JLJhury Kevin Lastre

Jhury Kevin Lastre

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jhury Kevin Lastre has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Closing the HNDL Window in Consumer eSIM Provisioning: Hybrid Post-Quantum Migration, Formal Verification, and Deployment Constraints on eUICC Silicon

    by Jhury Kevin Lastre, Yongho Ko, Hoseok Kwon, Ilsun You

    Embedded Subscriber Identity Modules (eSIMs) enable consumer devices to install mobile subscriptions remotely under the GSMA SGP.22 standard for Remote SIM Provisioning (RSP). Because RSP sessions rely on classical elliptic-curve cryptography and eSIM profiles can remain active for 5 to 20 years, recorded provisioning traffic faces a concrete Harvest-Now–Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat. Upgrading the network transport to post-quantum Transport Layer Security (TLS) is often assumed to be sufficient. However, SGP.22 exchanges the keys that protect the profile across the local host-to-chip interface, beneath the transport layer. This paper presents a systematic post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration framework for consumer RSP. We model four configurations of the SGP.22 on-card key-agreement step and determine, under a quantum key-recovery adversary, which configurations resist HNDL and what resources they require. We combine symbolic verification in ProVerif with a device-grounded evaluation that pairs provisioning and memory observations from a sysmocom C2T research embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC) with strict-instruction-set PQC measurements on an STM32 Nucleo-F446RE development board with an ARM Cortex-M4F core. Among the configurations studied, hybrid classical and post-quantum key exchange is the minimum configuration that resists HNDL, whereas a fully post-quantum configuration also protects authentication against signature forgery. Under the tested platform and resource assumptions, volatile Random Access Memory (RAM), rather than computation, is the binding deployment constraint. We therefore propose a capability-negotiation mechanism that would match a migration configuration to the memory advertised by each card.

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Revisiting the M2M remote SIM provisioning protocol: A comprehensive security and performance analysis

    by Yongho Ko, Jhury Kevin Lastre, Hoseok Kwon, Ilsun You


  • Open Access

    Towards 6G Roaming Security: Experimental Analysis of SUCI-Based DoS, Cost, and NF Stress

    by Taeho Won, Hoseok Kwon, Yongho Ko, Jhury Kevin Lastre, Ilsun You

    This study investigates performance overheads and security threats in 6th Generation Mobile Communication (6G) roaming environments, which are expected to enable services such as autonomous driving, smart cities, and remote healthcare that demand ultra-low latency and high reliability. To bridge the gap between standardization and real-world deployment, we built a realistic roaming testbed by separating the home and visited public land mobile networks (H-PLMN and V-PLMN) and simulating user equipment (UE) interactions. In this environment, we defined and measured roaming cost by comparing non-roaming and roaming procedures, and reproduced two Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI)-based denial-of-service (DoS) attacks: random generation and replay. Our experiments showed that intermediary functions such as the Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) and Service Communication Proxy (SCP) introduced CPU/memory overhead and latency, highlighting performance degradation unique to roaming. Moreover, random SUCI generation concentrated load on the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) in the H-PLMN, whereas replay attacks distributed it across both the H-PLMN and the V-PLMN, consistently identifying the AUSF as a bottleneck. These findings demonstrate that roaming enlarges the attack surface and exposes vulnerabilities not fully addressed in current standards. We conclude that secure and reliable 6G roaming requires multi-layered defense strategies with inter-operator cooperation, providing empirical evidence to guide standardization and operational practice.


  • Open Access

    Evaluating Transport Layer Security 1.3 Optimization Strategies for 5G Cross-Border Roaming: A Comprehensive Security and Performance Analysis

    by Jhury Kevin Lastre, Yongho Ko, Hoseok Kwon, Ilsun You

    Cross-border Fifth Generation Mobile Communication (5G) roaming requires secure N32 connections between network operators via Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) interfaces, but current Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 implementations face a critical trade-off between connection latency and security guarantees. Standard TLS 1.3 optimization modes either compromise Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) or suffer from replay vulnerabilities, while full handshakes impose excessive latency penalties for time-sensitive roaming services. This research introduces Zero Round Trip Time Forward Secrecy (0-RTT FS), a novel protocol extension that achieves zero round-trip performance while maintaining comprehensive security properties, including PFS and replay protection. Our solution addresses the fundamental limitation where existing TLS 1.3 optimizations sacrifice security for performance in international roaming scenarios. Through formal verification using ProVerif and comprehensive performance evaluation, we demonstrate that 0-RTT FS delivers 195.0 μs handshake latency (only 17% overhead compared to insecure 0-RTT) while providing full security guarantees that standard modes cannot achieve. Security analysis reveals critical replay vulnerabilities in all existing standard TLS 1.3 optimization modes, which our proposed approach successfully mitigates. The research provides operators with a decision framework for configuring sub-millisecond secure handshakes in next-generation roaming services, enabling both optimal performance and robust security for global 5G connectivity.


  • Open Access

    Enhancing Roaming Security in Cloud-Native 5G Core Network through Deep Learning-Based Intrusion Detection System

    by I Wayan Adi Juliawan Pawana, Vincent Abella, Jhury Kevin Lastre, Yongho Ko, Ilsun You

    Roaming in 5G networks enables seamless global mobility but also introduces significant security risks due to legacy protocol dependencies, uneven Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) deployment, and the dynamic nature of inter-Public Land Mobile Network (inter-PLMN) signaling. Traditional rule-based defenses are inadequate for protecting cloud-native 5G core networks, particularly as roaming expands into enterprise and Internet of Things (IoT) domains. This work addresses these challenges by designing a scalable 5G Standalone testbed, generating the first intrusion detection dataset specifically tailored to roaming threats, and proposing a deep learning based intrusion detection framework for cloud-native environments. Six deep learning models including Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), one-dimensional Convolutional Neural Network (1D CNN), Autoencoder (AE), Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU), and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) were evaluated on the dataset using both weighted and balanced metrics to account for strong class imbalance. While all models achieved over 99% accuracy, recurrent architectures such as GRU and LSTM outperformed others in balanced accuracy and macro-level evaluation, demonstrating superior effectiveness in detecting rare but high-impact attacks. These results confirm the importance of sequence-aware Artificial Intelligence (AI) models for securing roaming scenarios, where transient and context-dependent threats are common. The proposed framework provides a foundation for intelligent, adaptive intrusion detection in 5G and offers a path toward resilient security in Beyond 5G and 6G networks.