Daniel J. Solove
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Daniel J. Solove has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Woodrow Hartzog
Boston University School of Law; Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society
6 shared publications - Chris Jay Hoofnagle
University of California, Berkeley - School of Information; University of California, Berkeley - School of Law
2 shared publications Paul M. Schwartz
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Control, Consent, and Contract in Privacy Law: The Fair Market Fantasy
Since its early days, consumer privacy law has aimed to foster an idealistic vision of a fair consumer privacy market. According to this vision, empowered consumers make informed choices about the personal data they want to share and what they will allow companies to do with it. The law’s role is to give consumers control over their personal data, allowing them to bargain with companies and come to a fair deal about the collection and use of their data. The fair consumer privacy market vision has resulted in spectacular failure for privacy law. Even worse, this vision is doomed—it can’t succeed because it is a complete fantasy. Unfortunately, far too often policymakers and commentators keep advancing regulatory measures based on this fantasy, and they are doomed to fail. Others propose tweaks and fixes which, although well-meaning, amount to efforts to rearrange deck chairs on the Titanic. In this Essay, we contend that privacy law can’t provide meaningful protection until the fair market fantasy is abandoned. We dissect this idealistic vision, which involves three overlapping components—control, consent, and contract. Control involves the goal of trying to empower consumers to have greater dominion over their personal data. Consent, the primary means for consumers to exercise control, involves giving consumers the choice about whether others are permitted to collect, use, and share their personal data. Contract is one of the primary legal mechanisms for structuring consumer transactions and implementing control and consent. The fair market fantasy overestimates the power of individuals to negotiate and make choices in their own interest and underestimates the power of companies to shape the choices and fates of consumers. It is impossible for individuals to manage their own privacy in today’s age of digital technologies and AI. Privacy harms can’t be averted solely by empowering individuals because people’s privacy decisions affect others. The only practical way forward is to abandon the fair market fantasy.
- 16 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessControl, Consent, and Contract in Privacy Law: The Fair Market Fantasy
Since its early days, consumer privacy law has aimed to foster an idealistic vision of a fair consumer privacy market. According to this vision, empowered consumers make informed choices about the personal data they want to share and what they will allow companies to do with it. The law’s role is to give consumers control over their personal data, allowing them to bargain with companies and come to a fair deal about the collection and use of their data. The fair consumer privacy market vision has resulted in spectacular failure for privacy law. Even worse, this vision is doomed—it can’t succeed because it is a complete fantasy. Unfortunately, far too often policymakers and commentators keep advancing regulatory measures based on this fantasy, and they are doomed to fail. Others propose tweaks and fixes which, although well-meaning, amount to efforts to rearrange deck chairs on the Titanic. In this Essay, we contend that privacy law can’t provide meaningful protection until the fair market fantasy is abandoned. We dissect this idealistic vision, which involves three overlapping components—control, consent, and contract. Control involves the goal of trying to empower consumers to have greater dominion over their personal data. Consent, the primary means for consumers to exercise control, involves giving consumers the choice about whether others are permitted to collect, use, and share their personal data. Contract is one of the primary legal mechanisms for structuring consumer transactions and implementing control and consent. The fair market fantasy overestimates the power of individuals to negotiate and make choices in their own interest and underestimates the power of companies to shape the choices and fates of consumers. It is impossible for individuals to manage their own privacy in today’s age of digital technologies and AI. Privacy harms can’t be averted solely by empowering individuals because people’s privacy decisions affect others. The only practical way forward is to abandon the fair market fantasy.
- Open Access
- 20 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The AI Inference Problem in Privacy Law
AI provides an unprecedented ability to determine patterns in aggregated data which can produce inferences about people. There are two ways in which AI inferences undermine privacy laws. First, when AI allows inferences to be made, the inferred data is beyond what was disclosed to people in the privacy notice. Second, many privacy laws protect sensitive data differently from regular personal data. With AI inferences, sensitive data can readily be inferred from combining pieces of regular personal data. Determining which data should be classified as sensitive becomes nearly impossible. Whether they recognize inferences or not, privacy laws are in a bind. There is no easy escape from the AI inference problem. The laws must start to reckon with it.
