Ziqing Yang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ziqing Yang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael Backes
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany
2 shared publications - Yang Zhang
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany
2 shared publications - Rui Wen
Institute of Science Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
1 shared publication Xinlei He
Wuhan University, Wuchang, Wuhan, China
1 shared publication- Xinyu Zhang
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany
1 shared publication - Yun Shen
Flexera, Bracknell, U.K.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4417-4431
PersonaHate: A Scalable Persona-Based Data Synthesis Pipeline for Hate Speech Analysis
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4417-4431
Open AccessPersonaHate: A Scalable Persona-Based Data Synthesis Pipeline for Hate Speech Analysis
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 5530-5543
BadBone: Backdoor Attacks Against Backbone Models in Visual Prompt Learning
Prompt learning is a new machine learning paradigm that has attracted ample attention due to its simplicity and proven efficacy. Despite its growing adoption, the security vulnerabilities associated with this paradigm remain underexplored. In this work, we take the first step to propose BadBone, a stealthy and adaptive backdoor attack against prompt learning using bi-level optimization. Instead of backdooring the prompt learning process, we aim to compromise a backbone model such that only target downstream tasks employing prompt learning inherit the backdoor vulnerability. Extensive experiments on three different models and three datasets from various domains show that our targeted/untargeted backdoored models achieve high attack performance while maintaining utility on both pretraining and downstream tasks. Moreover, we evaluate our approach against six state-of-the-art model-level defenses, including Neural Cleanse, ABS, MNTD, NAD, CLP, and D-BR. The results demonstrate that these defenses are largely ineffective against our backdoored models and thus leave the effective defense as an important direction for future work. Our code is available at https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/BadBone.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 5530-5543
BadBone: Backdoor Attacks Against Backbone Models in Visual Prompt Learning
Prompt learning is a new machine learning paradigm that has attracted ample attention due to its simplicity and proven efficacy. Despite its growing adoption, the security vulnerabilities associated with this paradigm remain underexplored. In this work, we take the first step to propose BadBone, a stealthy and adaptive backdoor attack against prompt learning using bi-level optimization. Instead of backdooring the prompt learning process, we aim to compromise a backbone model such that only target downstream tasks employing prompt learning inherit the backdoor vulnerability. Extensive experiments on three different models and three datasets from various domains show that our targeted/untargeted backdoored models achieve high attack performance while maintaining utility on both pretraining and downstream tasks. Moreover, we evaluate our approach against six state-of-the-art model-level defenses, including Neural Cleanse, ABS, MNTD, NAD, CLP, and D-BR. The results demonstrate that these defenses are largely ineffective against our backdoored models and thus leave the effective defense as an important direction for future work. Our code is available at https://github.com/TrustAIRLab/BadBone.