Shengyu Fan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Shengyu Fan has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dan Meng
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Mingzhe Zhang
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS
2 shared publications - Rui Hou
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Mengxin Zheng
University of Central Florida
1 shared publication - Qian Lou
University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA
1 shared publication - Xianglong Deng
Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Cybersecurity
- Vol. 9 (1) , 218
A survey on fully homomorphic encryption compilers
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables computations on encrypted data without decryption, ensuring data privacy in cloud computing and preventing sensitive information leakage. In recent years, significant progress has been made in FHE research, resulting in the development of various FHE schemes and supporting libraries. However, FHE incurs substantial computational overhead, with execution times exceeding plaintext computation by 4-5 orders. As a result, optimized FHE programs can be several hundred times faster than their unoptimized counterparts, underscoring the critical importance of efficient FHE programming. However, the restricted set of primitive operations, numerous cryptographic parameters, and complexities in ciphertext management present significant challenges, rendering FHE programming prohibitively complex for users without cryptographic expertise. To address these challenges, numerous FHE programming tools, commonly referred to as FHE compilers, have been developed. These compilers aim to simplify FHE programming by allowing users to write standard plaintext programs, which are then automatically converted into ciphertext programs. They handle ciphertext management and parameter selection automatically, lowering the barrier for users. This paper systematically reviews existing FHE compilers, examining their techniques and effectiveness to explore the current state of the art and identify areas for future research. First, we analyze the challenges of FHE programming that compilers aim to address. We then outline a typical workflow of FHE compilers, classify compilers based on the problems they solve, and compare tools within each category. Finally, we provide a summary of the current state of research on FHE compilers and propose directions for future advancements in FHE programming tools.
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Cybersecurity
- Vol. 9 (1) , 218
Open AccessA survey on fully homomorphic encryption compilers
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables computations on encrypted data without decryption, ensuring data privacy in cloud computing and preventing sensitive information leakage. In recent years, significant progress has been made in FHE research, resulting in the development of various FHE schemes and supporting libraries. However, FHE incurs substantial computational overhead, with execution times exceeding plaintext computation by 4-5 orders. As a result, optimized FHE programs can be several hundred times faster than their unoptimized counterparts, underscoring the critical importance of efficient FHE programming. However, the restricted set of primitive operations, numerous cryptographic parameters, and complexities in ciphertext management present significant challenges, rendering FHE programming prohibitively complex for users without cryptographic expertise. To address these challenges, numerous FHE programming tools, commonly referred to as FHE compilers, have been developed. These compilers aim to simplify FHE programming by allowing users to write standard plaintext programs, which are then automatically converted into ciphertext programs. They handle ciphertext management and parameter selection automatically, lowering the barrier for users. This paper systematically reviews existing FHE compilers, examining their techniques and effectiveness to explore the current state of the art and identify areas for future research. First, we analyze the challenges of FHE programming that compilers aim to address. We then outline a typical workflow of FHE compilers, classify compilers based on the problems they solve, and compare tools within each category. Finally, we provide a summary of the current state of research on FHE compilers and propose directions for future advancements in FHE programming tools.
- Open Access
- 23 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cybersecurity
- Vol. 8 (1) , 119
Corrosion Hammer: a self-activated bit-flip attack to the processing-in-memory accelerator
The Resistive Random-Access-Memory (ReRAM) crossbar-based Processing-In-Memory (PIM) accelerator shows great promise in accelerating neural networks (NNs). This technique boasts low energy consumption and exceptional performance in multiplication and accumulations (MAC) operations, making ReRAM-based PIM accelerators an ideal solution for intelligent computing in wearable and low-power mobile devices. However, security concerns related to PIM have not been adequately addressed. In this paper, we present a new attack framework called SolutionName for ReRAM-based PIM accelerators. SolutionName builds upon the Bit Flip Attack (BFA), a weight modification attack that manipulates the NN function by flipping specific bits in the deployed quantized NN model. Unlike previous BFA methods that require explicit memory fault injection techniques, such as Row Hammer, to modify sensitive bits in the victim NN, SolutionName implants the trojan during the hardware-software co-design phase and flips sensitive bits using read disturbance. Read disturbance is a common noise in ReRAM caused by normal read operations. This approach enables the trojan to be activated quietly during normal use, eliminating the need for explicit attacks. Furthermore, we explore the impact of inputs on the activation time of the trojan and propose a method to expedite activation using normal input. Our experimental results demonstrate that SolutionName achieves an extremely covert trojan implantation and activation method, with an adversarial attack success rate of 94.38%. Additionally, with a specially designed method, the trojan activation can be accelerated on average by 61.98 $$\times $$ , providing controllable activation.- 23 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cybersecurity
- Vol. 8 (1) , 119
Open AccessCorrosion Hammer: a self-activated bit-flip attack to the processing-in-memory accelerator
The Resistive Random-Access-Memory (ReRAM) crossbar-based Processing-In-Memory (PIM) accelerator shows great promise in accelerating neural networks (NNs). This technique boasts low energy consumption and exceptional performance in multiplication and accumulations (MAC) operations, making ReRAM-based PIM accelerators an ideal solution for intelligent computing in wearable and low-power mobile devices. However, security concerns related to PIM have not been adequately addressed. In this paper, we present a new attack framework called SolutionName for ReRAM-based PIM accelerators. SolutionName builds upon the Bit Flip Attack (BFA), a weight modification attack that manipulates the NN function by flipping specific bits in the deployed quantized NN model. Unlike previous BFA methods that require explicit memory fault injection techniques, such as Row Hammer, to modify sensitive bits in the victim NN, SolutionName implants the trojan during the hardware-software co-design phase and flips sensitive bits using read disturbance. Read disturbance is a common noise in ReRAM caused by normal read operations. This approach enables the trojan to be activated quietly during normal use, eliminating the need for explicit attacks. Furthermore, we explore the impact of inputs on the activation time of the trojan and propose a method to expedite activation using normal input. Our experimental results demonstrate that SolutionName achieves an extremely covert trojan implantation and activation method, with an adversarial attack success rate of 94.38%. Additionally, with a specially designed method, the trojan activation can be accelerated on average by 61.98 $$\times $$ , providing controllable activation.