Maolin Yang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Maolin Yang has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hang Lei
School of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
4 shared publications - Haozhe Zhou
School of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
3 shared publications Chenghao Song
Beijing Institute of Control and Engineering,Beijing,CHINA
1 shared publication- Hang Luo
School of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
1 shared publication Hongbiao Liu
Beijing Institute of Control and Engineering,Beijing,CHINA
1 shared publication- Jun Shen
University of Wollongong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 September 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 16 (18) , 8925
EviGuard: Machine-Verifiable Evidence Grounding for LLM-Based Industrial Incident Reasoning
Large language models (LLMs) can turn a flood of cross-layer industrial logs into a fluent incident narrative, but a narrative that cites only real, resolvable events can still be wrong in every relation that matters: the login came from a different workstation, the write command occurred after the physical change it supposedly caused, the action fell inside a planned maintenance window, and the controller does not even actuate the affected process. A cited event is not necessarily supporting evidence. When such a narrative drives automated response, the error propagates into isolating the wrong controller or revoking a legitimate operator. We present EviGuard, a system that decides when an LLM’s understanding is trustworthy enough to act on. EviGuard stores auditable cross-layer evidence in a provenance graph, lets the LLM propose only hypotheses, compiles each hypothesis into atomic machine-checkable claims in an Incident Claim Language, and has an ensemble of deterministic verifiers label every claim supported, contradicted, or unknown against the graph—honoring interval time, event-time policy and credential versions, network reachability, and physical control dependencies. A response gate forbids any high-impact action whose critical preconditions are not all supported. On EviCPS-Bench (42 hardware-in-the-loop attack chains, 9600 claim-level labels, ), EviGuard cuts the unsupported-claim rate from 12.6% to 1.7%, raises relation-edge from 0.64 to 0.89, holds prompt-injection success to 0.4%, and executes zero unverified high-impact actions across 3200 response decisions, at a median end-to-end latency of 0.44 s.- 8 September 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 16 (18) , 8925
Open AccessEviGuard: Machine-Verifiable Evidence Grounding for LLM-Based Industrial Incident Reasoning
Large language models (LLMs) can turn a flood of cross-layer industrial logs into a fluent incident narrative, but a narrative that cites only real, resolvable events can still be wrong in every relation that matters: the login came from a different workstation, the write command occurred after the physical change it supposedly caused, the action fell inside a planned maintenance window, and the controller does not even actuate the affected process. A cited event is not necessarily supporting evidence. When such a narrative drives automated response, the error propagates into isolating the wrong controller or revoking a legitimate operator. We present EviGuard, a system that decides when an LLM’s understanding is trustworthy enough to act on. EviGuard stores auditable cross-layer evidence in a provenance graph, lets the LLM propose only hypotheses, compiles each hypothesis into atomic machine-checkable claims in an Incident Claim Language, and has an ensemble of deterministic verifiers label every claim supported, contradicted, or unknown against the graph—honoring interval time, event-time policy and credential versions, network reachability, and physical control dependencies. A response gate forbids any high-impact action whose critical preconditions are not all supported. On EviCPS-Bench (42 hardware-in-the-loop attack chains, 9600 claim-level labels, ), EviGuard cuts the unsupported-claim rate from 12.6% to 1.7%, raises relation-edge from 0.64 to 0.89, holds prompt-injection success to 0.4%, and executes zero unverified high-impact actions across 3200 response decisions, at a median end-to-end latency of 0.44 s. - Open Access
- 4 September 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Electronics
- Vol. 15 (17) , 4004
HRCred: Revocation-Consistent Hardware-Rooted Credentials for Cross-Domain Industrial Cyber–Physical Systems
Mobile industrial devices increasingly cross administrative domains. A maintenance terminal certified in one factory can be dispatched to another, while autonomous vehicles cross fog domains while reaching cloud digital twins. Existing solutions force a trade-off. Long-lived certificates expose a stable identity that every visited domain can track and that is clonable once a device is captured, while single-gateway token services concentrate issuing power in one trusted node and asynchronous revocation leaves an unquantified window in which a revoked device is still accepted. Here, we present HRCred, which converts hardware identities rooted in physical unclonable functions (PUFs) into domain-bound, epoch-bound, and threshold-issued short-lived pseudonymous credentials. A device proves possession of its reconstructed root key to its home domain using only symmetric primitives. A set of fog issuers jointly signs each credential with a t-of-n threshold BLS signature, so no coalition of fewer than t issuers can mint one. Finally, a monotonic revocation-epoch mechanism yields a configurable upper bound on how long a revoked credential can still be accepted, which we prove and validate. On constrained hardware, the device side costs 3.6 mJ (18.8 ms authentication and 5.4 ms verification, on par with the lightest single-gateway token) while resisting up to compromised issuers, cutting cross-domain linkage AUC to 0.55, and keeping all 12,000 measured post-revocation acceptances below the analytical bound.- 4 September 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Electronics
