Tianming Yan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Tianming Yan has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hongliang Tian
Ant Group, Hangzhou, China
1 shared publication - Kui Ren
Zhejiang University
1 shared publication - Kun Yang
The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China
1 shared publication - Shoumeng Yan
Ant Group
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 4 May 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 75 (8) , 2857-2869
Keystone-Vault: Hardware-Assisted Efficient Intra-Enclave Isolation for RISC-V TEEs
RISC-V’s open architecture provides an ideal platform for customizable security features, particularly in trusted execution environments (TEEs). However, existing RISC-V TEEs such as Keystone adopt a monolithic model where applications run with all dependencies in a single isolation domain, leading to bloated trusted computing bases (TCBs). When trusted applications grow large, vulnerabilities in any third-party library can compromise the entire enclave’s security. To address these challenges, we propose Keystone-Vault, which enables fine-grained isolation within RISC-V enclaves. Keystone-Vault reimplements and improves the Donky memory protection key mechanism and introduces a hardware-software co-designed isolation framework. The core idea is to partition each enclave into multiple regions, called Vaults, to isolate specific portions of code and data with hardware-assisted access control. Mean-while, our lightweight vault-switching mechanism runs entirely in user mode, making it more lightweight than existing RISC-V TEE designs that rely on Physical Memory Protection (PMP) to enforce security-domain partitioning. Proof-of-concept (PoC) experiments based on a prototype of Keystone-Vault implemented on the QEMU emulation platform demonstrate that Keystone-Vault successfully defends against attacks from a malicious OS and confines security risks from untrusted libraries within their respective vaults. Evaluation on realistic and complex workloads further demonstrates that, compared with baseline Keystone, Keystone-Vault introduces only 3%–7% additional performance overhead.
- 4 May 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 75 (8) , 2857-2869
Keystone-Vault: Hardware-Assisted Efficient Intra-Enclave Isolation for RISC-V TEEs
RISC-V’s open architecture provides an ideal platform for customizable security features, particularly in trusted execution environments (TEEs). However, existing RISC-V TEEs such as Keystone adopt a monolithic model where applications run with all dependencies in a single isolation domain, leading to bloated trusted computing bases (TCBs). When trusted applications grow large, vulnerabilities in any third-party library can compromise the entire enclave’s security. To address these challenges, we propose Keystone-Vault, which enables fine-grained isolation within RISC-V enclaves. Keystone-Vault reimplements and improves the Donky memory protection key mechanism and introduces a hardware-software co-designed isolation framework. The core idea is to partition each enclave into multiple regions, called Vaults, to isolate specific portions of code and data with hardware-assisted access control. Mean-while, our lightweight vault-switching mechanism runs entirely in user mode, making it more lightweight than existing RISC-V TEE designs that rely on Physical Memory Protection (PMP) to enforce security-domain partitioning. Proof-of-concept (PoC) experiments based on a prototype of Keystone-Vault implemented on the QEMU emulation platform demonstrate that Keystone-Vault successfully defends against attacks from a malicious OS and confines security risks from untrusted libraries within their respective vaults. Evaluation on realistic and complex workloads further demonstrates that, compared with baseline Keystone, Keystone-Vault introduces only 3%–7% additional performance overhead.