Jan Hanousek Jr.
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jan Hanousek Jr. has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jan Hanousek
Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
4 shared publications Stephen Ferris
Ball State University
2 shared publications- Velma Zahirovic-Herbert
Department of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Fogelman College of Business and Economics, University of Memphis, TN, USA
2 shared publications Anastasiya Shamshur
1 shared publication- Dominik Svoboda1 shared publication
Jared Williams
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Gaps and Price Efficiency: The Role of Social Media
We study how information availability affects price efficiency using natural disasters and delayed official damage reporting. When affected locations receive no traditional-media coverage, municipal bond yields exhibit an initial relative response followed by a predictable correction as more precise information becomes available. These corrections are substantially attenuated when decentralized local social information is available. Traditional media provide a clearer signal of subsequently realized damages, but decentralized information improves price discovery when traditional information is limited. Our results show that the value of an information source depends not only on its precision, but also on the information set available in its absence.
- 28 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Gaps and Price Efficiency: The Role of Social Media
We study how information availability affects price efficiency using natural disasters and delayed official damage reporting. When affected locations receive no traditional-media coverage, municipal bond yields exhibit an initial relative response followed by a predictable correction as more precise information becomes available. These corrections are substantially attenuated when decentralized local social information is available. Traditional media provide a clearer signal of subsequently realized damages, but decentralized information improves price discovery when traditional information is limited. Our results show that the value of an information source depends not only on its precision, but also on the information set available in its absence.
- Open Access
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Gaps and Price Efficiency: The Role of Social Media
We study how information availability affects price efficiency using natural disasters and delayed official damage reporting. When affected locations receive no traditional-media coverage, municipal bond yields exhibit an initial relative response followed by a predictable correction as more precise information becomes available. These corrections are substantially attenuated when decentralized local social information is available. Traditional media provide a clearer signal of subsequently realized damages, but decentralized information improves price discovery when traditional information is limited. Our results show that the value of an information source depends not only on its precision, but also on the information set available in its absence.
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Gaps and Price Efficiency: The Role of Social Media
We study how information availability affects price efficiency using natural disasters and delayed official damage reporting. When affected locations receive no traditional-media coverage, municipal bond yields exhibit an initial relative response followed by a predictable correction as more precise information becomes available. These corrections are substantially attenuated when decentralized local social information is available. Traditional media provide a clearer signal of subsequently realized damages, but decentralized information improves price discovery when traditional information is limited. Our results show that the value of an information source depends not only on its precision, but also on the information set available in its absence.
- Open Access
- 5 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Profit Shifting or Debt Shifting? Institutional Reform and the Reconfiguration of Business-Group Organizational Architecture
How do multinational enterprises respond when governments coordinate to reduce opportunities for cross-border tax arbitrage? Drawing on international business theory on institutional heterogeneity and business-group organizational architecture, we conceptualize multinational tax planning as a hierarchy of adjustment margins that differ in organizational flexibility. Using 799,555 subsidiary-year observations (193,205 subsidiaries) from multinational business groups operating across 29 European countries during 2007–2022, we examine profit allocation, debt allocation, and organizational adaptation around the implementation of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative. We find that operating profitability responds much more strongly to intra-group tax disadvantages than to leverage, consistent with profit allocation as a more flexible adjustment margin. However, BEPS produces little robust within-group change in either financial margin and does not induce meaningful substitution toward debt financing. Instead, multinational enterprises respond to institutional reform by reconfiguring their business-group organizational architecture, including ownership hierarchies, organizational footprints, and jurisdictional presence. These findings show that coordinated institutional reform can shift multinational adaptation beyond first-order financial allocation toward higher-order organizational reconfiguration. Our study contributes to international business research by showing how institutional convergence changes the organizational margins through which multinational enterprises adapt to cross-country institutional differences.