- 20 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe AI Inference Problem in Privacy Law
AI provides an unprecedented ability to determine patterns in aggregated data which can produce inferences about people. There are two ways in which AI inferences undermine privacy laws. First, when AI allows inferences to be made, the inferred data is beyond what was disclosed to people in the privacy notice. Second, many privacy laws protect sensitive data differently from regular personal data. With AI inferences, sensitive data can readily be inferred from combining pieces of regular personal data. Determining which data should be classified as sensitive becomes nearly impossible. Whether they recognize inferences or not, privacy laws are in a bind. There is no easy escape from the AI inference problem. The laws must start to reckon with it.
- Open Access
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Rethinking Privacy of the Mind: Why Protecting Neural Data Is Insufficient
Neural data is necessary to protect privacy of the mind but is far from sufficient. In this short essay, I examine recent attempts by U.S. state laws to protect the privacy of neural data, most by amending existing laws to add neural data as a type of sensitive data. But many of the definitions of neural data are too narrow, focusing only on the central nervous system and excluding the peripheral nervous system. Neural data protections are inspired by a desire to protect privacy of the mind, but this broader goal can’t be achieved by focusing on neural data alone. In today’s age of AI and Big Data, so much about our mental activity can be learned from gathering and analyzing non-neural data. The mind and body are far from separate, and bodily data gives rise to inferences about mental activities. To truly protect privacy of the mind, the law must radically rethink its approach to how it regulates the collection and processing of personal data. Ironically, the best way to protect privacy of the mind is to start thinking beyond just the mind.
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRethinking Privacy of the Mind: Why Protecting Neural Data Is Insufficient
Neural data is necessary to protect privacy of the mind but is far from sufficient. In this short essay, I examine recent attempts by U.S. state laws to protect the privacy of neural data, most by amending existing laws to add neural data as a type of sensitive data. But many of the definitions of neural data are too narrow, focusing only on the central nervous system and excluding the peripheral nervous system. Neural data protections are inspired by a desire to protect privacy of the mind, but this broader goal can’t be achieved by focusing on neural data alone. In today’s age of AI and Big Data, so much about our mental activity can be learned from gathering and analyzing non-neural data. The mind and body are far from separate, and bodily data gives rise to inferences about mental activities. To truly protect privacy of the mind, the law must radically rethink its approach to how it regulates the collection and processing of personal data. Ironically, the best way to protect privacy of the mind is to start thinking beyond just the mind.
- Open Access
- 5 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Meaningful Data Minimization
Data minimization—the requirement that entities should collect, process, or transfer only personal data that is necessary and proportionate to a particular purpose—is the heart and soul of privacy law. Most privacy laws include a data minimization principle, which in theory should reduce the amount of data collected and used to only what is needed and justified. Unfortunately, data minimization frequently ends up being meaningless in practice and rarely has any impact. Instead, the opposite of data minimization is occurring—entities are engaging in data maximization by collecting vaster quantities of personal data, processing it in a wide range of ways, and transferring it liberally. In this Article, we unpack the promise and failure of data minimization. We argue that meaningful data minimization is the most indispensable data privacy protection. Without data minimization, it is impossible to bring even a semblance of order and responsibility to out-of-control surveillance capitalism. Although most laws mandate data minimization, it is often not meaningful. To be effective, privacy laws must take a different and more rigorous approach to data minimization. Data minimization is woefully undertheorized. In this Article, we develop a robust theory of data minimization by explaining its origins, conceptual development, key components, and why it matters. Privacy laws take various approaches to data minimization, all of which include two basic prongs—purpose and tailoring. Purpose involves the reason for collecting and processing data and tailoring involves how closely connected the data activities are to the purpose. Most laws are far too open-ended on how they address purpose, which enables entities to evade data minimization by stating many broad and vague purposes. Most laws are also too loose on tailoring, requiring only that data activities be “reasonably necessary” for disclosed purposes. We contend that to be meaningful, data minimization must specify a list of permissible and impermissible purposes and must require data activities to be strictly necessary for each purpose. We also argue that laws must include several other dimensions to make data minimization meaningful. Simply put, without meaningful data minimization, data privacy laws have little impact, and the data minimization in most laws is far from meaningful. This Article provides a roadmap for how to give data minimization the rigor it needs to do its essential work.
