Sophie Moinas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Sophie Moinas has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Bruno Biais
3 shared publicationsSebastien Pouget
2 shared publicationsThierry Foucault
HEC Paris - Finance Department
2 shared publicationsThomas Mariotti
2 shared publications- Difang Huang
Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
1 shared publication - Erik Theissen
Mannheim Business School, Finance Area, Chair of Finance, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Fragile Hands: Bondholders' Portfolios and the Transmission of Monetary Policy to Credit Markets
How does the composition of a firm's creditor base affect the transmission of monetary policy to credit markets? Using bond-level institutional holdings matched to CDS data over 2001-2019, we show that CDS spreads respond more to high-frequency monetary policy surprises when bonds are held by investors whose portfolios are concentrated in low-rated or long-duration securities, consistent with binding portfolio constraints that force rebalancing. Mutual fund ownership no longer amplifies shocks once bondholders' portfolio exposures and trading intensity are controlled for. Ownership concentration dampens transmission only when large holders are constrained. Bondholders' balance sheets, not institutional labels, shape monetary transmission.
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFragile Hands: Bondholders' Portfolios and the Transmission of Monetary Policy to Credit Markets
How does the composition of a firm's creditor base affect the transmission of monetary policy to credit markets? Using bond-level institutional holdings matched to CDS data over 2001-2019, we show that CDS spreads respond more to high-frequency monetary policy surprises when bonds are held by investors whose portfolios are concentrated in low-rated or long-duration securities, consistent with binding portfolio constraints that force rebalancing. Mutual fund ownership no longer amplifies shocks once bondholders' portfolio exposures and trading intensity are controlled for. Ownership concentration dampens transmission only when large holders are constrained. Bondholders' balance sheets, not institutional labels, shape monetary transmission.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Asset Pricing and Risk Sharing in Complete Markets: An Experimental Investigation
We study asset pricing and risk sharing in experimental financial markets designed to test rational choice and competitive behavior in complete markets. We find that participants behave competitively but deviate from rationality: approximately 25% of their actions are first-order stochastically dominated. To interpret these experimental findings, we propose a random-choice model predicting that market-clearing prices and average trades should converge to those in the rational-choice competitive equilibrium as market size grows. Our experimental data support this convergence prediction. A structural estimation under CRRA utilities and logit choice probabilities reveals that approximately 20% of participants would have obtained higher expected utility in autarky, suggesting that bounded rationality can make market participation welfarereducing for a significant minority.
- 10 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAsset Pricing and Risk Sharing in Complete Markets: An Experimental Investigation
We study asset pricing and risk sharing in experimental financial markets designed to test rational choice and competitive behavior in complete markets. We find that participants behave competitively but deviate from rationality: approximately 25% of their actions are first-order stochastically dominated. To interpret these experimental findings, we propose a random-choice model predicting that market-clearing prices and average trades should converge to those in the rational-choice competitive equilibrium as market size grows. Our experimental data support this convergence prediction. A structural estimation under CRRA utilities and logit choice probabilities reveals that approximately 20% of participants would have obtained higher expected utility in autarky, suggesting that bounded rationality can make market participation welfarereducing for a significant minority.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (3) , 2656-2679
Click First or Last? Strategic Order Submission During the Euronext Preopening Session
We examine traders’ order submission strategies during the Euronext preopen, which uses price-time priorities to arrange opening trades via a call auction. Preopening order submissions follow a J-shape pattern. Sophisticated proprietary traders arrive late, consistent with information leakage concerns. Slow clients arrive early and place aggressive orders to advertise their trading needs and strategically gain time priority. Their early order submissions often occur in stocks with an increase in the tick size and on days with expected liquidity shocks. They also contribute to daily price discovery. Using a preopening outage as a natural experiment, we show that the Euronext preopen improves price discovery on a rival venue. These benefits hold even in the absence of an opening auction taking place. This paper was accepted by Lin William Cong, finance. Funding: Financial support from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grants ANR-16-CE26-0008, ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d’Avenir program)]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03998 .
