Nataliia Kovalevska
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Nataliia Kovalevska has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
A. Hryzo
1 shared publication- A. Ponomar1 shared publication
O. Kostyria
1 shared publication- S. Hrytsaienko1 shared publication
- Serhii Kovalevskyi
Харківський національний університет Повітряних Сил ім. І. Кожедуба, Харків, Україна
1 shared publication - Vadym Krykun1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 September 2026
- Published by State Scientific Research Institute of Armament and Military Equipment Testing and Certification in Наукові праці Державного науково-дослідного інституту випробувань і сертифікації озброєння та військової техніки
- No. 3(29),p. 147-158
ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE SEGMENT OF THE GLOBAL MILITARY RADAR MARKET, LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
The article presents a comprehensive analysis of the global market for military radar systems, with a focus on the Chinese segment as a potential source of supply for countries developing or modernizing national air defense systems. It is shown that the global military radar market demonstrates steady growth driven by escalating geopolitical tensions, the emergence of new types of aerial threats, and the obsolescence of a significant share of existing air defense systems worldwide. China is found to rank second globally in ground-based radar sales, surpassing its European competitors, which is attributed to state policy on technological autonomy and the implementation of the "Made in China 2025" strategy. The paper examines the tactical and technical characteristics of five key export models of Chinese radars (JYL-1, JY-26, JY-27A, JY-11B, YLC-18A), as well as manufacturers' marketing strategies, which are accompanied by hyperbolic promotional rhetoric regarding their ability to counter modern Western air-attack assets. Documented operational problems among user countries are examined, along with the results of the combat employment of Chinese radars during the U.S. operation in Venezuela in January 2026, which revealed a critical gap between declared and actual combat performance. Structural factors behind the unsatisfactory quality of Chinese radar equipment are identified, including corrupt practices, technological gaps in the production base, and the lack of commercial motivation among suppliers under the "state-to-state" contracting model. Criteria for supplier evaluation are formulated, together with practical recommendations for improving Ukraine's defense procurement system under martial law, in particular avoiding single-supplier dependence and accounting for total life-cycle cost.
- 30 September 2026
- Published by State Scientific Research Institute of Armament and Military Equipment Testing and Certification in Наукові праці Державного науково-дослідного інституту випробувань і сертифікації озброєння та військової техніки
- No. 3(29),p. 147-158
Open AccessANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE SEGMENT OF THE GLOBAL MILITARY RADAR MARKET, LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
The article presents a comprehensive analysis of the global market for military radar systems, with a focus on the Chinese segment as a potential source of supply for countries developing or modernizing national air defense systems. It is shown that the global military radar market demonstrates steady growth driven by escalating geopolitical tensions, the emergence of new types of aerial threats, and the obsolescence of a significant share of existing air defense systems worldwide. China is found to rank second globally in ground-based radar sales, surpassing its European competitors, which is attributed to state policy on technological autonomy and the implementation of the "Made in China 2025" strategy. The paper examines the tactical and technical characteristics of five key export models of Chinese radars (JYL-1, JY-26, JY-27A, JY-11B, YLC-18A), as well as manufacturers' marketing strategies, which are accompanied by hyperbolic promotional rhetoric regarding their ability to counter modern Western air-attack assets. Documented operational problems among user countries are examined, along with the results of the combat employment of Chinese radars during the U.S. operation in Venezuela in January 2026, which revealed a critical gap between declared and actual combat performance. Structural factors behind the unsatisfactory quality of Chinese radar equipment are identified, including corrupt practices, technological gaps in the production base, and the lack of commercial motivation among suppliers under the "state-to-state" contracting model. Criteria for supplier evaluation are formulated, together with practical recommendations for improving Ukraine's defense procurement system under martial law, in particular avoiding single-supplier dependence and accounting for total life-cycle cost.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by State Scientific Research Institute of Armament and Military Equipment Testing and Certification in Наукові праці Державного науково-дослідного інституту випробувань і сертифікації озброєння та військової техніки
- No. 2(28),p. 7-21
LESSONS FROM OPERATION “ABSOLUTE RESOLVE”, ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES IN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS UNDER MULTI-DOMAIN EFFECTS AND APPROACHES TO RISK MITIGATION
