Ajai K. Singh
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ajai K. Singh has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Nandkumar Nayar
Lehigh University - College of Business & Economics
6 shared publicationsWen Yu
University of St. Thomas - Opus College of Business
5 shared publicationsJohn W. Cooney
Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business
4 shared publications- Konan Chan
Department of Finance, National ChengChi University, Taipei, Taiwan
4 shared publications Alok Pande
Government of India; Indian Institute of Management (IIMB), Bangalore
3 shared publications- Arif Khurshed
University of Manchester - Manchester Business School, Division of Accounting Finance
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 February 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Non-Underwritten Placements of Equity
We examine non-underwritten placements of seasoned equity made by publicly traded firms and contrast non-intermediated and intermediated deals. We posit that agent-assisted, intermediated placements indicate relative weakness, whereas healthier firms place their equity directly with investors. Indeed, the market reaction to announcements of non-intermediated (intermediated) placements of equity is significantly positive (negative). Our findings are robust to selection and simultaneity checks. On average, non-intermediated offerings are placed at a premium and exhibit significantly better long-run stock performance. We also examine the role of the information environment provided by analysts and the coverage by agent-affiliated analysts in private placements.
- 5 February 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessNon-Underwritten Placements of Equity
We examine non-underwritten placements of seasoned equity made by publicly traded firms and contrast non-intermediated and intermediated deals. We posit that agent-assisted, intermediated placements indicate relative weakness, whereas healthier firms place their equity directly with investors. Indeed, the market reaction to announcements of non-intermediated (intermediated) placements of equity is significantly positive (negative). Our findings are robust to selection and simultaneity checks. On average, non-intermediated offerings are placed at a premium and exhibit significantly better long-run stock performance. We also examine the role of the information environment provided by analysts and the coverage by agent-affiliated analysts in private placements.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Absorption in Stocks with Short-Selling Constraints
Under short-sales restrictions, we document a phenomenon where the market reacts again to publicly available adverse information, to which it has already responded before. We employ a Japanese dataset endowed with distinctive regulatory features pertaining to trading restrictions for a specific subset of stocks. The price reaction on the issue date, is to the now stale information to which the market has already reacted at its announcement. The phenomenon is attributable to a delayed reaction to publicly available information for short-sales restricted stocks, manifested only when additional shares are introduced.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Absorption in Stocks with Short-Selling Constraints
Under short-sales restrictions, we document a phenomenon where the market reacts again to publicly available adverse information, to which it has already responded before. We employ a Japanese dataset endowed with distinctive regulatory features pertaining to trading restrictions for a specific subset of stocks. The price reaction on the issue date, is to the now stale information to which the market has already reacted at its announcement. The phenomenon is attributable to a delayed reaction to publicly available information for short-sales restricted stocks, manifested only when additional shares are introduced.
- Open Access
- 10 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Short-Selling Constraints and Supply Effects
Japanese markets have unique institutional attributes, which provide an ideal laboratory for investigating potential supply effects. These regulatory factors permit an examination of issue-day price effects, at the influx of additional shares from equity offerings, free of simultaneous release of new information. Moreover, Japanese regulations permit a clean identification of stocks with and without short-sales constraints. We posit that trading constraints engender a supply effect. Indeed, a supply effect is experienced by short-sale constrained stocks: Consistent with downward sloping demand curves, issue-day returns are significantly negative and, negatively related to the offers’ relative size, only for trading restricted stocks.
- 10 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessShort-Selling Constraints and Supply Effects
Japanese markets have unique institutional attributes, which provide an ideal laboratory for investigating potential supply effects. These regulatory factors permit an examination of issue-day price effects, at the influx of additional shares from equity offerings, free of simultaneous release of new information. Moreover, Japanese regulations permit a clean identification of stocks with and without short-sales constraints. We posit that trading constraints engender a supply effect. Indeed, a supply effect is experienced by short-sale constrained stocks: Consistent with downward sloping demand curves, issue-day returns are significantly negative and, negatively related to the offers’ relative size, only for trading restricted stocks.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Do Social Ties Help Get a Seat at the Table?
