Da He
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Da He has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Song Lin
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Marketing; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST); Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
1 shared publication- Song Lin
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 45 (3) , 515-533
Price Caps by Matching Platforms: The Case of Ticket Resales
This study examines ticket resale platforms’ voluntary price caps, analyzing their adoption incentives and effects on prices, sales, profitability, and welfare.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 45 (3) , 515-533
Price Caps by Matching Platforms: The Case of Ticket Resales
This study examines ticket resale platforms’ voluntary price caps, analyzing their adoption incentives and effects on prices, sales, profitability, and welfare.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Price Caps by Matching Platforms: The Case of Ticket Resales
In recent years, a growing number of ticket resale platforms have imposed price caps on ticket trading. This practice has been perceived to protect consumer welfare, at the expense of less platform profit. However, we show that this self-regulation can counter-intuitively hurt consumers while benefiting ticket trading platforms, even if consumers are fully rational and unconcerned with price fairness. We demonstrate how this result may arise in a matching model of sellers and buyers. Sellers have a limited supply of tickets and are heterogeneous in their willingness to sell on a platform. The platform collects a royalty fee from every transaction but can impose a cap on the transaction price. We show that a stringent price cap may drive those sellers who would otherwise charge a high price out of the market, thereby reducing the competition on the seller side. As a result, the average transaction price may turn out to be higher than that in a market with no price restriction. We discuss the relevant managerial and policy implications.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPrice Caps by Matching Platforms: The Case of Ticket Resales
In recent years, a growing number of ticket resale platforms have imposed price caps on ticket trading. This practice has been perceived to protect consumer welfare, at the expense of less platform profit. However, we show that this self-regulation can counter-intuitively hurt consumers while benefiting ticket trading platforms, even if consumers are fully rational and unconcerned with price fairness. We demonstrate how this result may arise in a matching model of sellers and buyers. Sellers have a limited supply of tickets and are heterogeneous in their willingness to sell on a platform. The platform collects a royalty fee from every transaction but can impose a cap on the transaction price. We show that a stringent price cap may drive those sellers who would otherwise charge a high price out of the market, thereby reducing the competition on the seller side. As a result, the average transaction price may turn out to be higher than that in a market with no price restriction. We discuss the relevant managerial and policy implications.