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (3) , 2656-2679
Click First or Last? Strategic Order Submission During the Euronext Preopening Session
We examine traders’ order submission strategies during the Euronext preopen, which uses price-time priorities to arrange opening trades via a call auction. Preopening order submissions follow a J-shape pattern. Sophisticated proprietary traders arrive late, consistent with information leakage concerns. Slow clients arrive early and place aggressive orders to advertise their trading needs and strategically gain time priority. Their early order submissions often occur in stocks with an increase in the tick size and on days with expected liquidity shocks. They also contribute to daily price discovery. Using a preopening outage as a natural experiment, we show that the Euronext preopen improves price discovery on a rival venue. These benefits hold even in the absence of an opening auction taking place. This paper was accepted by Lin William Cong, finance. Funding: Financial support from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grants ANR-16-CE26-0008, ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d’Avenir program)]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03998 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Asset Pricing and Risk Sharing in Complete Markets: An Experimental Investigation
We study asset pricing and risk sharing in experimental financial markets designed to test rational choice and competitive behavior in complete markets. Participants behave competitively but deviate from rationality: approximately 25% of actions are first-order stochastically dominated. We propose a random-choice model predicting that market-clearing prices and average trades converge to the rational-choice competitive equilibrium as market size grows. Our experimental data support this convergence prediction. Structural estimation with CRRA utilities and logit choice probabilities reveals that approximately 20% of participants would have higher expected utility in autarky, suggesting bounded rationality can make market participation welfare-reducing for a significant minority.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAsset Pricing and Risk Sharing in Complete Markets: An Experimental Investigation
We study asset pricing and risk sharing in experimental financial markets designed to test rational choice and competitive behavior in complete markets. Participants behave competitively but deviate from rationality: approximately 25% of actions are first-order stochastically dominated. We propose a random-choice model predicting that market-clearing prices and average trades converge to the rational-choice competitive equilibrium as market size grows. Our experimental data support this convergence prediction. Structural estimation with CRRA utilities and logit choice probabilities reveals that approximately 20% of participants would have higher expected utility in autarky, suggesting bounded rationality can make market participation welfare-reducing for a significant minority.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Funding Constraints and Market Liquidity in the European Treasury Bond Market
Theoretical studies show that shocks to funding constraints should affect and be affected by market illiquidity. However, little is known about the empirical magnitude of such responses because of the intrinsic endogeneity of illiquidity shocks. This paper adopts an identification technique based on the heteroskedasticity of illiquidity proxies to infer the reaction of one measure to shocks affecting the other in a joint setting. Using data for the European Treasury bond market, we find evidence of a two-way response occurring between funding and market illiquidity shocks. In the cross-section, we show that individual bonds' illiquidity responses to funding or market illiquidity shocks vary with with bond maturity, the credit risk of the issuer, haircuts, and the number of bonds issued by the country.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFunding Constraints and Market Liquidity in the European Treasury Bond Market
Theoretical studies show that shocks to funding constraints should affect and be affected by market illiquidity. However, little is known about the empirical magnitude of such responses because of the intrinsic endogeneity of illiquidity shocks. This paper adopts an identification technique based on the heteroskedasticity of illiquidity proxies to infer the reaction of one measure to shocks affecting the other in a joint setting. Using data for the European Treasury bond market, we find evidence of a two-way response occurring between funding and market illiquidity shocks. In the cross-section, we show that individual bonds' illiquidity responses to funding or market illiquidity shocks vary with with bond maturity, the credit risk of the issuer, haircuts, and the number of bonds issued by the country.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Liquidity Supply Across Multiple Trading Venues
Market fragmentation and technology have given rise to new trading strategies. One of them is to supply liquidity simultaneously across multiple trading venues,
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLiquidity Supply Across Multiple Trading Venues
Market fragmentation and technology have given rise to new trading strategies. One of them is to supply liquidity simultaneously across multiple trading venues,
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Equilibrium High-Frequency Trading