We examine the role of social ties in IPO underwriting syndicate formation and find that an investment bank is more likely to be included in the underwriting syndicate when it is connected to the IPO firm through interpersonal social ties between the respective executives and directors. These social ties generate better outcomes, consistent with a quid pro quo arrangement between the respective parties. The investment bank benefits by receiving higher compensation, a more senior role in the IPO, and greater share allocations. For the IPO firm, the presence of social ties between the IPO issuer and the chosen underwriters is associated with net wealth gains for its pre-IPO shareholders.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIPO Underwriting Syndicates: Do Social Ties Help Get a Seat at the Table?
We examine the role of social ties in IPO underwriting syndicate formation and find that an investment bank is more likely to be included in the underwriting syndicate when it is connected to the IPO firm through interpersonal social ties between the respective executives and directors. These social ties generate better outcomes, consistent with a quid pro quo arrangement between the respective parties. The investment bank benefits by receiving higher compensation, a more senior role in the IPO, and greater share allocations. For the IPO firm, the presence of social ties between the IPO issuer and the chosen underwriters is associated with net wealth gains for its pre-IPO shareholders.
- Open Access
- 23 December 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Market Reaction, Revised Proceeds, and the Classification of Seasoned Equity Offerings
Registrations of SEOs serve to galvanize information gathering about issuers. We posit that market reaction to new information influences issuers’ decision about their final offer size. The offer size relative to the amount filed initially is a parsimonious measure which helps predict subsequent firm performance. Improved offerings, whose offer size exceeds the amount registered originally, record significantly positive price reaction on the offer date and do not underperform post-issuance. Conversely their complement, Regular offers, experience significantly negative reaction on the offer date and underperform their benchmark following issuance. Improved SEO firms make relatively higher investments and generate stronger institutional demand.
- 23 December 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMarket Reaction, Revised Proceeds, and the Classification of Seasoned Equity Offerings
Registrations of SEOs serve to galvanize information gathering about issuers. We posit that market reaction to new information influences issuers’ decision about their final offer size. The offer size relative to the amount filed initially is a parsimonious measure which helps predict subsequent firm performance. Improved offerings, whose offer size exceeds the amount registered originally, record significantly positive price reaction on the offer date and do not underperform post-issuance. Conversely their complement, Regular offers, experience significantly negative reaction on the offer date and underperform their benchmark following issuance. Improved SEO firms make relatively higher investments and generate stronger institutional demand.
- Open Access
- 15 March 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Sentiment Traders & IPO Initial Returns
The distinct regulatory design of Indian IPOs permits an empirical evaluation of IPO underpricing models against those that model IPO initial returns as a consequence of overpricing. Characteristics of the Indian bookbuilding process allow us to study the timing and subscription patterns of different investor groups and to dissect IPO returns into two distinct components: one relating to pre-listing pricing by the underwriter and the other to the initial return from first day’s trade in the post-listing period. We find that a transparent bookbuilding process can alleviate the winner’s curse problem for retail investors but that does not eliminate IPO initial returns. Further, IPO initial returns persist but do not increase even if investment bankers are stripped of their discretionary allocation power. These results are not supportive of voluntary underpricing models. We find that the unmet demand of non-institutional investor groups is the primary driver of the IPO initial return. We consider these results to be supportive of the Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) models and consistent with the conclusions in Loffler, Panther and Theissen (2005) and Ljungqvist, Cornelli and Goldreich (2006).
- 15 March 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSentiment Traders & IPO Initial Returns
The distinct regulatory design of Indian IPOs permits an empirical evaluation of IPO underpricing models against those that model IPO initial returns as a consequence of overpricing. Characteristics of the Indian bookbuilding process allow us to study the timing and subscription patterns of different investor groups and to dissect IPO returns into two distinct components: one relating to pre-listing pricing by the underwriter and the other to the initial return from first day’s trade in the post-listing period. We find that a transparent bookbuilding process can alleviate the winner’s curse problem for retail investors but that does not eliminate IPO initial returns. Further, IPO initial returns persist but do not increase even if investment bankers are stripped of their discretionary allocation power. These results are not supportive of voluntary underpricing models. We find that the unmet demand of non-institutional investor groups is the primary driver of the IPO initial return. We consider these results to be supportive of the Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) models and consistent with the conclusions in Loffler, Panther and Theissen (2005) and Ljungqvist, Cornelli and Goldreich (2006).
