Rui Hou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Rui Hou has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Haokun Zhang
School of Computer and Communication Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Lisha Shuai
School of Computer and Communication Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
1 shared publication - Nan Zhang
State Grid Information and Telecommunication Group Company Ltd., Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Shaofeng Tan
School of Computer and Communication Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Xiaolong Yang
School of Computer and Communication Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 April 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society
- Vol. 7, 4777-4794
PEEL: A Poisoning-Exposing Encoding Mechanism for Local Differential Privacy
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) has emerged as a dominant privacy paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoT) due to its lightweight, decentralized and scalable nature. However, the indistinguishability guarantee inherent to LDP mechanisms inadvertently masks adversarial manipulation, rendering poisoned data difficult to differentiate from legitimate perturbations. Existing poisoning defense mechanisms either incur prohibitive overheads incompatible with resource-constrained IoT devices or rely on rigid domain priors. To address this, we propose PEEL, a Poisoning-Exposing Encoding mechanism for LDP, which reformulates poisoning exposure as a geometric structural verification problem within the encoding subspace. Departing from probabilistic statistical filtering, PEEL exploits the rank disparity between legitimate sparse perturbations and arbitrary adversarial injections. By projecting LDP outputs onto a low-rank structural support, the mechanism forces poisoning attempts to manifest as deterministic reconstruction residuals, thereby exposing structure-violating output and rule poisoning attacks. Theoretical analysis confirms that PEEL, as a post-randomization encoding layer, preserves the unbiasedness and statistical accuracy of the underlying LDP protocols, while deterministically exposing structure-violating output and rule poisoning attacks. Extensive evaluations across six protocols and two real-world datasets confirm that PEEL reduces client-side overheads by orders of magnitude compared to cryptographic baselines, while maintaining F1 scores exceeding 99.8% against structure-violating output and rule poisoning attacks.
- 27 April 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society
- Vol. 7, 4777-4794
Open AccessPEEL: A Poisoning-Exposing Encoding Mechanism for Local Differential Privacy
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) has emerged as a dominant privacy paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoT) due to its lightweight, decentralized and scalable nature. However, the indistinguishability guarantee inherent to LDP mechanisms inadvertently masks adversarial manipulation, rendering poisoned data difficult to differentiate from legitimate perturbations. Existing poisoning defense mechanisms either incur prohibitive overheads incompatible with resource-constrained IoT devices or rely on rigid domain priors. To address this, we propose PEEL, a Poisoning-Exposing Encoding mechanism for LDP, which reformulates poisoning exposure as a geometric structural verification problem within the encoding subspace. Departing from probabilistic statistical filtering, PEEL exploits the rank disparity between legitimate sparse perturbations and arbitrary adversarial injections. By projecting LDP outputs onto a low-rank structural support, the mechanism forces poisoning attempts to manifest as deterministic reconstruction residuals, thereby exposing structure-violating output and rule poisoning attacks. Theoretical analysis confirms that PEEL, as a post-randomization encoding layer, preserves the unbiasedness and statistical accuracy of the underlying LDP protocols, while deterministically exposing structure-violating output and rule poisoning attacks. Extensive evaluations across six protocols and two real-world datasets confirm that PEEL reduces client-side overheads by orders of magnitude compared to cryptographic baselines, while maintaining F1 scores exceeding 99.8% against structure-violating output and rule poisoning attacks.