- 5 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessProfit Shifting or Debt Shifting? Institutional Reform and the Reconfiguration of Business-Group Organizational Architecture
How do multinational enterprises respond when governments coordinate to reduce opportunities for cross-border tax arbitrage? Drawing on international business theory on institutional heterogeneity and business-group organizational architecture, we conceptualize multinational tax planning as a hierarchy of adjustment margins that differ in organizational flexibility. Using 799,555 subsidiary-year observations (193,205 subsidiaries) from multinational business groups operating across 29 European countries during 2007–2022, we examine profit allocation, debt allocation, and organizational adaptation around the implementation of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative. We find that operating profitability responds much more strongly to intra-group tax disadvantages than to leverage, consistent with profit allocation as a more flexible adjustment margin. However, BEPS produces little robust within-group change in either financial margin and does not induce meaningful substitution toward debt financing. Instead, multinational enterprises respond to institutional reform by reconfiguring their business-group organizational architecture, including ownership hierarchies, organizational footprints, and jurisdictional presence. These findings show that coordinated institutional reform can shift multinational adaptation beyond first-order financial allocation toward higher-order organizational reconfiguration. Our study contributes to international business research by showing how institutional convergence changes the organizational margins through which multinational enterprises adapt to cross-country institutional differences.
- 10 August 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Urban Studies
Politicians’ municipal bond purchases and local government misallocation: Implications for urban fiscal governance
Using financial disclosure reports of U.S. senators and representatives, we examine whether politicians’ municipal bond purchases anticipate subsequent fiscal support and how targeted counties evolve afterward. We find that counties whose municipal bonds are purchased by politicians subsequently receive higher federal funding, consistent with politicians investing in jurisdictions that later benefit from intergovernmental transfers. Secondary-market yields on these bonds decline roughly 4 months after purchase, suggesting that elected officials tend to buy when yields are elevated and benefit from subsequent price adjustments. However, we do not observe corresponding improvements in local real activity: new residential construction and housing prices remain flat, while 90-day mortgage delinquencies and unemployment rise in the post-purchase period. Using an Average Treatment Effect on the Treated/Rubin causal framework, event-time analyses, and placebo and robustness checks, we show that these patterns are not driven by differential pre-trends. Overall, politician bond purchases align with predictable changes in fiscal flows and bond pricing but are not followed by positive local economic spillovers, with implications for urban fiscal governance and the political economy of intergovernmental transfers.
- 10 August 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Urban Studies
Politicians’ municipal bond purchases and local government misallocation: Implications for urban fiscal governance
Using financial disclosure reports of U.S. senators and representatives, we examine whether politicians’ municipal bond purchases anticipate subsequent fiscal support and how targeted counties evolve afterward. We find that counties whose municipal bonds are purchased by politicians subsequently receive higher federal funding, consistent with politicians investing in jurisdictions that later benefit from intergovernmental transfers. Secondary-market yields on these bonds decline roughly 4 months after purchase, suggesting that elected officials tend to buy when yields are elevated and benefit from subsequent price adjustments. However, we do not observe corresponding improvements in local real activity: new residential construction and housing prices remain flat, while 90-day mortgage delinquencies and unemployment rise in the post-purchase period. Using an Average Treatment Effect on the Treated/Rubin causal framework, event-time analyses, and placebo and robustness checks, we show that these patterns are not driven by differential pre-trends. Overall, politician bond purchases align with predictable changes in fiscal flows and bond pricing but are not followed by positive local economic spillovers, with implications for urban fiscal governance and the political economy of intergovernmental transfers.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 37 (3) , 105-120
The Senate Premium: Legislative Information Asymmetry and Stock
Information asymmetry induced by legislative activity has been largely overlooked in the literature, despite the opacity of the legislative process and the legality of information sharing by politicians with third parties. Using aggregate equity trading by U.S. senators, we develop a two‐stage model of legislative information asymmetry that involves a direct effect followed by propagated trading of third parties. We find that firms in industries with high levels of senatorial trading face increased volatility, wider bid‐ask spreads, and greater idiosyncratic risk. Because size is associated with a firm's ability to lobby, we discover that the risk of larger firms is less affected by this information asymmetry. While banning politicians' trading might address the ethical problems inherent in political insider trading, our results demonstrate that it will not address the legislative information asymmetry. Instead, the goal should be to address the issue of selective information sharing and its legality.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 37 (3) , 105-120
The Senate Premium: Legislative Information Asymmetry and Stock
