FSFaezeh Sadat Sajadi

Faezeh Sadat Sajadi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Faezeh Sadat Sajadi has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Alexey Nekrasov

    Institute for Computer Technologies and Information Security, Southern Federal University, Chekhova 2, Taganrog 347922, Russia

    3 shared publications
  • Alexey Petrenko

    Scientific Center for Information Technologies and Artificial Intelligence, Sirius University of Science and Technology, Sirius Federal Territory, Sochi 354340, Russia

    3 shared publications
  • Evgeniya Ishchukova

    Scientific Center for Information Technologies and Artificial Intelligence, Sirius University of Science and Technology, Sirius Federal Territory, Sochi 354340, Russia

    3 shared publications
  • Sergei Petrenko

    Scientific Center for Information Technologies and Artificial Intelligence, Sirius University of Science and Technology, Sirius Federal Territory, Sochi 354340, Russia

    3 shared publications

Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Comparative Performance Analysis of NIST-Selected Post-Quantum Signature Schemes for Distributed Ledger Technology

    by Evgeniya Ishchukova, Faezeh Sadat Sajadi, Sergei Petrenko, Alexey Petrenko, Alexey Nekrasov

    Distributed ledgers must migrate from elliptic-curve signatures to post-quantum alternatives, and the open question is no longer which primitives are available but which ledger resource they exhaust first. This paper identifies the binding constraint of a block-constrained ledger after migration and its margin: whether capacity is limited by transaction payload or by signature-verification throughput. The inputs are measurements of the three NIST-selected families—ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), and FN-DSA (FIPS 206, in development)—across all nine parameter sets and three classical baselines on one x86-64 platform under WSL2. Under first-order analytical bounds, payload capacity is the binding constraint for every scheme at the block sizes, intervals, and transaction formats examined, with verification headroom from 124 to 1622 times for the post-quantum configurations. The verification advantage of ML-DSA is parameter-dependent: ML-DSA-44 verifies 1.47 times faster than the ECDSA secp256k1 ledger verifier, whereas ML-DSA-87, mandated by CNSA 2.0, is 1.67 times slower; absolute timings and these ratios may differ on other platforms. Five of the nine configurations are Pareto-optimal within their security level. The FN-DSA results reflect the liboqs 0.16.0 implementation and may change once FIPS 206 is finalized. An interleaved control-probe protocol holds the mean cross-run coefficient of variation to 1.35%.

  • Open Access

    A Quantum Risk Index for Cryptographic CVEs: Empirical Evidence from the National Vulnerability Database, 2016–2026

    by Evgeniya Ishchukova, Faezeh Sadat Sajadi, Sergei Petrenko, Alexey Petrenko, Alexey Nekrasov

    The harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) attack is an attack that collects encrypted information now and decrypts it later after the arrival of a quantum computer that can perform some cryptographic operations. Time of exposure is data retention and not Q-Day, so the threat is imminent, but it is not reflected in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). We present the Quantum Risk Index (QRI), which is based on CVSS base severity, the Quantum Factor (QF, vulnerability to Shor’s or Grover’s algorithm), and the HNDL Score (HS, susceptibility to a harvest-and-store adversary). We computed the QRI for 78,587 CVEs that were cataloged in the NIST National Vulnerability Database between January 2016 and the first quarter of 2026 and cross-checked it with the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) list. The number of CVEs related to cryptography increased by a CAGR of 11.0%, while the number of Shor-vulnerable CVEs increased at a CAGR of 8.8%. The 437 KEV-matched CVEs carry a mean QRI of 13.05, against 10.31 for the non-KEV remainder—a 26.6% separation (p = 2.17 × 10−63)—and Shor-vulnerable CVEs appear in the KEV list at 1.52 times the baseline rate (p = 0.002). This separation is valid for each of the tested settings of QF and HS. This is the first study to apply a quantum-adjusted vulnerability score to a government’s in-the-wild vulnerability reporting database at the CVE scale, providing a repeatable foundation for quantum-aware vulnerability triage.


  • Open Access

    Post-Quantum Transition in Blockchain Architectures: A Systematic Review of Cross-Layer Security, Performance, and Governance Constraints

    by Evgeniya Ishchukova, Faezeh Sadat Sajadi, Sergei Petrenko, Alexey Petrenko, Alexey Nekrasov

    We performed a cross-layer, system-level analysis of the post-quantum transition of blockchain architectures through a systematic review. The analysis, based on 108 peer-reviewed studies, moves beyond post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as merely a primitive substitution and examines how quantum pressures cascade through validation, propagation, interoperability, governance, and regulatory layers. Empirical results show that the authenticated payloads for lattice signatures grow from ~65–73 bytes (ECDSA) up to kilobyte-scale sizes, and verification overhead is increased by a factor of 2× to 5× depending on the deployment scenario. Such inflation can narrow block-capacity margins, increase propagation delay under fixed-interval regimes, and shift validator resource thresholds in heterogeneous networks. Moreover, the harvest-now–decrypt-later model creates a temporal asymmetry between the design options and the exposure window. These findings indicate that post-quantum resilience depends more on maintaining a structural balance among the tightly coupled technical and institutional stress channels than on the strength of the algorithm itself, and migration success ultimately depends on the ability to coordinate the management of these constraints, rather than on managing them separately.