S. N. Ethier
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
S. N. Ethier has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jiyeon Lee
Yeungnam University
4 shared publications - John Jungtae Kim
Allstate Insurance Company of Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Optimal conditional expectation at the video poker game Jacks or Better
There are 134,459 distinct initial hands at the video poker game Jacks or Better, taking suit exchangeability into account. A computer program can determine the optimal strategy (i.e., which cards to hold) for each such hand, but a complete list of these strategies would require a book-length manuscript. Instead, a hand-rank table, which fits on a single page and reproduces the optimal strategy perfectly, was found for Jacks or Better as early as the mid 1990s. Is there a systematic way to derive such a hand-rank table? We show that there is indeed, and it involves finding the exact optimal conditional expected return, given the initial hand. In the case of Jacks or Better (paying 800, 50, 25, 9, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0), this is a random variable with 1,153 distinct values, of which 766 correspond to garbage hands for which it is optimal to draw five new cards. We describe the hands corresponding to each of the remaining 387 values of the optimal conditional expected return (sorted from largest to smallest) and show how this leads readily to an optimal strategy hand-rank table for Jacks or Better. Of course, the method applies to other video poker games as well.
Open AccessOptimal conditional expectation at the video poker game Jacks or Better
There are 134,459 distinct initial hands at the video poker game Jacks or Better, taking suit exchangeability into account. A computer program can determine the optimal strategy (i.e., which cards to hold) for each such hand, but a complete list of these strategies would require a book-length manuscript. Instead, a hand-rank table, which fits on a single page and reproduces the optimal strategy perfectly, was found for Jacks or Better as early as the mid 1990s. Is there a systematic way to derive such a hand-rank table? We show that there is indeed, and it involves finding the exact optimal conditional expected return, given the initial hand. In the case of Jacks or Better (paying 800, 50, 25, 9, 6, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0), this is a random variable with 1,153 distinct values, of which 766 correspond to garbage hands for which it is optimal to draw five new cards. We describe the hands corresponding to each of the remaining 387 values of the optimal conditional expected return (sorted from largest to smallest) and show how this leads readily to an optimal strategy hand-rank table for Jacks or Better. Of course, the method applies to other video poker games as well.
- Open Access
Parrondo games with two-dimensional spatial dependence
Parrondo games with one-dimensional spatial dependence were introduced by Toral and extended to the two-dimensional setting by Mihailovi\'c and Rajkovi\'c. $MN$ players are arranged in an $M\times N$ array. There are three games, the fair, spatially independent game $A$, the spatially dependent game $B$, and game $C$, which is a random mixture or nonrandom pattern of games $A$ and $B$. Of interest is $\mu_B$ (or $\mu_C$), the mean profit per turn at equilibrium to the set of $MN$ players playing game $B$ (or game $C$). Game $A$ is fair, so if $\mu_B\le0$ and $\mu_C>0$, then we say the Parrondo effect is present. We obtain a strong law of large numbers and a central limit theorem for the sequence of profits of the set of $MN$ players playing game $B$ (or game $C$). The mean and variance parameters are computable for small arrays and can be simulated otherwise. The SLLN justifies the use of simulation to estimate the mean. The CLT permits evaluation of the standard error of a simulated estimate. We investigate the presence of the Parrondo effect for both small arrays and large ones. One of the findings of Mihailovi\'c and Rajkovi\'c was that "capital evolution depends to a large degree on the lattice size." We provide evidence that this conclusion is incorrect. Part of the evidence is that, under certain conditions, the means $\mu_B$ and $\mu_C$ converge as $M,N\to\infty$. Proof requires that a related spin system on ${\bf Z}^2$ be ergodic. However, our sufficient conditions for ergodicity are rather restrictive.Open AccessParrondo games with two-dimensional spatial dependence
Parrondo games with one-dimensional spatial dependence were introduced by Toral and extended to the two-dimensional setting by Mihailovi\'c and Rajkovi\'c. $MN$ players are arranged in an $M\times N$ array. There are three games, the fair, spatially independent game $A$, the spatially dependent game $B$, and game $C$, which is a random mixture or nonrandom pattern of games $A$ and $B$. Of interest is $\mu_B$ (or $\mu_C$), the mean profit per turn at equilibrium to the set of $MN$ players playing game $B$ (or game $C$). Game $A$ is fair, so if $\mu_B\le0$ and $\mu_C>0$, then we say the Parrondo effect is present. We obtain a strong law of large numbers and a central limit theorem for the sequence of profits of the set of $MN$ players playing game $B$ (or game $C$). The mean and variance parameters are computable for small arrays and can be simulated otherwise. The SLLN justifies the use of simulation to estimate the mean. The CLT permits evaluation of the standard error of a simulated estimate. We investigate the presence of the Parrondo effect for both small arrays and large ones. One of the findings of Mihailovi\'c and Rajkovi\'c was that "capital evolution depends to a large degree on the lattice size." We provide evidence that this conclusion is incorrect. Part of the evidence is that, under certain conditions, the means $\mu_B$ and $\mu_C$ converge as $M,N\to\infty$. Proof requires that a related spin system on ${\bf Z}^2$ be ergodic. However, our sufficient conditions for ergodicity are rather restrictive. - Open Access
The evolution of the game of baccarat
The game of baccarat has evolved from a parlor game played by French aristocrats in the first half of the 19th century to a casino game that generated over US\$41 billion in revenue for the casinos of Macau in 2013. The parlor game was originally a three-person zero-sum game. Later in the 19th century it was simplified to a two-person zero-sum game. Early in the 20th century the parlor game became a casino game, no longer zero-sum. In the mid 20th century, the strategic casino game became a nonstrategic game, with players competing against the house instead of against each other. We argue that this evolution was motivated by both economic and game-theoretic considerations.
Open AccessThe evolution of the game of baccarat
The game of baccarat has evolved from a parlor game played by French aristocrats in the first half of the 19th century to a casino game that generated over US\$41 billion in revenue for the casinos of Macau in 2013. The parlor game was originally a three-person zero-sum game. Later in the 19th century it was simplified to a two-person zero-sum game. Early in the 20th century the parlor game became a casino game, no longer zero-sum. In the mid 20th century, the strategic casino game became a nonstrategic game, with players competing against the house instead of against each other. We argue that this evolution was motivated by both economic and game-theoretic considerations.
- Open Access
On the three-person game baccara banque
Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by $\theta\in(0,1)$. A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. But this solution exists only for certain $\theta$. A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium, always exists. Under a "with replacement" assumption as well as a simplifying assumption concerning the information available to one of the players, we derive each of the three solutions for all $\theta$.Open AccessOn the three-person game baccara banque
Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by $\theta\in(0,1)$. A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. But this solution exists only for certain $\theta$. A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium, always exists. Under a "with replacement" assumption as well as a simplifying assumption concerning the information available to one of the players, we derive each of the three solutions for all $\theta$. - Open Access
A property of Petrov's diffusion
Petrov constructed a diffusion process in the Kingman simplex whose unique stationary distribution is the two-parameter Poisson-Dirichlet distribution of Pitman and Yor. We show that the subset of the simplex comprising vectors whose coordinates do not sum to 1 acts like an entrance boundary for the diffusion.
Open AccessA property of Petrov's diffusion
Petrov constructed a diffusion process in the Kingman simplex whose unique stationary distribution is the two-parameter Poisson-Dirichlet distribution of Pitman and Yor. We show that the subset of the simplex comprising vectors whose coordinates do not sum to 1 acts like an entrance boundary for the diffusion.