PYPeijie Yin

Peijie Yin

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Peijie Yin has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Optimization of encrypted data poisoning defense strategies in Social Federated Computing: An evolutionary game approach

    by Zhe Sun, Wenxin Gao, Peijie Yin, Weiping Li, Ming Zhang, Yahong Chen, Jiangang Shu, Yunchuan Guo

  • Game-Theoretic Defense Against Encrypted Data Poisoning in Federated Learning for Social Networks

    by Zhe Sun, Wenxin Gao, Peijie Yin, Weiping Li, Ming Zhang, Yahong Chen, Jiangang Shu


  • LDST-UAVS: A Lightweight Data Secure Transmission Protocol for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarms in Emergency Rescue Scenarios

    by Zhenyang Guo, Jin Cao, XiongPeng Ren, Yuchen Zhou, Lifu Cheng, Peijie Yin, Hui Li

    Currently, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) groups can quickly build a multi-hop transmission network, which have been widely utilized in emergency communication scenarios to perform search and rescue, environmental monitoring, personnel positioning, rapid networking, etc. In such emergency rescue situations, strict demands on real-time communication, security, and minimal resource consumption become paramount. Higher requirements for security, bandwidth, and real-time performance necessitate a secure and lightweight data transmission protocol. Additionally, due to the lack of personnel supervision in these scenarios, the probability of malicious nodes increases. Therefore, it is essential to quickly and proximally block malicious nodes’ data to prevent it from affecting subsequent network propagation, and to accurately identify the malicious nodes. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a traceable, lightweight, and secure data transmission protocol for UAV multi-hop networks in emergency rescue scenarios. The proposed protocol can verify the integrity of data transmitted by a large number of nodes in real time, detect erroneous transmissions, and trace malicious users. Experimental results show that our protocol consistently outperforms the comparison schemes in terms of computational overhead. Moreover, in scenarios involving smaller groups (m=5) and fewer hops (n=4), it exhibits significantly lower communication bandwidth overhead than the reference methods. Security analysis using BAN logic and the formal verification tool Scyther indicates that the proposed scheme meets security requirements. Additionally, comparative analysis results demonstrate that the proposed scheme is highly effective and outperforms other related schemes under the unique constraints of emergency rescue scenarios, where rapid, secure decision-making and data transmission are critical.


  • FlexClave: An Extensible and Secure Trusted Execution Environment Framework

    by Qihang Zhou, Wenzhuo Cao, Xiaoqi Jia, Shaowen Xu, Jiayun Chen, Nan Jiang, Zhicong Zhang, Zhenyu Song, Haichao Du, Yamin Xie, et al.

    As computer system software stacks become increasingly complex, the associated security risks also escalate. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged as a mainstream security solution to enhance system security. TEEs can be categorized into user-level TEEs, OS-level TEEs, and hybrid TEEs. However, these TEEs typically possess fixed security boundaries and isolation domains, limiting their adaptability to varying security requirements and dynamic scenarios. Moreover, the design of Trusted Computing Base (TCB) components in TEE frameworks often operates at the highest privilege levels of the architecture. This concentration of critical code at the highest privilege level increases the whole platform’s security risk due to the growing amount of code as more security functions are added. In this paper, we propose FlexClave, an extensible and secure TEE framework designed to address these issues. FlexClave leverages hardware primitives to create secure isolation boundaries tailored to different use cases. Additionally, our framework distributes TCB components across various privilege levels, reducing the concentration of security functions at the highest privilege levels and mitigating the risks associated with running extensive code in a single, highly privileged context. We implement two prototypes on ARMv9-A Fixed Virtual Platform and ARMv8 RK3399 SoC, each with two use cases (container and virtual machine), to evaluate the system’s security and performance.