The article is devoted to the analysis of architectural vulnerabilities of integrated air defense systems under multidomain adversary influence. Based on a detailed examination of the U.S. Armed Forces’ military operation “Absolute Resolve” against Venezuela (January 2026), critical vulnerabilities were identified in an air defense architecture built on the principle of quantitative saturation with radar assets without proper organizational and technical integration of components from different manufacturers. The study investigates the synergistic effects of kinetic, cyber, electronic warfare, and energy factors, which led to rapid disorganization of the command and control (C2) system, loss of situational awareness, and the effective paralysis of the entire air defense system. Special attention is given to the fact that the decisive factor in the operation’s success was not only the technological gap but also a five-month phase of comprehensive reconnaissance (August–December 2025), during which U.S. forces created a “digital twin” of Venezuela’s air defense system. This approach enabled maximum shortening of the adversary’s decision-making cycle and ensured high synchronization of multidomain effects. The research methodology includes analysis of open-source data with cross-source verification, a system-structural approach to evaluating air defense architecture, functional analysis of impacts on the command cycle, and a comparative method referencing contemporary conflicts, particularly the russian-ukrainian war. The study analyzed the characteristics of Venezuela’s radar reconnaissance system, which relied on Chinese and russian complexes. Despite wide spatial coverage, the system proved fragmented, overly centralized, and critically dependent on civilian energy infrastructure. It was determined that the neutralization of a limited number of key nodes resulted in systemic collapse, rendering approximately 60 % of air defense assets nonoperational or non-integrated at the onset of the active phase of the operation. For the Armed Forces of Ukraine, key directions to enhance the resilience of radar reconnaissance systems have been identified: transition to a network-centric architecture with distributed command functions; autonomy and decentralization of units; ensuring energy independence of each node; implementation of the dynamic functional survivability concept; changing radar operating modes and positions, response algorithms, and applying concealment measures to complicate adversary reconnaissance; and development of a robust logistics system capable of functioning under prolonged conflict conditions.
- 30 June 2026
- Published by State Scientific Research Institute of Armament and Military Equipment Testing and Certification in Наукові праці Державного науково-дослідного інституту випробувань і сертифікації озброєння та військової техніки
- No. 2(28),p. 7-21
Open AccessLESSONS FROM OPERATION “ABSOLUTE RESOLVE”, ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES IN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS UNDER MULTI-DOMAIN EFFECTS AND APPROACHES TO RISK MITIGATION
The article is devoted to the analysis of architectural vulnerabilities of integrated air defense systems under multidomain adversary influence. Based on a detailed examination of the U.S. Armed Forces’ military operation “Absolute Resolve” against Venezuela (January 2026), critical vulnerabilities were identified in an air defense architecture built on the principle of quantitative saturation with radar assets without proper organizational and technical integration of components from different manufacturers. The study investigates the synergistic effects of kinetic, cyber, electronic warfare, and energy factors, which led to rapid disorganization of the command and control (C2) system, loss of situational awareness, and the effective paralysis of the entire air defense system. Special attention is given to the fact that the decisive factor in the operation’s success was not only the technological gap but also a five-month phase of comprehensive reconnaissance (August–December 2025), during which U.S. forces created a “digital twin” of Venezuela’s air defense system. This approach enabled maximum shortening of the adversary’s decision-making cycle and ensured high synchronization of multidomain effects. The research methodology includes analysis of open-source data with cross-source verification, a system-structural approach to evaluating air defense architecture, functional analysis of impacts on the command cycle, and a comparative method referencing contemporary conflicts, particularly the russian-ukrainian war. The study analyzed the characteristics of Venezuela’s radar reconnaissance system, which relied on Chinese and russian complexes. Despite wide spatial coverage, the system proved fragmented, overly centralized, and critically dependent on civilian energy infrastructure. It was determined that the neutralization of a limited number of key nodes resulted in systemic collapse, rendering approximately 60 % of air defense assets nonoperational or non-integrated at the onset of the active phase of the operation. For the Armed Forces of Ukraine, key directions to enhance the resilience of radar reconnaissance systems have been identified: transition to a network-centric architecture with distributed command functions; autonomy and decentralization of units; ensuring energy independence of each node; implementation of the dynamic functional survivability concept; changing radar operating modes and positions, response algorithms, and applying concealment measures to complicate adversary reconnaissance; and development of a robust logistics system capable of functioning under prolonged conflict conditions.