High-speed market connections and information processing improve the ability to seize trading opportunities, raising gains from trade. They also enable fast traders to process information before slow traders, generating adverse selection, and thus negative externalities. When investing in fast-trading technologies, institutions do not internalize these externalities. Accordingly, they overinvest in equilibrium. Completely banning fast trading is dominated by offering two platforms: one accepting fast traders, the other banning them. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by having i) a single platform on which fast and slow traders coexist and ii) Pigovian taxes on investment in the fast-trading technology.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEquilibrium High-Frequency Trading
High-speed market connections and information processing improve the ability to seize trading opportunities, raising gains from trade. They also enable fast traders to process information before slow traders, generating adverse selection, and thus negative externalities. When investing in fast-trading technologies, institutions do not internalize these externalities. Accordingly, they overinvest in equilibrium. Completely banning fast trading is dominated by offering two platforms: one accepting fast traders, the other banning them. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by having i) a single platform on which fast and slow traders coexist and ii) Pigovian taxes on investment in the fast-trading technology.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Hidden Limit Orders and Liquidity in Limit Order Markets
Many limit order markets allow limit order traders to submit "hidden" orders (also called "iceberg" or "undisclosed" orders). Liquidity suppliers thus have the possibility to post a quote and either display none or only a fraction of their order's quantity to the market. Some recent empirical studies show that such orders represent a large proportion of the market liquidity. These orders are indeed supposed to limit the liquidity suppliers' risk of adverse selection and information disclosure. However, these orders could also be used by informed agents to trade a large volume without disseminating their private information. In this paper, we propose a theoretical sequential and discrete model of trading in a limit order book to investigate the\ impact of hidden orders on market performance and agents' welfare, when a limit order trader possesses a private information on the realization of the value of the security with some probability. We show that submitting hidden orders may indeed be part of the informed agent's equilibrium camouflage strategy. However, counter-intuitively, the informed agent may be better off in the transparent market. The move to an opaque market indeed increases the total depth at the best quotes in the limit order book, but decreases the visible depth. Thus it becomes more difficult, for the informed agent, to get a large transaction volume in this market while replicating the behavior of an uninformed limit order trader. We show that this effect can counterbalance what she earns by submitting hidden orders. Conversely, the Bayesian and strategic uninformed market order trader beneficiates from a larger liquidity supply in the opaque market.
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHidden Limit Orders and Liquidity in Limit Order Markets
Many limit order markets allow limit order traders to submit "hidden" orders (also called "iceberg" or "undisclosed" orders). Liquidity suppliers thus have the possibility to post a quote and either display none or only a fraction of their order's quantity to the market. Some recent empirical studies show that such orders represent a large proportion of the market liquidity. These orders are indeed supposed to limit the liquidity suppliers' risk of adverse selection and information disclosure. However, these orders could also be used by informed agents to trade a large volume without disseminating their private information. In this paper, we propose a theoretical sequential and discrete model of trading in a limit order book to investigate the\ impact of hidden orders on market performance and agents' welfare, when a limit order trader possesses a private information on the realization of the value of the security with some probability. We show that submitting hidden orders may indeed be part of the informed agent's equilibrium camouflage strategy. However, counter-intuitively, the informed agent may be better off in the transparent market. The move to an opaque market indeed increases the total depth at the best quotes in the limit order book, but decreases the visible depth. Thus it becomes more difficult, for the informed agent, to get a large transaction volume in this market while replicating the behavior of an uninformed limit order trader. We show that this effect can counterbalance what she earns by submitting hidden orders. Conversely, the Bayesian and strategic uninformed market order trader beneficiates from a larger liquidity supply in the opaque market.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets?
We analyze the effect of concealing limit order traders' identities on market liquidity. First we develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric i
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets?
We analyze the effect of concealing limit order traders' identities on market liquidity. First we develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric i