Heng Zhao

To achieve the “dual carbon” goals, green construction technologies (GCTs) are in transition from pilot projects to full-scale promotion in the Chengdu–Chongqing Economic Circle. Previous studies have largely overlooked the quantitative analysis of parameters influencing stakeholder decision-making and the consideration of risk preferences in the process of GCTs of application. Based on evolutionary game and prospect theory, this study establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, owners, and constructors. Through model derivation and numerical simulation, it analyzes the strategic evolution and parameter sensitivity of each stakeholder at different lifecycle phases of GCTs. Results uncover a three-stage path: strategy adjustment range, fast convergence range, and slow convergence range. Government funds achieve peak efficiency in the fast convergence range. Owners react most strongly to incentives, contractors to cost changes. State-owned enterprises rely on policy signals, whereas private enterprises focus on market returns and risk expectations. Targeted promotion mechanisms and policy recommendations are proposed, offering a theoretical basis and practical route for precise government intervention and low-carbon transformation of the construction industry.