Tamer Elswah

This study examines the impact of tax avoidance practices on investment efficiency in Egypt, with particular emphasis on the moderating role of earnings management by exploring whether these tactics reflect managerial opportunism or serve as a mechanism to ease financial constraints. We employ panel data regression to analyze a sample of 58 non-financial firms listed on the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) over the period 2017–2024, yielding 464 firm-year observations. Data are collected from official corporate websites, EGX, and Egypt for Information Dissemination (EGID). Grounded in agency theory, signaling theory, and pecking order theory, this study reveals how conflicts of interest and information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders lead to managerial opportunism. The findings show that tax avoidance undermines the investment efficiency in the Egyptian market. Earnings manipulation further intensified this effect due to the financial statements’ opacity. A closer examination reveals that earnings management exacerbates overinvestment by masking managerial decisions. Conversely, for financially constrained firms with a tendency to underinvest, tax avoidance and earnings management may contribute to improved efficiency by generating internal liquidity and alleviating external financing constraints. These results provide valuable insights for regulators, highlighting that policy should be directed against managerial opportunism and improving transparency, instead of focusing solely on curbing tax avoidance. From an investor perspective, they should closely monitor and understand the tax-planning strategies to ensure they enhance the firm’s value.