- 5 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMeaningful Data Minimization
Data minimization—the requirement that entities should collect, process, or transfer only personal data that is necessary and proportionate to a particular purpose—is the heart and soul of privacy law. Most privacy laws include a data minimization principle, which in theory should reduce the amount of data collected and used to only what is needed and justified. Unfortunately, data minimization frequently ends up being meaningless in practice and rarely has any impact. Instead, the opposite of data minimization is occurring—entities are engaging in data maximization by collecting vaster quantities of personal data, processing it in a wide range of ways, and transferring it liberally. In this Article, we unpack the promise and failure of data minimization. We argue that meaningful data minimization is the most indispensable data privacy protection. Without data minimization, it is impossible to bring even a semblance of order and responsibility to out-of-control surveillance capitalism. Although most laws mandate data minimization, it is often not meaningful. To be effective, privacy laws must take a different and more rigorous approach to data minimization. Data minimization is woefully undertheorized. In this Article, we develop a robust theory of data minimization by explaining its origins, conceptual development, key components, and why it matters. Privacy laws take various approaches to data minimization, all of which include two basic prongs—purpose and tailoring. Purpose involves the reason for collecting and processing data and tailoring involves how closely connected the data activities are to the purpose. Most laws are far too open-ended on how they address purpose, which enables entities to evade data minimization by stating many broad and vague purposes. Most laws are also too loose on tailoring, requiring only that data activities be “reasonably necessary” for disclosed purposes. We contend that to be meaningful, data minimization must specify a list of permissible and impermissible purposes and must require data activities to be strictly necessary for each purpose. We also argue that laws must include several other dimensions to make data minimization meaningful. Simply put, without meaningful data minimization, data privacy laws have little impact, and the data minimization in most laws is far from meaningful. This Article provides a roadmap for how to give data minimization the rigor it needs to do its essential work.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
How to Maintain Our Privacy in the AI Age
This essay, written as part of the Wall Street Journal's USA250 series, argues that today's privacy laws aren't working because they put the onus on us to guard our data. This approach fails because digital technologies are too complicated for us to manage. Instead, to be effective, privacy laws must hold companies accountable. Whenever a company creates an unreasonable risk of harm through uses of data or through AI algorithms, the company must be held responsible. The essay proposes measures such as rigorous data minimization, fiduciary duties, liability for negligent or reckless technological design, liability for algorithms that cause harm, and multi-stakeholder review of technologies.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHow to Maintain Our Privacy in the AI Age
This essay, written as part of the Wall Street Journal's USA250 series, argues that today's privacy laws aren't working because they put the onus on us to guard our data. This approach fails because digital technologies are too complicated for us to manage. Instead, to be effective, privacy laws must hold companies accountable. Whenever a company creates an unreasonable risk of harm through uses of data or through AI algorithms, the company must be held responsible. The essay proposes measures such as rigorous data minimization, fiduciary duties, liability for negligent or reckless technological design, liability for algorithms that cause harm, and multi-stakeholder review of technologies.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Enforcing Privacy Law: Why Private Litigation Is Essential
Enforcement is an essential dimension for effective privacy and data protection laws—and it is probably the most important one. No matter how many privacy laws are enacted and how strong the laws are, if enforcement falls short, the laws will fail to achieve their goals. Unfortunately, the enforcement of privacy laws is often weak and inadequate, a plague that renders them infirm.This Article addresses a gap in the academic literature about privacy law, as enforcement is undertheorized. Only a few articles have addressed enforcement in depth, and these pieces have focused on specific laws and types of enforcement; they have not explored the whole picture. Enforcement is an essential issue, as it is not possible to evaluate a privacy law meaningfully without considering how it will be enforced in practice. Policymakers, however, often neglect to reckon with the practicalities of enforcement, resulting in laws that are ineffective.This Article makes four primary arguments. First, the effectiveness of privacy laws depends upon enforcement, and poor enforcement can neuter even a strong law. The enforcement of privacy laws is currently quite weak.Second, government enforcement has many substantial shortcomings