Muhamet Yildiz
Research Subjects
Muhamet Yildiz has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ali Jadbabaie
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
1 shared publication Amir Ajorlou
1 shared publication- Chin-Chia Hsu
Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA
1 shared publication - Rajiv Sethi
Columbia University, and the Santa Fe Institute
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Media Bias, News Verification, and Subscription Choice
We study how individuals choose among biased information sources with persuasion motiveswhen the news may or may not be informative. We develop a game-theoretic model featuringanonymous subscribers with diverse ideological perspectives and two news intermediarieswith opposing ideological perspectives. In our model, each individual subscribes to a news intermediary,and then intermediaries may receive a private signal. To influence public opinion,the intermediaries strategically decide whether to verify the informativeness of a private signaland whether to disclose it to their subscribers. In equilibrium, moderate subscribers subscribeto the intermediary with an opposing view, optimizing their information acquisition throughcross-ideological sorting. In contrast, extremist subscribers select the intermediary with analigned view, exhibiting aligned-ideological sorting.
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMedia Bias, News Verification, and Subscription Choice
We study how individuals choose among biased information sources with persuasion motiveswhen the news may or may not be informative. We develop a game-theoretic model featuringanonymous subscribers with diverse ideological perspectives and two news intermediarieswith opposing ideological perspectives. In our model, each individual subscribes to a news intermediary,and then intermediaries may receive a private signal. To influence public opinion,the intermediaries strategically decide whether to verify the informativeness of a private signaland whether to disclose it to their subscribers. In equilibrium, moderate subscribers subscribeto the intermediary with an opposing view, optimizing their information acquisition throughcross-ideological sorting. In contrast, extremist subscribers select the intermediary with analigned view, exhibiting aligned-ideological sorting.