Yeqi Fu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Yeqi Fu has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zhenkai Liang
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
3 shared publications - Ding Li
Key Laboratory of High-Confidence Software Technologies (MOE), School of Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Yao Guo
Peking University
2 shared publications - Yuanpeng Wang
Peking University, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Zong Cao
Imperial Global Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
2 shared publications - Heng Yin
University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 6655-6668
Neurosymbolic Disassembly
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 6655-6668
Open AccessNeurosymbolic Disassembly
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (ISSTA) , 1649-1671
SymWeb: Feedback-Driven Context Exploration and Context-Aware Symbolic Execution for Browser-Embedded WebAssembly Vulnerability Detection
Browser-deployed WebAssembly (Wasm) modules often inherit memory-safety bugs from C and C++-style code, yet exploiting, and even reaching, these bugs in the Web threat model is fundamentally context-dependent. JavaScript (JS) controls the exported-call schedule and constructs the Wasm entry state, including arguments, globals, and linear-memory layouts, from attacker-influenced web inputs. This makes both Wasm-only analysis, which assumes static initial states, and prior browser-based testing such as Wemby ineffective. Wemby generates a fixed, Wasm-agnostic context pool and then only mutates Wasm parameters, which limits its ability to systematically reach deeper, Wasm-relevant contexts and gated behaviors. We present SymWeb, a feedback-driven closed-loop system that links external inputs to browser-reachable JS-induced Wasm contexts and then to context-aware Wasm symbolic execution. SymWeb couples an Feedback-driven Context Generator with an Context-Aware Wasm Symbolic Executor. The Feedback-driven Context Generator performs binary rewriting for ASan-like checks and observability, collects contexts in the browser, and uses Influence-guided Mutation to steer web inputs. The symbolic executor clusters and symbolizes contexts, performs coverage-guided symbolic execution under reachable entry states, and returns actionable constraints to steer the next online round. We evaluate SymWeb on 30 real-world Wasm-enabled websites. Under our Web threat model, SymWeb verifies 17 exploitable vulnerabilities and achieves 72.8% average Wasm basic-block coverage. Compared to the browser-based baseline Wemby, SymWeb finds 8 more verified vulnerabilities and improves coverage by 19.9 percentage points. Compared to the Wasm-only baseline WASEM, SymWeb finds 14 more verified vulnerabilities and improves coverage by 40.4 percentage points. Overall, these results show that closing the loop between browser-reachable context generation and context-aware Wasm analysis substantially improves both vulnerability-finding effectiveness and exploration depth in real Web environments.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (ISSTA) , 1649-1671
Open AccessSymWeb: Feedback-Driven Context Exploration and Context-Aware Symbolic Execution for Browser-Embedded WebAssembly Vulnerability Detection
Browser-deployed WebAssembly (Wasm) modules often inherit memory-safety bugs from C and C++-style code, yet exploiting, and even reaching, these bugs in the Web threat model is fundamentally context-dependent. JavaScript (JS) controls the exported-call schedule and constructs the Wasm entry state, including arguments, globals, and linear-memory layouts, from attacker-influenced web inputs. This makes both Wasm-only analysis, which assumes static initial states, and prior browser-based testing such as Wemby ineffective. Wemby generates a fixed, Wasm-agnostic context pool and then only mutates Wasm parameters, which limits its ability to systematically reach deeper, Wasm-relevant contexts and gated behaviors. We present SymWeb, a feedback-driven closed-loop system that links external inputs to browser-reachable JS-induced Wasm contexts and then to context-aware Wasm symbolic execution. SymWeb couples an Feedback-driven Context Generator with an Context-Aware Wasm Symbolic Executor. The Feedback-driven Context Generator performs binary rewriting for ASan-like checks and observability, collects contexts in the browser, and uses Influence-guided Mutation to steer web inputs. The symbolic executor clusters and symbolizes contexts, performs coverage-guided symbolic execution under reachable entry states, and returns actionable constraints to steer the next online round. We evaluate SymWeb on 30 real-world Wasm-enabled websites. Under our Web threat model, SymWeb verifies 17 exploitable vulnerabilities and achieves 72.8% average Wasm basic-block coverage. Compared to the browser-based baseline Wemby, SymWeb finds 8 more verified vulnerabilities and improves coverage by 19.9 percentage points. Compared to the Wasm-only baseline WASEM, SymWeb finds 14 more verified vulnerabilities and improves coverage by 40.4 percentage points. Overall, these results show that closing the loop between browser-reachable context generation and context-aware Wasm analysis substantially improves both vulnerability-finding effectiveness and exploration depth in real Web environments.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (ISSTA) , 1401-1423
WASCII: Bridging WebAssembly Specifications and Implementations through LLM-Enhanced Validation
