of Electrical Engineering, Malaviya National Institute of Technology Jaipur, Jaipur, India
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems
- Vol. 3, 454-463
A Novel Integrated Load Redistribution Attack Model to Induce Cascading Failures in Cyber Physical Systems
Load Redistribution (LR) attacks pose a significant threat to the reliability and security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), particularly in critical infrastructures such as power system, potentially triggering cascading failures. Accurate modeling is essential for a comprehensive understanding of these attacks and their consequences. Existing models for these attacks typically handle critical line identification and exploitation as separate tasks. This segregated approach might overlook power flow changes during an attack and post-contingency phase, possibly affecting the accurate identification of vulnerable lines. To overcome this limitation, this paper introduces a new integrated LR attack model. This model handles critical line identification and exploitation simultaneously, considering power flow changes during and after the attack. This approach aids in the accurate identification of the critical line that could cause a cascading failure. The findings presented in this study, particularly from an attacker's perspective, could significantly contribute to the development of robust and secure CPS. The proposed model is validated using the modified IEEE 14 and IEEE 57 bus system, demonstrating its ability to induce overloads on multiple lines by targeting a single critical line, leading to a cascading failure
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems
- Vol. 3, 454-463
A Novel Integrated Load Redistribution Attack Model to Induce Cascading Failures in Cyber Physical Systems
Load Redistribution (LR) attacks pose a significant threat to the reliability and security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), particularly in critical infrastructures such as power system, potentially triggering cascading failures. Accurate modeling is essential for a comprehensive understanding of these attacks and their consequences. Existing models for these attacks typically handle critical line identification and exploitation as separate tasks. This segregated approach might overlook power flow changes during an attack and post-contingency phase, possibly affecting the accurate identification of vulnerable lines. To overcome this limitation, this paper introduces a new integrated LR attack model. This model handles critical line identification and exploitation simultaneously, considering power flow changes during and after the attack. This approach aids in the accurate identification of the critical line that could cause a cascading failure. The findings presented in this study, particularly from an attacker's perspective, could significantly contribute to the development of robust and secure CPS. The proposed model is validated using the modified IEEE 14 and IEEE 57 bus system, demonstrating its ability to induce overloads on multiple lines by targeting a single critical line, leading to a cascading failure
- 9 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Systems Journal
- Vol. 19 (2) , 712-715
Enhancing the Stealth of Load Redistribution Attacks: A Novel Cluster-Driven Approach
This letter proposes a novel cluster-driven bilevel Load Redistribution (LR) attack model in cyber physical power systems. The main goal is on overloading multiple transmission lines while maintaining a high level of stealth. The proposed model employs cluster-based approach to form distinct clusters, each representing different load patterns within the power system. This enables the design of attack vectors that seamlessly blend with these load patterns, thereby challenging advanced anomaly detection systems. The stealth of the attack is quantified by the Stealth Distance Index (SDI), ensuring that injected false data remain within the maximum permissible distance from the centroid of its corresponding cluster. The proposed model is validated on the modified IEEE 14-bus and 30-bus systems, demonstrating enhanced stealth capabilities in LR attacks.
- 9 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Systems Journal
- Vol. 19 (2) , 712-715
Enhancing the Stealth of Load Redistribution Attacks: A Novel Cluster-Driven Approach
This letter proposes a novel cluster-driven bilevel Load Redistribution (LR) attack model in cyber physical power systems. The main goal is on overloading multiple transmission lines while maintaining a high level of stealth. The proposed model employs cluster-based approach to form distinct clusters, each representing different load patterns within the power system. This enables the design of attack vectors that seamlessly blend with these load patterns, thereby challenging advanced anomaly detection systems. The stealth of the attack is quantified by the Stealth Distance Index (SDI), ensuring that injected false data remain within the maximum permissible distance from the centroid of its corresponding cluster. The proposed model is validated on the modified IEEE 14-bus and 30-bus systems, demonstrating enhanced stealth capabilities in LR attacks.