YYYunhao Yu

Yunhao Yu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Yunhao Yu has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    STD: Sensor-Oriented Temporal Detector Against Multi-Type Load Redistribution Attacks in Smart Grid

    by Yunhao Yu, Boda Zhang, Mengxiang Liu, Xuguo Jiao

    The modern smart grid integrates information and communication technology (ICT) with electronic devices, but this integration introduces cybersecurity risks. Load measurements, crucial for grid operation, are vulnerable to attacks, particularly Load Redistribution Attacks (LRAs). LRAs maliciously alter load readings to mislead control systems without being detected by conventional methods. This paper first introduces two advanced LRA variants: a stealthy-enhanced LRA designed to bypass sophisticated data-driven detectors, and an impact-enhanced LRA engineered to cause significant operational disruptions, such as increased generation costs. To address these evolving threats, we propose a novel Sensor-oriented Temporal Detector (STD). Unlike existing methods that often rely on aggregate data or labeled attack examples, our STD focuses on the unique temporal patterns of individual sensor measurements. It achieves this by combining principal subspace projection to identify normal data subspaces with sequential change extraction to detect subtle deviations over time. This approach allows the STD to identify various LRA types effectively, even without prior knowledge of attack signatures. Extensive simulations validate the destructive impact of our proposed LRA variants and demonstrate the superior detection performance of the STD against these sophisticated attacks.

  • Open Access

    Topology Robustness of State Estimation Against False Data Injection and Network Parameter Attacks on Power Monitoring and Control Systems

    by Yunhao Yu, Yu Wang, Fuhua Luo, Meiling Dicha, Song Li, Zhenyong Zhang

    With the integration of information and communication systems, cyberattacks threaten the normal operation of the power grid. As a critical function, state estimation in the power monitoring and control system is an attractive target for attackers. There are two typical cyberattacks—false data injection attack (FDIA) and network parameter attack (NPA)—that produce incorrect state estimation results, threatening the control and operation of the power system. This paper introduces the first theoretical framework for analyzing the topology robustness of state estimation against FDIA, NPA, and coordinated FDIA+NPA, quantifying the inherent tolerance to injected errors under the DC model. Novel contributions include the following: (1) derivation of analytical bounds on relative state errors for FDIA and similar expressions for NPA and coordinated attacks; (2) proof that sensor measurements, network topology, and branch parameters are key factors influencing robustness, with larger robustness factor amplifying errors in dense or partially measured systems; and (3) validation through extensive MATPOWER simulations on IEEE 14-, 30-, 57-, 118-, and 300-bus systems, confirming bound tightness across scales. These insights enable preventive grid design to enhance resilience against cyber-physical threats.


  • Open Access

    Mitigating Dynamic Load-Altering Attacks on Grid Frequency with the Proportional–Integral Control Strategy

    by Yunhao Yu, Meiling Dizha, Zhenyong Zhang

    Grid frequency is a critical factor for the stability of a power system. However, with the penetration of massive dynamic load requirements and information and communication infrastructure, grid frequency is vulnerable to cyberattacks on the load side. In this paper, we model dynamic load-altering attacks (LAAs) on grid frequency and propose a control-based mitigation strategy. First, the dynamic grid-frequency model for frequency-sensitive loads is constructed. Then, the vulnerability of grid frequency to dynamic LAAs is analyzed using eigenvalue sensitivity analysis. To design the mitigation strategy, a stability condition with the first-order dynamic model is derived. Further, a second-order dynamic model is constructed to illustrate the joint impact of dynamic LAAs and the control strategy on eigenvalues, thereby revealing insights into mitigating factors for maintaining grid frequency stability. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the vulnerability of grid frequency under dynamic LAAs and to validate the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy.