Haojie Jing
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Haojie Jing has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xu Chen
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Technology Licensing between Competing Firms with Brand Spillover Effects
A technology firm with superior technology but limited brand recognition may license its technology to a well-known brand firm entering the consumer market. Although licensing can expand market coverage and generate brand spillover benefits for the technology firm, it also creates downstream competition between the two firms. This paper studies the technology firm’s licensing decisions under fixed lump sum, revenue-sharing, and hybrid fee contracts. We formulate a two-stage game-theoretic model with Nash bargaining, in which the firms first determine the licensing contract and then compete in the consumer market. We also examine how brand spillover and the technology firm’s no-selling commitment affect equilibrium outcomes. We show that the optimal strategy, including the choice between licensing and monopoly, depends on both the maximum retail price and brand spillover. Under fixed lump sum and revenue-sharing contracts, greater spillover may reduce the technology firm’s profit; it may also increase the brand firm’s profit. We also find that a no-selling commitment can increase the technology firm’s profit under fixed lump-sum licensing. Overall, well-designed licensing contracts can sometimes generate simultaneous gains for firms, consumers, and society.
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTechnology Licensing between Competing Firms with Brand Spillover Effects
A technology firm with superior technology but limited brand recognition may license its technology to a well-known brand firm entering the consumer market. Although licensing can expand market coverage and generate brand spillover benefits for the technology firm, it also creates downstream competition between the two firms. This paper studies the technology firm’s licensing decisions under fixed lump sum, revenue-sharing, and hybrid fee contracts. We formulate a two-stage game-theoretic model with Nash bargaining, in which the firms first determine the licensing contract and then compete in the consumer market. We also examine how brand spillover and the technology firm’s no-selling commitment affect equilibrium outcomes. We show that the optimal strategy, including the choice between licensing and monopoly, depends on both the maximum retail price and brand spillover. Under fixed lump sum and revenue-sharing contracts, greater spillover may reduce the technology firm’s profit; it may also increase the brand firm’s profit. We also find that a no-selling commitment can increase the technology firm’s profit under fixed lump-sum licensing. Overall, well-designed licensing contracts can sometimes generate simultaneous gains for firms, consumers, and society.
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 292
Competition and capacity sharing strategies in supply chain with scale economies
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 292
Competition and capacity sharing strategies in supply chain with scale economies