- Open Access
- 21 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Market Reaction, Managerial Response, and the Classification of SEOs
The registration date of a seasoned equity offering marks the beginning of the offering process and serves to galvanize further scrutiny and information gathering about the issuer. We posit that the market reaction to this new additional information influences issuers’ decisions about their SEOs. Consistent with this view, we develop a parsimonious ex ante measure that successfully separates stock offerings designed to time the market (Regular offers) from those presumably used for bona fide corporate reasons such as to fund investments (Improved offers). Improved offerings, where the dollar offer size exceeds the amount filed initially at registration, record a significantly positive price reaction on the offer date and do not underperform their benchmark in the post-issuance period. Conversely, Regular offers underperform in both instances. Further, Improved SEO firms make higher investments and generate stronger institutional demand compared to Regular SEOs.
- 21 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMarket Reaction, Managerial Response, and the Classification of SEOs
The registration date of a seasoned equity offering marks the beginning of the offering process and serves to galvanize further scrutiny and information gathering about the issuer. We posit that the market reaction to this new additional information influences issuers’ decisions about their SEOs. Consistent with this view, we develop a parsimonious ex ante measure that successfully separates stock offerings designed to time the market (Regular offers) from those presumably used for bona fide corporate reasons such as to fund investments (Improved offers). Improved offerings, where the dollar offer size exceeds the amount filed initially at registration, record a significantly positive price reaction on the offer date and do not underperform their benchmark in the post-issuance period. Conversely, Regular offers underperform in both instances. Further, Improved SEO firms make higher investments and generate stronger institutional demand compared to Regular SEOs.
- Open Access
- 13 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Who is #1? A New Approach to Ranking U.S. Equity Underwriters
We introduce a new approach to ranking U.S. equity underwriters, the ELO system. This system was originally developed for ranking chess players, and has subsequently been used to rank competitors in many other areas. In our implementation, we view an equity offering as a contest in which participating members of the underwriting syndicate compete for prestige as measured by their relative proportion of shares underwritten. Banks that underwrite a greater portion of the shares in a particular offering are viewed as “defeating” those with smaller allocations. Based on 7,713 IPOs and 6,345 SEOs from 1978 to 2009, we use this approach to rank banks actively participating in equity underwriting syndicates across five subperiods. First Boston is the highest ranked investment bank in the first of these periods (1978-84) and Goldman Sachs is the highest ranked in the most recent period (2005-09). The ELO system overcomes several of the disadvantages of existing ranking systems and in empirical tests does better than the Carter-Manaster ranking system in measuring prestige. Similar to other studies, we find that the prestige of the lead underwriter, as measured by its ELO rating, is negatively related to IPO underpricing in the 1980s and positively related to IPO underpricing in the 1990s and 2000s. Prestige is negatively related to SEO underpricing across all three decades.
- 13 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWho is #1? A New Approach to Ranking U.S. Equity Underwriters
We introduce a new approach to ranking U.S. equity underwriters, the ELO system. This system was originally developed for ranking chess players, and has subsequently been used to rank competitors in many other areas. In our implementation, we view an equity offering as a contest in which participating members of the underwriting syndicate compete for prestige as measured by their relative proportion of shares underwritten. Banks that underwrite a greater portion of the shares in a particular offering are viewed as “defeating” those with smaller allocations. Based on 7,713 IPOs and 6,345 SEOs from 1978 to 2009, we use this approach to rank banks actively participating in equity underwriting syndicates across five subperiods. First Boston is the highest ranked investment bank in the first of these periods (1978-84) and Goldman Sachs is the highest ranked in the most recent period (2005-09). The ELO system overcomes several of the disadvantages of existing ranking systems and in empirical tests does better than the Carter-Manaster ranking system in measuring prestige. Similar to other studies, we find that the prestige of the lead underwriter, as measured by its ELO rating, is negatively related to IPO underpricing in the 1980s and positively related to IPO underpricing in the 1990s and 2000s. Prestige is negatively related to SEO underpricing across all three decades.
