Vincent Heddesheimer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Vincent Heddesheimer has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hanno Hilbig
University of California, Davis, Department of Political Science, Davis, USA
2 shared publications - Andreas Wiedemann
Princeton University
1 shared publication - Erik Voeten
Georgetown University
1 shared publication - Rafaela Dancygier
Princeton University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Housing Populism Under Financialized Capitalism
This paper examines the rise of housing populism: narratives casting financial investors as predatory and policies demanding investor bans. We argue that housing populism is politically appealing less because it reflects economic realities than because it resonates with public moral commitments: distrust of financialized capitalism and support for housing as a collective entitlement. Drawing on two decades of property-level transaction data, we demonstrate that institutional investors account for a very small share of housing transactions and have limited effects on housing costs. Original surveys reveal, however, that voters overestimate investor activity, believe that investors undermine the right to housing, and demand that the government safeguards access. Experimental evidence shows that politicians advocating investor bans via rights-based or anti-predatory frames substantially outperform those prioritizing home-building through pragmatic or market-oriented appeals. Housing populism channels social-rights claims into symbolic confrontations between ``the people'' and financial elites, often displacing more effective policy responses.
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessHousing Populism Under Financialized Capitalism
This paper examines the rise of housing populism: narratives casting financial investors as predatory and policies demanding investor bans. We argue that housing populism is politically appealing less because it reflects economic realities than because it resonates with public moral commitments: distrust of financialized capitalism and support for housing as a collective entitlement. Drawing on two decades of property-level transaction data, we demonstrate that institutional investors account for a very small share of housing transactions and have limited effects on housing costs. Original surveys reveal, however, that voters overestimate investor activity, believe that investors undermine the right to housing, and demand that the government safeguards access. Experimental evidence shows that politicians advocating investor bans via rights-based or anti-predatory frames substantially outperform those prioritizing home-building through pragmatic or market-oriented appeals. Housing populism channels social-rights claims into symbolic confrontations between ``the people'' and financial elites, often displacing more effective policy responses.
- Open Access
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Long-run political change after the Great Recession
What are the long-run political consequences of economic crises? We study the Great Recession in the United States, exploiting geographic variation in unemployment shocks. Harder-hit counties shifted toward Democratic candidates. House gains persisted through 2022, after the shock's employment effects had dissipated, while presidential gains attenuated after 2016. House gains did not track local recovery or Republican incumbency, which weighs against simple retrospective voting accounts. Harder-hit places also showed no shift toward right-wing populist candidates or movements. Instead, survey and ballot measure evidence points to economic scarring and demand for protection: residents of harder-hit places remained pessimistic about their economic prospects, even as personal finances recovered, and became more supportive of social protection. Taken together, the findings suggest that a crisis can durably reshape what affected communities demand from government after acute local labor market distress has subsided.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessLong-run political change after the Great Recession
What are the long-run political consequences of economic crises? We study the Great Recession in the United States, exploiting geographic variation in unemployment shocks. Harder-hit counties shifted toward Democratic candidates. House gains persisted through 2022, after the shock's employment effects had dissipated, while presidential gains attenuated after 2016. House gains did not track local recovery or Republican incumbency, which weighs against simple retrospective voting accounts. Harder-hit places also showed no shift toward right-wing populist candidates or movements. Instead, survey and ballot measure evidence points to economic scarring and demand for protection: residents of harder-hit places remained pessimistic about their economic prospects, even as personal finances recovered, and became more supportive of social protection. Taken together, the findings suggest that a crisis can durably reshape what affected communities demand from government after acute local labor market distress has subsided.
- Open Access
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- p. 1-23
The Green Transition and Political Polarization Along Occupational Lines
Green transition policies set long-term targets to reduce carbon emissions and other pollutants, posing a threat to workers in polluting occupations and communities reliant on them. Can far-right parties attract voters who anticipate losing from the green transition? We explore this in Germany, which has ambitious green policies and a large workforce in polluting occupations. The far-right AfD started campaigning as the only party opposing green transition policies in 2016. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show AfD support increased more in counties with larger shares of employment in polluting occupations once the AfD adopted an anti-green platform in 2016. A panel survey demonstrates that individuals in these occupations also shifted toward the AfD. Probing mechanisms, we find that far-right support may stem from shifting perceptions of social stigma and lower status. Our results highlight the need for a new research agenda on backlash against the normative dimension of the green transition.
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- p. 1-23
Open AccessThe Green Transition and Political Polarization Along Occupational Lines
Green transition policies set long-term targets to reduce carbon emissions and other pollutants, posing a threat to workers in polluting occupations and communities reliant on them. Can far-right parties attract voters who anticipate losing from the green transition? We explore this in Germany, which has ambitious green policies and a large workforce in polluting occupations. The far-right AfD started campaigning as the only party opposing green transition policies in 2016. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show AfD support increased more in counties with larger shares of employment in polluting occupations once the AfD adopted an anti-green platform in 2016. A panel survey demonstrates that individuals in these occupations also shifted toward the AfD. Probing mechanisms, we find that far-right support may stem from shifting perceptions of social stigma and lower status. Our results highlight the need for a new research agenda on backlash against the normative dimension of the green transition.