Marina Lostal

Can convicted persons at the ICC get away with murder? In the context of victim representation for participation and reparations, this has already happened. For many years, ICC case law ruled that victims who died before applying for participation and reparations could not be represented posthumously, rendering deceased persons practically invisible in that dimension of proceedings. However, a minority opinion arguing that the views, concerns, and reparations claims of some deceased victims should be considered is gaining renewed traction. The ICC now stands at a crossroads between two diametrically opposed interpretations. The approach ultimately adopted will affect the accountability of convicted persons, the ICC’s role in truth-telling, and its legacy. This article argues that excluding applications on behalf of deceased victims is flawed and advocates abandoning unduly restrictive interpretations in favour of a consistent, victim-centred and human rights–anchored approach.

This article considers whether an approach to the rights of nature (RoN) that reproduces rights and legal personality (which we will call the Extension Model) can achieve the goal of profoundly transforming our relationship with nature. The paper argues, first, that some of the ways in which Ecuador and New Zealand have implemented RoN suggest that the Extension Model carries an in-built risk of duplicating existing frameworks of subordination and objectification of nature. Second, the paper explores alternative forms of constitutional organisation to materialise RoN's objectives: the All-Encompassing Model, where the preservation of nature would become the governing principle of the constitutional order; and the Co-Dependence Model, which would require awarding nature and humans equal consideration to ensure their mutual self-preservation. Overall, the paper shows that the recognition of rights or legal personality should not act as a conversation stopper; and that critical inquiries on how to prompt RoN's pursued paradigm shift need to be continued.

This submission conveys three points. First, unlike the rights of the Covenant, SD is a non-binding aspirational goal under international human rights law. The Draft GC should carefully consider whether the required consent is present for SD to assume such a prominent role in the interpretation and application of the otherwise binding economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights enshrined in the Covenant. Second, SD entrenches a view of the future, that is, it reflects a political choice. The dominant notion of SD has entailed upholding the current economic system and a never-ending commitment to capitalist economic growth. The Draft GC should disclose the political choices inherent in the chosen notion of SD, examine their consequences, and assess their compatibility with human rights. Third, the prevailing approach to SD presupposes that the environmental, social and economic objectives of SD can be successfully balanced. The Draft GC should be cautious about uncritically accepting this assumption.

The Ecuadorian Constitutional Court ruled in the Estrellita case (2022) that animals, as elements of nature, are subjects of rights, and ordered what became the Bill Organic Animal Law (Bill LOA), due for debate in the Ecuadorian National Assembly in August 2024. This is the world’s first bill that seeks to legislatively recognise animal rights. Therefore, Ecuador’s actions in this realm will serve as a catalyst for global discourse, prompting reflection and reaction in legal frameworks world over. However, our critical analysis of the Bill LOA reveals that the text is noble in its objectives, but deficient in its articulation. Its content often ends up being a manifestation of the practices it pledged to disrupt: speciesism, anthropocentrism, and the instrumentalisation of animals. This article proposes that the National Assembly pause and reflect, treating the Bill LOA as an agent of change, rather than the immediate mechanism to achieve it. It further identifies where the text turned against its own ideals, and key questions that need to be resolved before passing a law that forever undoes the reification of animals.

The Ecuadorian Constitutional Court ruled in the Estrellita case (2022) that animals, as elements of nature, are subjects of rights, and ordered what became the Bill Organic Animal Law (Bill LOA), soon due for debate in the Ecuadorian National Assembly. This is the world's first bill that seeks to legislatively recognise animal rights. Therefore, Ecuador's actions in this realm will serve as a catalyst for global discourse, prompting reflection and reaction in legal frameworks world over. However, our critical analysis of the Bill LOA reveals that the text is noble in its objectives, but deficient in its articulation. Its content often ends up being a manifestation of the practices it pledged to disrupt: speciesism, anthropocentrism, and the instrumentalisation of animals. This article proposes that the National Assembly pause and reflect, treating the Bill LOA as an agent of change, rather than the immediate mechanism to achieve it. It further identifies where the text turned against its own ideals, and key questions that need to be resolved before passing a law that forever undoes the reification of animals.

A group of over 50 scholars and practitioners in the field of cultural heritage law from all continents came together under the umbrella of the International Law Association (ILA) and, between 2017 and 2022, dedicated themselves to the topic of participation in global cultural heritage governance. This document contains a brief summary in German of the main report (which was published in English), alongside its recommendations and the resolution (originally published in English and French) that further fleshes out those recommendations. The Committee’s focus on participation served to address broader issues of heritage governance, seen through the lenses of the conceptualization and implementation of participation. We urge you to consider this report’s recommendations in relation to your own work, and remain at your disposal for further discussion and to organize any events with your organization that you might desire to publicise and discuss our findings. In its work, the Committee surveyed over 40 international and regional organizations around the world, as well as over 30 domestic jurisdictions on all continents, to query current practices in the field of participation, its possibilities and pitfalls. The phenomenon of trying to map and understand participation in governance is not restricted to heritage, nor is heritage restricted to UNESCO. Therefore, the Committee has looked more broadly at how a range of regional and universal bodies, in and beyond heritage, engage with affected participants. Many thanks to Astrid Reisinger Coracini for the excellent translation.

This paper addresses the first three questions posed by the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights in the framework of the study of intentional destruction of cultural heritage as a violation of human rights: (1) What is the impact of the intentional destruction of cultural heritage on the enjoyment of human rights, and particularly, on cultural rights? What is the impact of destruction of tangible cultural heritage on intangible cultural heritage, on cultural practices and beliefs, and on the right of concerned persons to participate in cultural life? (2) What are examples of different situations illustrating the above? (3) What are examples of good practices, especially with regard to prevention and protection against destruction, as well as repatriation and reconstruction measures of cultural heritage, including through human and cultural rights education and awareness?

This paper examines to what extent the ICTY and the protection of cultural property under IHL are two sides of the same coin or whether, by contrast, the initial stages of cultural property in international criminal law have given rise to a two-track approach to its protection. To this end, the paper first provides a summary account of the protection afforded to cultural property by IHL (from customary international law to the 1999 Second Protocol). Then it puts IHL in perspective with Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute and its related case-law. The paper further analyzes what has been labelled the most relevant doctrinal contribution to the protection of cultural property by the ICTY - namely, the link that the tribunal has established between its damage/destruction with the crimes of persecution and genocide- and points that this line of jurisprudence has added little to the protection of cultural property per se. Finally, it explores the potential impact that the ICTY may have in the development of customary international law.