- Vol. 15 (17) , 4004
Open AccessHRCred: Revocation-Consistent Hardware-Rooted Credentials for Cross-Domain Industrial Cyber–Physical Systems
Mobile industrial devices increasingly cross administrative domains. A maintenance terminal certified in one factory can be dispatched to another, while autonomous vehicles cross fog domains while reaching cloud digital twins. Existing solutions force a trade-off. Long-lived certificates expose a stable identity that every visited domain can track and that is clonable once a device is captured, while single-gateway token services concentrate issuing power in one trusted node and asynchronous revocation leaves an unquantified window in which a revoked device is still accepted. Here, we present HRCred, which converts hardware identities rooted in physical unclonable functions (PUFs) into domain-bound, epoch-bound, and threshold-issued short-lived pseudonymous credentials. A device proves possession of its reconstructed root key to its home domain using only symmetric primitives. A set of fog issuers jointly signs each credential with a t-of-n threshold BLS signature, so no coalition of fewer than t issuers can mint one. Finally, a monotonic revocation-epoch mechanism yields a configurable upper bound on how long a revoked credential can still be accepted, which we prove and validate. On constrained hardware, the device side costs 3.6 mJ (18.8 ms authentication and 5.4 ms verification, on par with the lightest single-gateway token) while resisting up to compromised issuers, cutting cross-domain linkage AUC to 0.55, and keeping all 12,000 measured post-revocation acceptances below the analytical bound. - Open Access
- 30 August 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Future Internet
- Vol. 18 (9) , 466
ZTSafe: Safety-Certified Risk-Adaptive Scheduling for Zero-Trust Time-Sensitive Industrial Networks
Zero-trust security continuously re-evaluates the trustworthiness of industrial devices and reacts by rerouting, isolating, or rescheduling traffic. In a time-sensitive network (TSN) that carries feedback control loops, however, every such reaction is itself a control-plane disturbance: a reroute that meets every deadline can still deliver stale measurements, and an optimizer that crashes mid-reconfiguration can leave the network in an undefined state. This paper presents ZTSafe, a scheduling architecture that treats physical safety—not attack blocking—as the object of guarantee. The guarantee has two distinct layers: compliance with the communication contract yields a deterministic invariance result conditional on the stated plant, disturbance, synchronization, and trusted-base assumptions, whereas the risk bound’s coverage is an empirical probabilistic calibration result. ZTSafe (i) synthesizes, offline and per control loop, a communication safety contract that bounds delay, age of information (AoI), consecutive losses, jitter, and path risk such that the physical state remains in its safe set under those assumptions; (ii) converts zero-trust evidence into conservative risk upper bounds and couples the admissible path-risk budget to the runtime safety margin of the plant; and (iii) places the scheduling optimizer outside the trusted computing base: an independent runtime shield checks every proposed schedule against the contracts, and on solver timeout, crash, or infeasibility the system atomically switches to a pre-checked fallback instead of executing an unverified approximate solution. Here, “verified” means independently checked by the shield, not machine-verified; a systematic shield defect or compromise of the remaining trusted computing base voids the deterministic claim. On a hardware TSN testbed with three physical control loops and fourteen attack and fault scenarios, ZTSafe reduces safe-set violations by 92.9% relative to the strongest baseline (12.8% to 0.9%; two-proportion , ) while sustaining 94.3% on-time completion of critical traffic, recovers within three control periods, and executes zero unverified configurations across 10,000 injected solver failures.- 30 August 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Future Internet
- Vol. 18 (9) , 466
Open AccessZTSafe: Safety-Certified Risk-Adaptive Scheduling for Zero-Trust Time-Sensitive Industrial Networks