The rapid evolution of WebAssembly (Wasm) has led to significant implementation inconsistencies between its specification and the behavior of various Wasm runtimes, posing critical threats to application reliability and security. Verifying that a runtime's implementation adheres to the natural-language specification is a profound challenge. While Large Language Models offer a promising way to bridge the semantic gap between specification text and source code, their inherent fallibility makes them untrustworthy for direct verification. In this paper, we introduce WASCII, a novel framework for bridging specification and implementation with execution-based validation. Our approach first constructs a Check Tree from the natural-language specification, which captures the validation rules that runtimes must enforce. We then align runtime code to the Check Tree, and employ a Clean Room design with execution-based validation to ensure the correctness of the bridging. The validated test cases are then used for cross-runtime differential testing to identify behavioral inconsistencies. Evaluated on seven major Wasm runtimes, WASCII identified 248 differential behaviors, among which 35 are confirmed as previously unknown specification conformance issues, with 17 confirmed or fixed by developers. These results demonstrate that our approach is a highly effective strategy for discovering subtle yet critical bugs in complex systems.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (ISSTA) , 1401-1423
Open AccessWASCII: Bridging WebAssembly Specifications and Implementations through LLM-Enhanced Validation
The rapid evolution of WebAssembly (Wasm) has led to significant implementation inconsistencies between its specification and the behavior of various Wasm runtimes, posing critical threats to application reliability and security. Verifying that a runtime's implementation adheres to the natural-language specification is a profound challenge. While Large Language Models offer a promising way to bridge the semantic gap between specification text and source code, their inherent fallibility makes them untrustworthy for direct verification. In this paper, we introduce WASCII, a novel framework for bridging specification and implementation with execution-based validation. Our approach first constructs a Check Tree from the natural-language specification, which captures the validation rules that runtimes must enforce. We then align runtime code to the Check Tree, and employ a Clean Room design with execution-based validation to ensure the correctness of the bridging. The validated test cases are then used for cross-runtime differential testing to identify behavioral inconsistencies. Evaluated on seven major Wasm runtimes, WASCII identified 248 differential behaviors, among which 35 are confirmed as previously unknown specification conformance issues, with 17 confirmed or fixed by developers. These results demonstrate that our approach is a highly effective strategy for discovering subtle yet critical bugs in complex systems.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
- Vol. 10 (OOPSLA1) , 1989-2016
Reframing Paths as Logic: Semantic Segmentation for Vulnerability Detection
Path-sensitive vulnerabilities, such as use-after-free, integer overflows, and command injection, pose significant challenges for traditional static analysis tools, which often face trade-offs between precision, scalability, and interpretability. To address these challenges, we present SEVDF (Semantic-Enhanced Vulnerability Detection Framework), a novel methodology that integrates may-analysis taint propagation with large language models (LLMs) to detect path-related vulnerabilities in large C/C++ codebases. SEVDF begins by constructing a program dependency graph and performing a sound but incomplete taint analysis to extract all potential vulnerable paths. After segmentation, deduplication, feasibility check, and semantic summarization by LLMs, the vulnerable paths are reformed and confirmed with LLMs for their inter-procedural feasibility and semantic consistency. We evaluate SEVDF on the Juliet Test Suite (thirteen representative CWE categories) and a curated real-world dataset of 71 vulnerabilities across 9 projects. SEVDF consistently outperforms the default CodeQL rules, CodeQL rules with all unnecessary constraints removed, and three open-source detectors, which are Infer, Cppcheck and CodeChecker. SEVDF is able to achieve 100% precision on several CWEs while maintaining or improving recall on Juliet benchmark. Moreover, our segment-based design reduces the analysis workload for LLMs by 90.6% compared to direct-path prompting through Logic Unit deduplication, making SEVDF cost-effective for large-scale deployment. Finally, SEVDF uncovered and reported 29 0-day vulnerabilities (12 confirmed to date), including 3 CVEs in VirtualBox, demonstrating practical value.
- 10 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
- Vol. 10 (OOPSLA1) , 1989-2016
Open AccessReframing Paths as Logic: Semantic Segmentation for Vulnerability Detection
Path-sensitive vulnerabilities, such as use-after-free, integer overflows, and command injection, pose significant challenges for traditional static analysis tools, which often face trade-offs between precision, scalability, and interpretability. To address these challenges, we present SEVDF (Semantic-Enhanced Vulnerability Detection Framework), a novel methodology that integrates may-analysis taint propagation with large language models (LLMs) to detect path-related vulnerabilities in large C/C++ codebases. SEVDF begins by constructing a program dependency graph and performing a sound but incomplete taint analysis to extract all potential vulnerable paths. After segmentation, deduplication, feasibility check, and semantic summarization by LLMs, the vulnerable paths are reformed and confirmed with LLMs for their inter-procedural feasibility and semantic consistency. We evaluate SEVDF on the Juliet Test Suite (thirteen representative CWE categories) and a curated real-world dataset of 71 vulnerabilities across 9 projects. SEVDF consistently outperforms the default CodeQL rules, CodeQL rules with all unnecessary constraints removed, and three open-source detectors, which are Infer, Cppcheck and CodeChecker. SEVDF is able to achieve 100% precision on several CWEs while maintaining or improving recall on Juliet benchmark. Moreover, our segment-based design reduces the analysis workload for LLMs by 90.6% compared to direct-path prompting through Logic Unit deduplication, making SEVDF cost-effective for large-scale deployment. Finally, SEVDF uncovered and reported 29 0-day vulnerabilities (12 confirmed to date), including 3 CVEs in VirtualBox, demonstrating practical value.