that undermine its effectiveness. Government enforcement requires far more resources, insulation from political interference, consistency, and potency. Even with considerable improvement, there ultimately will be a ceiling. In most cases, government enforcement will never be nearly enough.Third, enforcement is about incentives. Far too often, the incentives are poorly aligned for organizations to follow the law. Government enforcement is rarely sufficiently dissuasive. The risk equation comes out heavily in favor of non-compliance or poor compliance because penalties are not severe or frequent enough to outweigh the benefits of noncompliance.Fourth, enforcement from multiple enforcers and enforcement mechanisms works best, and private litigation is an essential part of the enforcement equation, adding dimensions to enforcement that government enforcement lacks. Only with an understanding of the overall landscape of enforcement can the virtues of private litigation be fully appreciated.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEnforcing Privacy Law: Why Private Litigation Is Essential
Enforcement is an essential dimension for effective privacy and data protection laws—and it is probably the most important one. No matter how many privacy laws are enacted and how strong the laws are, if enforcement falls short, the laws will fail to achieve their goals. Unfortunately, the enforcement of privacy laws is often weak and inadequate, a plague that renders them infirm.This Article addresses a gap in the academic literature about privacy law, as enforcement is undertheorized. Only a few articles have addressed enforcement in depth, and these pieces have focused on specific laws and types of enforcement; they have not explored the whole picture. Enforcement is an essential issue, as it is not possible to evaluate a privacy law meaningfully without considering how it will be enforced in practice. Policymakers, however, often neglect to reckon with the practicalities of enforcement, resulting in laws that are ineffective.This Article makes four primary arguments. First, the effectiveness of privacy laws depends upon enforcement, and poor enforcement can neuter even a strong law. The enforcement of privacy laws is currently quite weak.Second, government enforcement has many substantial shortcomings that undermine its effectiveness. Government enforcement requires far more resources, insulation from political interference, consistency, and potency. Even with considerable improvement, there ultimately will be a ceiling. In most cases, government enforcement will never be nearly enough.Third, enforcement is about incentives. Far too often, the incentives are poorly aligned for organizations to follow the law. Government enforcement is rarely sufficiently dissuasive. The risk equation comes out heavily in favor of non-compliance or poor compliance because penalties are not severe or frequent enough to outweigh the benefits of noncompliance.Fourth, enforcement from multiple enforcers and enforcement mechanisms works best, and private litigation is an essential part of the enforcement equation, adding dimensions to enforcement that government enforcement lacks. Only with an understanding of the overall landscape of enforcement can the virtues of private litigation be fully appreciated.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
On Privacy and Technology (excerpt)
This is an except from Daniel J. Solove’s book, ON PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY (Oxford University Press 2025). The book discusses the profound changes technology is wreaking upon privacy, why these changes matter, and what can be done about them. Drawing from a quarter-century of thinking, teaching, and writing about privacy law, Solove explores the important questions: Can privacy law keep up with rapidly changing digital technologies? Is it possible to protect privacy in the age of AI? Solove argues that the answers to these questions are yes, but only if privacy law takes a radical new direction. Weaving together philosophy, literature, and the humanities with concrete practical knowledge, ON PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY tackles issues such as control, manipulation, automation, consent, and reputation, offering a new and provocative perspective on privacy. In this excerpt, Solove explores the meaning and importance of privacy, including the societal value of privacy. He debunks several myths that stand in the way of effective regulation such as (1) the myth of the privacy paradox, (2) the myth of technology exceptionalism, (3) the myth that regulation stifles innovation, (4) the myth that changes in degree don’t matter, (5) the myth that the law is an interloper, and (6) the myth of technology neutrality. Solove argues that for various technological changes affecting privacy, the law often not only fails to address them adequately but also contributes to the problems. Many of the problems stem not directly from technology but from prevailing views and myths about technology and privacy.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOn Privacy and Technology (excerpt)
