JSJianxiong Shao

Jianxiong Shao

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Jianxiong Shao has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Formal analysis of HMAC authorisation in the TPM2.0 specification

    by Jianxiong Shao, Yu Qin, Dengguo Feng

    The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a system component that provides a hardware‐based approach to establish trust in a platform. The latest TPM2.0 specification was accepted as the ISO standard in 2015. It offers functionality for key management by storing keys into the TPM's protected storage. The access to the TPM‐resident key object is protected by the session‐based authorisation mechanism. This mechanism is keyed to the object's authorisation value known as authValue and the session‐bound secret value known as sessionKey. The new authValue introduced into the TPM is protected by the session‐based encryption mechanism, which is also keyed on the sessionKey. In the authors’ study, they conduct a formal analysis of the TPM2.0 HMAC (hash message authentication code) authorisation mechanism used in the key management. They first use the stateful applied calculus to formalise the session‐based HMAC authorisation and encryption mechanisms in a model of TPM2.0 API commands. They propose a threat model to formalise the secrecy and authentication properties. Then they discuss several attacking scenarios in practice where the sessionKey could be disclosed. They also instantiate their threat model according to specific attacking scenarios. By using the SAPIC tool and the tamarin prover, they automatically give out the analysis results of their models.


  • Open Access

    Computational Soundness Results for Stateful Applied pi Calculus

    by Jianxiong Shao, Yu Qin, Dengguo Feng

    In recent years, many researches have been done to establish symbolic models of stateful protocols. Two works among them, the SAPIC tool and StatVerif tool, provide a high-level specification language and an automated analysis. Their language, the stateful applied \pi-calculus, is extended from the applied \pi-calculus by defining explicit state constructs. Symbolic abstractions of cryptography used in it make the analysis amenable to automation. However, this might overlook the attacks based on the algebraic properties of the cryptographic algorithms. In our paper, we establish the computational soundness results for stateful applied \pi-calculus used in SAPIC tool and StatVerif tool. In our approach, we build our results on the CoSP framework. For SAPIC, we embed the non-monotonic protocol states into the CoSP protocols, and prove that the resulting CoSP protocols are efficient. Through the embedding, we provide the computational soundness result for SAPIC (by Theorem 1). For StatVerif, we encode the StatVerif process into a subset of SAPIC process, and obtain the computational soundness result for StatVerif (by Theorem 2). Our encoding shows the differences between the semantics of the two languages. Our work inherits the modularity of CoSP, which allows for easily extending the proofs to specific cryptographic primitives. Thus we establish a computationally sound automated verification result for the input languages of SAPIC and StatVerif that use public-key encryption and signatures (by Theorem 3).