Jingkai Mao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jingkai Mao has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Xiaolin Chang
Beijing Jiaotong University
4 shared publications - Junchao Fan
Beijing Jiaotong University
3 shared publications - Lin Li
Beijing Jiaotong University
3 shared publications - Ruichen Zhang
Nanyang Technological University
2 shared publications - Bocheng Ju
Beijing Jiaotong University
1 shared publication - Haoran Zhu
Beijing Key Laboratory of Security and Privacy in Intelligent Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 75 (11) , 4025-4039
Trusted Runtime Customizable TEE on FPGA-SoC with User-Controllable TPM
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 75 (11) , 4025-4039
Trusted Runtime Customizable TEE on FPGA-SoC with User-Controllable TPM
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (6) , 12577-12593
TZRIMA: A Runtime Integrity Measurement Architecture for ARM TrustZone-Based TEE
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (6) , 12577-12593
TZRIMA: A Runtime Integrity Measurement Architecture for ARM TrustZone-Based TEE
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 13 (18) , 43540-43553
Sparse Threats, Focused Defense: Criticality-Aware Robust Reinforcement Learning for Safe Autonomous Driving
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 13 (18) , 43540-43553
Sparse Threats, Focused Defense: Criticality-Aware Robust Reinforcement Learning for Safe Autonomous Driving
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 13, 552-567
Towards Verifiable Trust Proof for Trusted Confidential Virtual Machines
Trusted-Execution-Environment (TEE)-based Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) deployed in public clouds currently lack verifiable trust proof of their running state, undermining remote users’ confidence in using them. While Virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM) techniques can be leveraged to generate such proof for CVMs, existing vTPM-based approaches suffer from three key weaknesses: lack of a well-defined root-of-trust, lack of vTPM protection, and lack of vTPM's trust proof. Consequently, it is hard for these approaches to generate verifiable trust proof to represent the states of remote users’ CVMs. This paper proposes T3CVM, an approach that leverages vTPM to generate verifiable trust proof for remote users’ AMD SEV-based CVMs. T3CVM comprises three components and a trusted boot scheme to overcome the weaknesses of the existing state-of-the-art approaches and then increase user's confidence in the trust proof. Our approach allows trusted computing-based applications to run seamlessly in the trusted CVM. Additionally, our approach can be extended to the CVMs based on other VM-based TEE technologies, such as Intel TDX. We formally analyze T3CVM's security and evaluate its performance through a prototype implementation.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 13, 552-567
Towards Verifiable Trust Proof for Trusted Confidential Virtual Machines
Trusted-Execution-Environment (TEE)-based Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) deployed in public clouds currently lack verifiable trust proof of their running state, undermining remote users’ confidence in using them. While Virtual Trusted Platform Module (vTPM) techniques can be leveraged to generate such proof for CVMs, existing vTPM-based approaches suffer from three key weaknesses: lack of a well-defined root-of-trust, lack of vTPM protection, and lack of vTPM's trust proof. Consequently, it is hard for these approaches to generate verifiable trust proof to represent the states of remote users’ CVMs. This paper proposes T3CVM, an approach that leverages vTPM to generate verifiable trust proof for remote users’ AMD SEV-based CVMs. T3CVM comprises three components and a trusted boot scheme to overcome the weaknesses of the existing state-of-the-art approaches and then increase user's confidence in the trust proof. Our approach allows trusted computing-based applications to run seamlessly in the trusted CVM. Additionally, our approach can be extended to the CVMs based on other VM-based TEE technologies, such as Intel TDX. We formally analyze T3CVM's security and evaluate its performance through a prototype implementation.