This is an except from Daniel J. Solove’s book, ON PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY (Oxford University Press 2025). The book discusses the profound changes technology is wreaking upon privacy, why these changes matter, and what can be done about them. Drawing from a quarter-century of thinking, teaching, and writing about privacy law, Solove explores the important questions: Can privacy law keep up with rapidly changing digital technologies? Is it possible to protect privacy in the age of AI? Solove argues that the answers to these questions are yes, but only if privacy law takes a radical new direction. Weaving together philosophy, literature, and the humanities with concrete practical knowledge, ON PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY tackles issues such as control, manipulation, automation, consent, and reputation, offering a new and provocative perspective on privacy. In this excerpt, Solove explores the meaning and importance of privacy, including the societal value of privacy. He debunks several myths that stand in the way of effective regulation such as (1) the myth of the privacy paradox, (2) the myth of technology exceptionalism, (3) the myth that regulation stifles innovation, (4) the myth that changes in degree don’t matter, (5) the myth that the law is an interloper, and (6) the myth of technology neutrality. Solove argues that for various technological changes affecting privacy, the law often not only fails to address them adequately but also contributes to the problems. Many of the problems stem not directly from technology but from prevailing views and myths about technology and privacy.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
An Overview of Privacy Law in 2024
Chapter 1 of PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS (7th edition, IAPP 2024) provides an overview of information privacy law circa 2024. The chapter summarizes the common themes in privacy laws and discusses the various types of laws (federal, constitutional, state, international). It contains a list and brief summary of the most significant U.S. federal privacy laws. The heart of the chapter is an historical timeline of major developments in the law of privacy and data security, including key cases, enactments of laws, major regulatory developments, influential publications, and other significant events. The chapter also contains a curated list of important treatises and scholarly works. PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS is a distilled guide to the essential elements of U.S. data privacy law. In an easily-digestible format, the book covers core concepts, key laws, and leading cases. The book summarizes the essential provisions of all of the major privacy statutes and regulations, including COPPA, ECPA, FCRA, FERPA, FISA, FTC Act, GLBA, HIPAA, TCPA, VPPA, and more. The book includes summaries of foreign laws such as the EU's GDPR, China's PIPL, Canada's PIPEDA, Brazil's LGPD, and more. In addition, the book summarizes key state laws on consumer privacy, health privacy, and biometric data, among other topics. The authors provide numerous charts and tables summarizing privacy statutes.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAn Overview of Privacy Law in 2024
Chapter 1 of PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS (7th edition, IAPP 2024) provides an overview of information privacy law circa 2024. The chapter summarizes the common themes in privacy laws and discusses the various types of laws (federal, constitutional, state, international). It contains a list and brief summary of the most significant U.S. federal privacy laws. The heart of the chapter is an historical timeline of major developments in the law of privacy and data security, including key cases, enactments of laws, major regulatory developments, influential publications, and other significant events. The chapter also contains a curated list of important treatises and scholarly works. PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS is a distilled guide to the essential elements of U.S. data privacy law. In an easily-digestible format, the book covers core concepts, key laws, and leading cases. The book summarizes the essential provisions of all of the major privacy statutes and regulations, including COPPA, ECPA, FCRA, FERPA, FISA, FTC Act, GLBA, HIPAA, TCPA, VPPA, and more. The book includes summaries of foreign laws such as the EU's GDPR, China's PIPL, Canada's PIPEDA, Brazil's LGPD, and more. In addition, the book summarizes key state laws on consumer privacy, health privacy, and biometric data, among other topics. The authors provide numerous charts and tables summarizing privacy statutes.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Great Scrape: The Clash Between Scraping and Privacy
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems depend on massive quantities of data, often gathered by “scraping”—the automated extraction of large amounts of data from the internet. A great deal of scraped data contains people’s personal information. This personal data provides the grist for AI tools such as facial recognition, deep fakes, and generative AI. Although scraping enables web searching, archiving of records, and meaningful scientific research, scraping for AI can also be objectionable and even harmful to individuals and society. Organizations are scraping at an escalating pace and scale, even though many privacy laws are seemingly incongruous with the practice. In this Article, we contend that scraping must undergo a serious reckoning with privacy law. Scraping violates nearly all of the key principles of privacy laws, including fairness, individual rights and control, transparency, consent, purpose specification and secondary use restrictions, data minimization, onward transfer, and data security. Scraping ignores the data protection laws built around these requirements. Scraping has evaded a reckoning with privacy law largely because scrapers act as if all publicly available data were free for the taking. But the public availability of scraped data shouldn’t give scrapers a free pass. Privacy law regularly protects publicly available data, and privacy principles are implicated even when personal data is accessible to others. This Article explores the fundamental tension between scraping and privacy law. With the zealous pursuit and astronomical growth of AI, we are in the midst of what we call the “great scrape.” There must now be a great reconciliation.