Information asymmetry induced by legislative activity has been largely overlooked in the literature, despite the opacity of the legislative process and the legality of information sharing by politicians with third parties. Using aggregate equity trading by U.S. senators, we develop a two‐stage model of legislative information asymmetry that involves a direct effect followed by propagated trading of third parties. We find that firms in industries with high levels of senatorial trading face increased volatility, wider bid‐ask spreads, and greater idiosyncratic risk. Because size is associated with a firm's ability to lobby, we discover that the risk of larger firms is less affected by this information asymmetry. While banning politicians' trading might address the ethical problems inherent in political insider trading, our results demonstrate that it will not address the legislative information asymmetry. Instead, the goal should be to address the issue of selective information sharing and its legality.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Unmasking An Unseen Influence: Uninformed Retail Investors and Their Capital Market Effects
Using a natural experiment based on technical improvements to Google Trends data, we can more clearly separate less informed from more informed retail investors. We find that uninformed trading has a significant negative effect on liquidity, although the effect is most pronounced for smaller firms. This adverse effect of uninformed trading also increases the cost of capital for smaller firms. Our results help to explain the mixed evidence in the literature regarding the effect of uninformed trading on market liquidity.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessUnmasking An Unseen Influence: Uninformed Retail Investors and Their Capital Market Effects
Using a natural experiment based on technical improvements to Google Trends data, we can more clearly separate less informed from more informed retail investors. We find that uninformed trading has a significant negative effect on liquidity, although the effect is most pronounced for smaller firms. This adverse effect of uninformed trading also increases the cost of capital for smaller firms. Our results help to explain the mixed evidence in the literature regarding the effect of uninformed trading on market liquidity.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
𝕏 Bots and Earnings Announcements
This paper studies the rationale and effects of buying bots on 𝕏 (former Twitter). We observe that large amount of attention to corporate 𝕏 accounts around earnings announcements is driven by bots. Bot activity is a significant predictor of investor disagreement, which is persistent long-term. Moreover, bot activity increases analyst dispersion for the following quarterly earnings announcement. Consistent with managerial short-termism, bot activity often accompanies intense earnings management. Our results are robust to various specifications, including a matching approach indicating causal interpretation.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open Access𝕏 Bots and Earnings Announcements
This paper studies the rationale and effects of buying bots on 𝕏 (former Twitter). We observe that large amount of attention to corporate 𝕏 accounts around earnings announcements is driven by bots. Bot activity is a significant predictor of investor disagreement, which is persistent long-term. Moreover, bot activity increases analyst dispersion for the following quarterly earnings announcement. Consistent with managerial short-termism, bot activity often accompanies intense earnings management. Our results are robust to various specifications, including a matching approach indicating causal interpretation.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Peering into the Crystal Ball: The Information Content of Legislative Trading
This study introduces a new measure of the political risk to which firms are subject. We find that the aggregate equity trading U.S. senators significantly predicts a firm’s future risk and return. This measure possesses industry-relevant information beyond what is contained in existing measures of political risk and uncertainty. We show that aggregated Senatorial trading conveys information about future industry performance more than individual equity transactions. Our findings are robust to alternate model specifications and are economically significant. Our results significantly extend the findings of previous studies on how political risk affects a firm’s performance.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPeering into the Crystal Ball: The Information Content of Legislative Trading
This study introduces a new measure of the political risk to which firms are subject. We find that the aggregate equity trading U.S. senators significantly predicts a firm’s future risk and return. This measure possesses industry-relevant information beyond what is contained in existing measures of political risk and uncertainty. We show that aggregated Senatorial trading conveys information about future industry performance more than individual equity transactions. Our findings are robust to alternate model specifications and are economically significant. Our results significantly extend the findings of previous studies on how political risk affects a firm’s performance.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Social Networks and Strategic Behavior: Case of Political Inside Information
The paper uses the trading data for U.S. senators to study the effects of social networks and interactions on the potential dissemination of private information. The various layers of their network are created using several hand-collected data, including committee assignments, political donations, joint fundraising, and seating orders. The results reveal that senators use and share insider information, e.g., the introduction of firm-relevant legislation, and their transactions could predict upcoming important corporate events/news. Furthermore, the results suggest that every time the information is shared, other individuals in the network observe and trade on it, thus disseminating insider information to the public.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSocial Networks and Strategic Behavior: Case of Political Inside Information
The paper uses the trading data for U.S. senators to study the effects of social networks and interactions on the potential dissemination of private information. The various layers of their network are created using several hand-collected data, including committee assignments, political donations, joint fundraising, and seating orders. The results reveal that senators use and share insider information, e.g., the introduction of firm-relevant legislation, and their transactions could predict upcoming important corporate events/news. Furthermore, the results suggest that every time the information is shared, other individuals in the network observe and trade on it, thus disseminating insider information to the public.