Zero-trust security continuously re-evaluates the trustworthiness of industrial devices and reacts by rerouting, isolating, or rescheduling traffic. In a time-sensitive network (TSN) that carries feedback control loops, however, every such reaction is itself a control-plane disturbance: a reroute that meets every deadline can still deliver stale measurements, and an optimizer that crashes mid-reconfiguration can leave the network in an undefined state. This paper presents ZTSafe, a scheduling architecture that treats physical safety—not attack blocking—as the object of guarantee. The guarantee has two distinct layers: compliance with the communication contract yields a deterministic invariance result conditional on the stated plant, disturbance, synchronization, and trusted-base assumptions, whereas the risk bound’s coverage is an empirical probabilistic calibration result. ZTSafe (i) synthesizes, offline and per control loop, a communication safety contract that bounds delay, age of information (AoI), consecutive losses, jitter, and path risk such that the physical state remains in its safe set under those assumptions; (ii) converts zero-trust evidence into conservative risk upper bounds and couples the admissible path-risk budget to the runtime safety margin of the plant; and (iii) places the scheduling optimizer outside the trusted computing base: an independent runtime shield checks every proposed schedule against the contracts, and on solver timeout, crash, or infeasibility the system atomically switches to a pre-checked fallback instead of executing an unverified approximate solution. Here, “verified” means independently checked by the shield, not machine-verified; a systematic shield defect or compromise of the remaining trusted computing base voids the deterministic claim. On a hardware TSN testbed with three physical control loops and fourteen attack and fault scenarios, ZTSafe reduces safe-set violations by 92.9% relative to the strongest baseline (12.8% to 0.9%; two-proportion , ) while sustaining 94.3% on-time completion of critical traffic, recovers within three control periods, and executes zero unverified configurations across 10,000 injected solver failures. - Open Access
- 1 August 2026
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in Tsinghua Science and Technology
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1961-1976
Research on the Schedulability of Sporadic Tasks in Spaceborne Mixed Real-Time Operating System
A spacecraft is a typical time-sensitive system, and the characteristics of hard real-time and limited resources make the design of real-time scheduling algorithms particularly crucial in spaceborne operating system. With the development of space technology, onboard computer has transformed from a closed system with a single type of task to an open system with mixed sets of tasks. The system allows new tasks to be dynamically loaded during operation, leading to real-time changes in the types and numbers of tasks, further increasing the difficulty of predicting and the uncertainty of the system. Sporadic tasks are more common in actual system and have special temporal characteristics of releasing by a random frequency, making the schedulability determination more complex than that of other types of tasks. Therefore, we focused on the schedulability of sporadic tasks in spaceborne operating system and first classified the situations in which schedulability needs to be determined. For each preemption case in different situations, corresponding determination strategies were proposed based on Response Time Analysis (RTA). Due to RTA’s high time complexity, we additionally utilized Interference Bound Function (IBF) to judge the schedulability, thus providing flexible choices for system design. By tracking task’s runtime information and analyzing at a finer granularity, our methods reduced pessimism and achieved a better schedulable ratio.
- 1 August 2026
- Published by Tsinghua University Press in Tsinghua Science and Technology
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1961-1976
Open AccessResearch on the Schedulability of Sporadic Tasks in Spaceborne Mixed Real-Time Operating System
A spacecraft is a typical time-sensitive system, and the characteristics of hard real-time and limited resources make the design of real-time scheduling algorithms particularly crucial in spaceborne operating system. With the development of space technology, onboard computer has transformed from a closed system with a single type of task to an open system with mixed sets of tasks. The system allows new tasks to be dynamically loaded during operation, leading to real-time changes in the types and numbers of tasks, further increasing the difficulty of predicting and the uncertainty of the system. Sporadic tasks are more common in actual system and have special temporal characteristics of releasing by a random frequency, making the schedulability determination more complex than that of other types of tasks. Therefore, we focused on the schedulability of sporadic tasks in spaceborne operating system and first classified the situations in which schedulability needs to be determined. For each preemption case in different situations, corresponding determination strategies were proposed based on Response Time Analysis (RTA). Due to RTA’s high time complexity, we additionally utilized Interference Bound Function (IBF) to judge the schedulability, thus providing flexible choices for system design. By tracking task’s runtime information and analyzing at a finer granularity, our methods reduced pessimism and achieved a better schedulable ratio.
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Computer Science and Technology
- Vol. 41 (4) , 1249-1261
A Fine-Grained Analysis for Parallel Tasks with Spin-Locks Under Global Fixed-Priority Scheduling
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Computer Science and Technology
- Vol. 41 (4) , 1249-1261
A Fine-Grained Analysis for Parallel Tasks with Spin-Locks Under Global Fixed-Priority Scheduling