- Open Access
- 12 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Market Feedback and Classification of Market Timing SEOs
We posit that the market’s response during the registration period influences issuers’ decisions about their SEOs. In line with our proposition we develop a parsimonious ex ante measure that successfully separates stock offerings designed to time the market (Regular SEOs) from those used to fund investments or for general corporate purposes (Improved offers). Improved seasoned equity offerings, whose dollar offer size exceeds the amount filed initially at registration, record a significantly positive price reaction on the offer date and do not underperform their benchmark in the post-issuance period. Conversely, Regular offers underperform in both instances. The return difference between the two SEO groups amounts to 0.7% per month in the two-year post-issue period. Further, Improved SEO firms generate stronger institutional demand around offerings and make higher investments following their offers compared to Regular SEOs.
- 12 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMarket Feedback and Classification of Market Timing SEOs
We posit that the market’s response during the registration period influences issuers’ decisions about their SEOs. In line with our proposition we develop a parsimonious ex ante measure that successfully separates stock offerings designed to time the market (Regular SEOs) from those used to fund investments or for general corporate purposes (Improved offers). Improved seasoned equity offerings, whose dollar offer size exceeds the amount filed initially at registration, record a significantly positive price reaction on the offer date and do not underperform their benchmark in the post-issuance period. Conversely, Regular offers underperform in both instances. The return difference between the two SEO groups amounts to 0.7% per month in the two-year post-issue period. Further, Improved SEO firms generate stronger institutional demand around offerings and make higher investments following their offers compared to Regular SEOs.
- Open Access
- 17 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Dissection of Bookbuilt IPOs: Subscriptions, Underpricing, and Initial Returns
Certain unique characteristics of the Indian bookbuilding process allow us to study the timing and subscription pattern of different investor groups and to dissect the IPO returns into two distinct components: one relating to pre-listing underpricing set by the underwriter and the initial return from first day's trade in the post-listing period. The transparency of the bookbuilding process in India alleviates the winner's curse problem for the uninformed investors and we find that non-institutional buyers follow institutional investors' subscription patterns when bidding for the IPO shares. However, Indian IPOs still exhibit significant positive initial return in the post-listing aftermarket, even after the removal of the underwriters' power of discretionary allocations to preferred institutional clients. These results are inconsistent with Rock's (1986) winner's-curse explanation for positive IPO initial returns and also with that of Benevineste and Spindts' (1989) preferred allocation/information extraction quid pro quo model. We find that the IPO initial return is driven primarily by the unmet demand of the noninstitutional investor groups and consider these results to be generally supportive of Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006).
- 17 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Dissection of Bookbuilt IPOs: Subscriptions, Underpricing, and Initial Returns
Certain unique characteristics of the Indian bookbuilding process allow us to study the timing and subscription pattern of different investor groups and to dissect the IPO returns into two distinct components: one relating to pre-listing underpricing set by the underwriter and the initial return from first day's trade in the post-listing period. The transparency of the bookbuilding process in India alleviates the winner's curse problem for the uninformed investors and we find that non-institutional buyers follow institutional investors' subscription patterns when bidding for the IPO shares. However, Indian IPOs still exhibit significant positive initial return in the post-listing aftermarket, even after the removal of the underwriters' power of discretionary allocations to preferred institutional clients. These results are inconsistent with Rock's (1986) winner's-curse explanation for positive IPO initial returns and also with that of Benevineste and Spindts' (1989) preferred allocation/information extraction quid pro quo model. We find that the IPO initial return is driven primarily by the unmet demand of the noninstitutional investor groups and consider these results to be generally supportive of Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006).