Nadya Hanaveriesa
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Nadya Hanaveriesa has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Agnes Patricia
Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia
1 shared publicationAzriel Lilo Timothy Siregar
Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia
1 shared publication- Idhamsyah Eka Putra
Universitas Persada Indonesia Y.A.I., Indonesia
1 shared publication - Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Department of Psychology, New York University
1 shared publication - Joevarian Hudiyana
Universitas Indonesia
1 shared publication - Laura K. Globig
Department of Psychology and Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Predicting the Machine: Intentionality Framing Reduces the Prediction Gap in Human–AI Cooperation
Cooperation is sustained by shared norms that regulate expectations about how others will behave. As artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly participate in social and economic interactions, a critical question emerges: Do the normative expectations that sustain human cooperation extend to artificial players? We propose that failures in human–AI cooperation may reflect a fundamental difficulty to form accurate predictions about artificial behavior that disrupts norm-based coordination. In Study 1 (N = 794), participants in a repeated Public Goods Game were less sensitive to prosocial norms when interacting with AI versus human players. This cooperative deficit was accompanied by a systematic “prediction gap”: participants exhibited larger errors and directional biases when forecasting AI behavior. In Study 2 (N = 314), we observed that framing AI as intentional rather than mechanistic substantially reduced prediction errors and reduced cooperation differences between AI and human players. Analysis of trial-by-trial learning revealed that intentionality framing affected initial expectation calibration but not feedback-driven updating, consistent with a shift in participants’ initial mental model of the AI. These findings suggest that norm-based cooperation in human-AI interaction depends on predictability.
- 11 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessPredicting the Machine: Intentionality Framing Reduces the Prediction Gap in Human–AI Cooperation
Cooperation is sustained by shared norms that regulate expectations about how others will behave. As artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly participate in social and economic interactions, a critical question emerges: Do the normative expectations that sustain human cooperation extend to artificial players? We propose that failures in human–AI cooperation may reflect a fundamental difficulty to form accurate predictions about artificial behavior that disrupts norm-based coordination. In Study 1 (N = 794), participants in a repeated Public Goods Game were less sensitive to prosocial norms when interacting with AI versus human players. This cooperative deficit was accompanied by a systematic “prediction gap”: participants exhibited larger errors and directional biases when forecasting AI behavior. In Study 2 (N = 314), we observed that framing AI as intentional rather than mechanistic substantially reduced prediction errors and reduced cooperation differences between AI and human players. Analysis of trial-by-trial learning revealed that intentionality framing affected initial expectation calibration but not feedback-driven updating, consistent with a shift in participants’ initial mental model of the AI. These findings suggest that norm-based cooperation in human-AI interaction depends on predictability.
- 8 December 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Public Understanding of Science
- Vol. 35 (3) , 333-351
The leap of faith in science hypothesis: The link between secular belief and confidence in scientific consensus is better explained by faith in science than by knowledge
Previous studies have examined the relationship between religion and science, but the role of secular belief systems in shaping attitudes toward scientific findings remains understudied. This research tested the leap of faith hypothesis, suggesting that secular individuals may accept scientific claims based more on faith in science than on scientific literacy. In Study 1 ( N = 202) and a preregistered Study 2 ( N = 300), Indonesian adults completed measures of secular beliefs, faith in science, scientific literacy, and confidence in scientific consensus. Across both studies, faith in science consistently mediated the effect of secular beliefs on confidence in scientific consensus, whereas scientific literacy did not. These findings suggest that secular individuals may place trust in scientific claims through conviction—indicating that confidence in science can operate as a faith-like commitment rather than a cognitive understanding.
- 8 December 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Public Understanding of Science
- Vol. 35 (3) , 333-351
The leap of faith in science hypothesis: The link between secular belief and confidence in scientific consensus is better explained by faith in science than by knowledge
Previous studies have examined the relationship between religion and science, but the role of secular belief systems in shaping attitudes toward scientific findings remains understudied. This research tested the leap of faith hypothesis, suggesting that secular individuals may accept scientific claims based more on faith in science than on scientific literacy. In Study 1 ( N = 202) and a preregistered Study 2 ( N = 300), Indonesian adults completed measures of secular beliefs, faith in science, scientific literacy, and confidence in scientific consensus. Across both studies, faith in science consistently mediated the effect of secular beliefs on confidence in scientific consensus, whereas scientific literacy did not. These findings suggest that secular individuals may place trust in scientific claims through conviction—indicating that confidence in science can operate as a faith-like commitment rather than a cognitive understanding.