Xiaoya Ma
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Xiaoya Ma has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jing Chen
Wuhan University
2 shared publications - Kun He
Wuhan University
2 shared publications - Ruiying Du
Wuhan University
2 shared publications - Zijun Zhang
Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
2 shared publications - Cong Wu
School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
1 shared publication - Qiao Li
Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 3973-3988
N Truths and a Lie: Consistency-Based Backdoor Defense for Vertical Federated Learning
Recently, a growing number of backdoor attacks have been implemented against vertical federated learning (VFL). To carry out such attacks, it is possible for an attacker to manipulate its local data and model, which are not accessible to the defender. This asymmetry complicates the design of defense mechanisms, resulting in a lack of effective defenses against backdoor attacks in VFL. In this paper, we propose a novel backdoor defense mechanism tailored for VFL. Specifically, we observe that the malicious embeddings provided by an attacker are often inconsistent with the embeddings provided by honest VFL participants and thus are less predictable from the latter. On the basis of this observation, we introduce a latent masked autoencoder (LMAE) to assess the semantic consistency of the embeddings provided by different VFL participants. On the basis of the LMAE, we further develop an algorithm to identify attackers and enable backdoor-resistant predictions. To evaluate the proposed defense, we conduct experiments involving four baseline defenses, seven backdoor attacks, and five datasets (CIFAR-10, CINIC-10, Yahoo Answers, BHI, and BM) of different modalities. The results show that our defense is effective at identifying attackers and achieves high prediction accuracy. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the defense is robust against various attacks in a wide range of scenarios.
- 18 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 3973-3988
N Truths and a Lie: Consistency-Based Backdoor Defense for Vertical Federated Learning
Recently, a growing number of backdoor attacks have been implemented against vertical federated learning (VFL). To carry out such attacks, it is possible for an attacker to manipulate its local data and model, which are not accessible to the defender. This asymmetry complicates the design of defense mechanisms, resulting in a lack of effective defenses against backdoor attacks in VFL. In this paper, we propose a novel backdoor defense mechanism tailored for VFL. Specifically, we observe that the malicious embeddings provided by an attacker are often inconsistent with the embeddings provided by honest VFL participants and thus are less predictable from the latter. On the basis of this observation, we introduce a latent masked autoencoder (LMAE) to assess the semantic consistency of the embeddings provided by different VFL participants. On the basis of the LMAE, we further develop an algorithm to identify attackers and enable backdoor-resistant predictions. To evaluate the proposed defense, we conduct experiments involving four baseline defenses, seven backdoor attacks, and five datasets (CIFAR-10, CINIC-10, Yahoo Answers, BHI, and BM) of different modalities. The results show that our defense is effective at identifying attackers and achieves high prediction accuracy. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the defense is robust against various attacks in a wide range of scenarios.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (5) , 1-13
Silent Poisoning: A Stealthy and Unified Dual-Space Framework for VFL Backdoor Attacks
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (5) , 1-13
Silent Poisoning: A Stealthy and Unified Dual-Space Framework for VFL Backdoor Attacks