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Great Scrape: The Clash Between Scraping and Privacy
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems depend on massive quantities of data, often gathered by “scraping”—the automated extraction of large amounts of data from the internet. A great deal of scraped data contains people’s personal information. This personal data provides the grist for AI tools such as facial recognition, deep fakes, and generative AI. Although scraping enables web searching, archiving of records, and meaningful scientific research, scraping for AI can also be objectionable and even harmful to individuals and society. Organizations are scraping at an escalating pace and scale, even though many privacy laws are seemingly incongruous with the practice. In this Article, we contend that scraping must undergo a serious reckoning with privacy law. Scraping violates nearly all of the key principles of privacy laws, including fairness, individual rights and control, transparency, consent, purpose specification and secondary use restrictions, data minimization, onward transfer, and data security. Scraping ignores the data protection laws built around these requirements. Scraping has evaded a reckoning with privacy law largely because scrapers act as if all publicly available data were free for the taking. But the public availability of scraped data shouldn’t give scrapers a free pass. Privacy law regularly protects publicly available data, and privacy principles are implicated even when personal data is accessible to others. This Article explores the fundamental tension between scraping and privacy law. With the zealous pursuit and astronomical growth of AI, we are in the midst of what we call the “great scrape.” There must now be a great reconciliation.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Failure of Data Security Law
In this book chapter, we survey the law and policy of data security and analyze its strengths and weaknesses. Broadly speaking, there are three types of data security laws: (1) breach notification laws; (2) security safeguards laws that require substantive measures to protect security; and (3) private litigation under various causes of action. We argue that despite some small successes, the law is generally failing to combat the data security threats we face. Breach notification laws merely require organizations to provide transparency about data breaches, but the laws don’t provide prevention or a cure. Security safeguards laws are often enforced too late, if at all. Enforcement authorities wait until a data breach occurs, but penalizing organizations after a breach increases the pain of a breach marginally, but not enough to be a game changer. Private litigation has increased the costs of data breaches but has accomplished little else. Courts have often struggled to understand the harm from data breaches, so data breach cases have frequently been dismissed. Overall, we contend that data security law is too reactionary. The law fails to do enough to prevent data breaches, focuses too much on organizations that suffer data breaches and ignores other contributing actors, and doesn’t take sufficient steps to mitigate the harm from data breaches.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Failure of Data Security Law
In this book chapter, we survey the law and policy of data security and analyze its strengths and weaknesses. Broadly speaking, there are three types of data security laws: (1) breach notification laws; (2) security safeguards laws that require substantive measures to protect security; and (3) private litigation under various causes of action. We argue that despite some small successes, the law is generally failing to combat the data security threats we face. Breach notification laws merely require organizations to provide transparency about data breaches, but the laws don’t provide prevention or a cure. Security safeguards laws are often enforced too late, if at all. Enforcement authorities wait until a data breach occurs, but penalizing organizations after a breach increases the pain of a breach marginally, but not enough to be a game changer. Private litigation has increased the costs of data breaches but has accomplished little else. Courts have often struggled to understand the harm from data breaches, so data breach cases have frequently been dismissed. Overall, we contend that data security law is too reactionary. The law fails to do enough to prevent data breaches, focuses too much on organizations that suffer data breaches and ignores other contributing actors, and doesn’t take sufficient steps to mitigate the harm from data breaches.