Ruian Duan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ruian Duan has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daiping Liu
Palo Alto Networks, Santa Clara, CA, USA
1 shared publication - Janos Szurdi
Independent researcher, Budapest, Hungary
1 shared publication - Mohammad Ghasemisharif
Palo Alto Networks, Santa Clara, USA
1 shared publication - Reethika Ramesh
Palo Alto Networks, Santa Clara, USA
1 shared publication - William Melicher
Palo Alto Networks, Santa Clara, USA
1 shared publication - Zhanhao Chen
Palo Alto Networks, Santa Clara, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1228-1245
Practical Real-time Detection of IPv4 Record Classical Domain Hijacking at Scale
One of the most dangerous cyberattacks is classical domain hijacking, where an attacker takes control of the administration of a domain's existing DNS records, modifying them, and sending visitors to malicious destinations. Domain hijacking can have a disastrous impact on both domain owners and their users, as criminals can direct all users to Man-in-the-Middle, phishing, and a wide array of other attacks. In recent years, researchers have analyzed and built detectors for various types of DNS hijacking attacks, including domain shadowing, exploitation of mistyped domains, and abuse of dangling records. However, only two studies on classical domain hijacking exist, failing to provide the community with a method to identify domain hijacking precisely and in time. This paper explores the feasibility of real-time classical domain hijacking detection for IPv4 records and characterizes its prevalence in the wild. We designed a framework that can process hundreds of millions of new records to identify a few dozen hijacking records or to analyze live DNS traffic from customers of a large cybersecurity company in around ten minutes. The framework leverages hundreds of terabytes of passive DNS logs and geolocation databases. It also utilizes active measurements such as WHOIS and web crawls to collect additional information about potential hijacking records. We evaluated the framework on our labeled datasets and additionally tested it in a large DNS security provider's network for over a year, finding multiple new domain hijacking attacks. Our work provides the first method for detecting domain hijacking with high precision, in real-time, and tested in a production environment.
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1228-1245
Open AccessPractical Real-time Detection of IPv4 Record Classical Domain Hijacking at Scale
One of the most dangerous cyberattacks is classical domain hijacking, where an attacker takes control of the administration of a domain's existing DNS records, modifying them, and sending visitors to malicious destinations. Domain hijacking can have a disastrous impact on both domain owners and their users, as criminals can direct all users to Man-in-the-Middle, phishing, and a wide array of other attacks. In recent years, researchers have analyzed and built detectors for various types of DNS hijacking attacks, including domain shadowing, exploitation of mistyped domains, and abuse of dangling records. However, only two studies on classical domain hijacking exist, failing to provide the community with a method to identify domain hijacking precisely and in time. This paper explores the feasibility of real-time classical domain hijacking detection for IPv4 records and characterizes its prevalence in the wild. We designed a framework that can process hundreds of millions of new records to identify a few dozen hijacking records or to analyze live DNS traffic from customers of a large cybersecurity company in around ten minutes. The framework leverages hundreds of terabytes of passive DNS logs and geolocation databases. It also utilizes active measurements such as WHOIS and web crawls to collect additional information about potential hijacking records. We evaluated the framework on our labeled datasets and additionally tested it in a large DNS security provider's network for over a year, finding multiple new domain hijacking attacks. Our work provides the first method for detecting domain hijacking with high precision, in real-time, and tested in a production environment.