Mohamed ElGhamrawy
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mohamed ElGhamrawy has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Christine Van Vredendaal
NXP Semiconductors, Hamburg, Germany
1 shared publicationJoost Renes
NXP Semiconductors, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
1 shared publicationMarkus Schönauer
NXP Semiconductors, Gratkorn, Austria
1 shared publicationMelissa Azouaoui
NXP Semiconductors, Hamburg, Germany
1 shared publicationOkan Seker
NXP Semiconductors, Hamburg, Germany
1 shared publicationOlivier Bronchain
NXP Semiconductors, Leuven, Belgium
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- p. 262-286
From MLWE to RLWE: A Differential Fault Attack on Randomized & Deterministic Dilithium
The post-quantum digital signature scheme CRYSTALS-Dilithium has been recently selected by the NIST for standardization. Implementing CRYSTALSDilithium, and other post-quantum cryptography schemes, on embedded devices raises a new set of challenges, including ones related to performance in terms of speed and memory requirements, but also related to side-channel and fault injection attacks security. In this work, we investigated the latter and describe a differential fault attack on the randomized and deterministic versions of CRYSTALS-Dilithium. Notably, the attack requires a few instructions skips and is able to reduce the MLWE problem that Dilithium is based on to a smaller RLWE problem which can be practically solved with lattice reduction techniques. Accordingly, we demonstrated key recoveries using hints extracted on the secret keys from the same faulted signatures using the LWE with side-information framework introduced by Dachman-Soled et al. at CRYPTO’20. As a final contribution, we proposed algorithmic countermeasures against this attack and in particular showed that the second one can be parameterized to only induce a negligible overhead over the signature generation.
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- p. 262-286
Open AccessFrom MLWE to RLWE: A Differential Fault Attack on Randomized & Deterministic Dilithium
The post-quantum digital signature scheme CRYSTALS-Dilithium has been recently selected by the NIST for standardization. Implementing CRYSTALSDilithium, and other post-quantum cryptography schemes, on embedded devices raises a new set of challenges, including ones related to performance in terms of speed and memory requirements, but also related to side-channel and fault injection attacks security. In this work, we investigated the latter and describe a differential fault attack on the randomized and deterministic versions of CRYSTALS-Dilithium. Notably, the attack requires a few instructions skips and is able to reduce the MLWE problem that Dilithium is based on to a smaller RLWE problem which can be practically solved with lattice reduction techniques. Accordingly, we demonstrated key recoveries using hints extracted on the secret keys from the same faulted signatures using the LWE with side-information framework introduced by Dachman-Soled et al. at CRYPTO’20. As a final contribution, we proposed algorithmic countermeasures against this attack and in particular showed that the second one can be parameterized to only induce a negligible overhead over the signature generation.