Mustafa K. Taqi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mustafa K. Taqi has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ali Ahmed
Center for Applied Mathematics and Bioinformatics (CAMB), Computer Science Department, Gulf University for Science & Technology, West Mishref, Hawally 07207, Kuwait
1 shared publication - Erika Thea Ajes
Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, Faculty of Computer Science, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, NB E3B 5A3, Canada
1 shared publication - Fatima Alhaj
Department of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence, Faculty of Information Technology, Applied Science Private University, Amman 11937, Jordan
1 shared publication - Jordan Abimanyu
Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, Faculty of Computer Science, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, NB E3B 5A3, Canada
1 shared publication - Mahmoud H. Qutqut
Center for Applied Mathematics and Bioinformatics (CAMB), Computer Science Department, Gulf University for Science & Technology, West Mishref, Hawally 07207, Kuwait
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 8 January 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy
- Vol. 6 (1) , 17
A Comparative Evaluation of Snort and Suricata for Detecting Data Exfiltration Tunnels in Cloud Environments
Data exfiltration poses a major cybersecurity challenge because it involves the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are vital security controls in identifying such attacks; however, their effectiveness in cloud computing environments remains limited, particularly against covert channels such as Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and Domain Name System (DNS) tunneling. This study compares two widely used IDSs, Snort and Suricata, in a controlled cloud computing environment. The assessment focuses on their ability to detect data exfiltration techniques implemented via ICMP and DNS tunneling, using DNSCat2 and Iodine. We evaluate detection performance using standard classification metrics, including Recall, Precision, Accuracy, and F1-Score. Our experiments were conducted on Amazon Web Services (AWS) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instances, where IDS instances monitored simulated exfiltration traffic generated by DNSCat2, Iodine, and Metasploit. Network traffic was mirrored via AWS Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) Traffic Mirroring, with the ELK Stack integrated for centralized logging and visual analysis. The findings indicate that Suricata outperformed Snort in detecting DNS-based exfiltration, underscoring the advantages of multi-threaded architectures for managing high-volume cloud traffic. For DNS tunneling, Suricata achieved 100% detection (recall) for both DNSCat2 and Iodine, whereas Snort achieved 85.7% and 66.7%, respectively. Neither IDS detected ICMP tunneling using Metasploit, with both recording 0% recall. It is worth noting that both IDSs failed to detect ICMP tunneling under default configurations, highlighting the limitations of signature-based detection in isolation. These results emphasize the need to combine signature-based and behavior-based analytics, supported by centralized logging frameworks, to strengthen cloud-based intrusion detection and enhance forensic visibility.
- 8 January 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy
- Vol. 6 (1) , 17
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessA Comparative Evaluation of Snort and Suricata for Detecting Data Exfiltration Tunnels in Cloud Environments
Data exfiltration poses a major cybersecurity challenge because it involves the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are vital security controls in identifying such attacks; however, their effectiveness in cloud computing environments remains limited, particularly against covert channels such as Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and Domain Name System (DNS) tunneling. This study compares two widely used IDSs, Snort and Suricata, in a controlled cloud computing environment. The assessment focuses on their ability to detect data exfiltration techniques implemented via ICMP and DNS tunneling, using DNSCat2 and Iodine. We evaluate detection performance using standard classification metrics, including Recall, Precision, Accuracy, and F1-Score. Our experiments were conducted on Amazon Web Services (AWS) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instances, where IDS instances monitored simulated exfiltration traffic generated by DNSCat2, Iodine, and Metasploit. Network traffic was mirrored via AWS Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) Traffic Mirroring, with the ELK Stack integrated for centralized logging and visual analysis. The findings indicate that Suricata outperformed Snort in detecting DNS-based exfiltration, underscoring the advantages of multi-threaded architectures for managing high-volume cloud traffic. For DNS tunneling, Suricata achieved 100% detection (recall) for both DNSCat2 and Iodine, whereas Snort achieved 85.7% and 66.7%, respectively. Neither IDS detected ICMP tunneling using Metasploit, with both recording 0% recall. It is worth noting that both IDSs failed to detect ICMP tunneling under default configurations, highlighting the limitations of signature-based detection in isolation. These results emphasize the need to combine signature-based and behavior-based analytics, supported by centralized logging frameworks, to strengthen cloud-based intrusion detection and enhance forensic visibility.