Manish Tripathy
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Manish Tripathy has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hans Sebastian Heese
NC State University
2 shared publications Harish Krishnan
University of British Columbia (UBC) - Sauder School of Business
1 shared publication- Jiaru Bai
College of Business, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York 11794
1 shared publication Sanjith Gopalakrishnan
McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management
1 shared publicationTim Kraft
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Model of International Transfers of Carbon Mitigation Outcomes: Analyzing the Impact of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Problem Definition: Under the Paris Agreement, countries independently determine their contributions to help achieve the goals of the treaty. These ``nationally determined contributions’’ (NDCs) establish targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions. However, Article 6 (of the Paris Agreement) recognizes that it may sometimes be beneficial for countries to collaborate in reducing their joint emissions and proposes a mechanism called Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). ITMOs allow countries to transfer ``mitigation outcomes'', i.e., a reduction of emissions in one country can be credited to another. However, we lack a coherent theoretical framework for conceptualizing ITMO creation and implementation. In addition, the impact of ITMOs on domestic energy demands, prices, and other economic outcomes like total welfare within the participating countries are unclear. Methodology and Results: In this paper, we present a theoretical and stylized model for the implementation of ITMOs between two countries, one producing a low carbon fuel and the other reliant on a high carbon fuel. We show that, under certain restrictions, low carbon fuel trade can benefit both countries. Furthermore, if a transfer of ITMOs is allowed, a higher amount of trade can be sustained to the benefit of all parties while still complying with emission caps. We also outline the impacts of ITMOs on domestic energy prices and the energy consumption mix in the two countries and show that appropriately designed ITMOs can lead to better economic and environmental outcomes for consumers and firms in both countries. Managerial Implications: Our work also yields several operational implications with respect to the implementation of ITMOs. Specifically, we argue that ITMOs need not be priced and traded as commodities. Additionally, we show that ITMOs can lead to greater ambition in setting NDCs and incentivize low carbon innovation within countries.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Model of International Transfers of Carbon Mitigation Outcomes: Analyzing the Impact of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Problem Definition: Under the Paris Agreement, countries independently determine their contributions to help achieve the goals of the treaty. These ``nationally determined contributions’’ (NDCs) establish targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions. However, Article 6 (of the Paris Agreement) recognizes that it may sometimes be beneficial for countries to collaborate in reducing their joint emissions and proposes a mechanism called Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). ITMOs allow countries to transfer ``mitigation outcomes'', i.e., a reduction of emissions in one country can be credited to another. However, we lack a coherent theoretical framework for conceptualizing ITMO creation and implementation. In addition, the impact of ITMOs on domestic energy demands, prices, and other economic outcomes like total welfare within the participating countries are unclear. Methodology and Results: In this paper, we present a theoretical and stylized model for the implementation of ITMOs between two countries, one producing a low carbon fuel and the other reliant on a high carbon fuel. We show that, under certain restrictions, low carbon fuel trade can benefit both countries. Furthermore, if a transfer of ITMOs is allowed, a higher amount of trade can be sustained to the benefit of all parties while still complying with emission caps. We also outline the impacts of ITMOs on domestic energy prices and the energy consumption mix in the two countries and show that appropriately designed ITMOs can lead to better economic and environmental outcomes for consumers and firms in both countries. Managerial Implications: Our work also yields several operational implications with respect to the implementation of ITMOs. Specifically, we argue that ITMOs need not be priced and traded as commodities. Additionally, we show that ITMOs can lead to greater ambition in setting NDCs and incentivize low carbon innovation within countries.
- Open Access
- 15 March 2022
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 54 (4) , 434-446
Driver collusion in ride‐hailing platforms
Many on‐demand service platforms employ state‐dependent pricing strategies to balance supply capacity and customer demand. In the context of ride‐hailing platforms, it has been observed that drivers strategically exploit the structure of such pricing policies by coordinating with each other to deactivate some drivers in order to create an artificial shortage of supply capacity and trigger so‐called surge pricing. We develop a simple and high‐level analytical framework to structurally characterize the drivers of such collusive behavior and the consequences for drivers and the platform. We find that collusive driver behavior is more likely in settings where customers exhibit moderate sensitivity to waiting time. For some of these cases, if customers continue to request service under driver collusion, the platform may benefit from the higher surge prices. For settings where driver collusion is harmful to the platform, we consider two possible mitigation strategies: a bonus payment structure to eliminate the drivers' incentives to collude, which comes at a direct cost to the platform, and a freeze period after deactivating the app during which drivers cannot reactivate. We show that with the appropriate duration, such a freeze period can effectively eliminate driver collusion without any direct costs to the platform.
- 15 March 2022
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 54 (4) , 434-446
Open AccessDriver collusion in ride‐hailing platforms
Many on‐demand service platforms employ state‐dependent pricing strategies to balance supply capacity and customer demand. In the context of ride‐hailing platforms, it has been observed that drivers strategically exploit the structure of such pricing policies by coordinating with each other to deactivate some drivers in order to create an artificial shortage of supply capacity and trigger so‐called surge pricing. We develop a simple and high‐level analytical framework to structurally characterize the drivers of such collusive behavior and the consequences for drivers and the platform. We find that collusive driver behavior is more likely in settings where customers exhibit moderate sensitivity to waiting time. For some of these cases, if customers continue to request service under driver collusion, the platform may benefit from the higher surge prices. For settings where driver collusion is harmful to the platform, we consider two possible mitigation strategies: a bonus payment structure to eliminate the drivers' incentives to collude, which comes at a direct cost to the platform, and a freeze period after deactivating the app during which drivers cannot reactivate. We show that with the appropriate duration, such a freeze period can effectively eliminate driver collusion without any direct costs to the platform.