Haotong Liu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Haotong Liu has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Wanpeng Li
University of Liverpool
3 shared publications - Zhi Wang
College of Cryptology and Cyber Science, Nankai University, Tianjin, China
3 shared publications - Zhuohang Liu
Nankai University, College of Cryptology and Cyber Science, Tianjin, China
2 shared publications - Yuejun Guo
Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7429-7431
POSTER: Beyond Pickle-Free: Loading-Boundary Failures in Safetensors
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7429-7431
Open AccessPOSTER: Beyond Pickle-Free: Loading-Boundary Failures in Safetensors
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (FSE) , 3793-3815
DECODE: Dynamic Exploration for Constraint-Guided Vulnerability Discovery in Deep Learning Operators
The security and robustness of deep learning (DL) frameworks are vital, as vulnerabilities in low-level operator implementations can lead to serious reliability and security risks. While testing has proven effective in uncovering such flaws, existing techniques struggle to accurately capture the complex input constraints required by DL operators, resulting in low test coverage and missed bugs. To address this, we propose DECODE, a fully automated framework that performs efficient and precise constraint extraction through dynamic analysis. DECODE models operator-specific input requirements by observing valid execution traces and exploring constraint relationships. It then uses these refined constraints to generate high-quality test inputs capable of exposing memory error vulnerabilities. We evaluated DECODE on two widely used DL frameworks - TensorFlow and PyTorch - where it uncovered 96 bugs (54 in TensorFlow and 42 in PyTorch), 82 of which have been confirmed by developers. Compared to state-of-the-art tools, DECODE detected 41, 75, and 87 more bugs than IvySyn, DocTer, and DeepREL, respectively, demonstrating its superior effectiveness in uncovering previously undetected vulnerabilities.
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
- Vol. 3 (FSE) , 3793-3815
Open AccessDECODE: Dynamic Exploration for Constraint-Guided Vulnerability Discovery in Deep Learning Operators
The security and robustness of deep learning (DL) frameworks are vital, as vulnerabilities in low-level operator implementations can lead to serious reliability and security risks. While testing has proven effective in uncovering such flaws, existing techniques struggle to accurately capture the complex input constraints required by DL operators, resulting in low test coverage and missed bugs. To address this, we propose DECODE, a fully automated framework that performs efficient and precise constraint extraction through dynamic analysis. DECODE models operator-specific input requirements by observing valid execution traces and exploring constraint relationships. It then uses these refined constraints to generate high-quality test inputs capable of exposing memory error vulnerabilities. We evaluated DECODE on two widely used DL frameworks - TensorFlow and PyTorch - where it uncovered 96 bugs (54 in TensorFlow and 42 in PyTorch), 82 of which have been confirmed by developers. Compared to state-of-the-art tools, DECODE detected 41, 75, and 87 more bugs than IvySyn, DocTer, and DeepREL, respectively, demonstrating its superior effectiveness in uncovering previously undetected vulnerabilities.
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3673-3685
An Empirical Study on Static Application Security Testing (SAST) Tools for Python
Python is currently the most popular programming language and ensuring the security of Python applications has become a critical concern. Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools have been introduced to address this need, claiming to support a wide range of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). However, the ability of these tools to detect real-world vulnerabilities in Python programs has not been comprehensively evaluated. In this paper, we selected eight SAST tools from 117 existing ones based on well-designed criteria. Based on the synthetic and real-world dataset, we evaluated and compared these SAST tools from different perspectives including effectiveness and efficiency. Our results reveal significant limitations in current SAST tools: although perform well on the synthetic dataset, a single tool detects no more than 40% of the vulnerabilities in our real-world dataset. Even when aggregating the outputs of all evaluated tools, only 66.7% of the real-world vulnerabilities are identified. To further understand these shortcomings, we performed a root cause analysis of the detection results and identified useful insights for both SAST tool designers and users, focusing on tool development, evaluation, and selection.
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3673-3685
Open AccessAn Empirical Study on Static Application Security Testing (SAST) Tools for Python
Python is currently the most popular programming language and ensuring the security of Python applications has become a critical concern. Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools have been introduced to address this need, claiming to support a wide range of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). However, the ability of these tools to detect real-world vulnerabilities in Python programs has not been comprehensively evaluated. In this paper, we selected eight SAST tools from 117 existing ones based on well-designed criteria. Based on the synthetic and real-world dataset, we evaluated and compared these SAST tools from different perspectives including effectiveness and efficiency. Our results reveal significant limitations in current SAST tools: although perform well on the synthetic dataset, a single tool detects no more than 40% of the vulnerabilities in our real-world dataset. Even when aggregating the outputs of all evaluated tools, only 66.7% of the real-world vulnerabilities are identified. To further understand these shortcomings, we performed a root cause analysis of the detection results and identified useful insights for both SAST tool designers and users, focusing on tool development, evaluation, and selection.