Yuegang Pu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yuegang Pu has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Feng Hong
Shanghai Acoustics Laboratory, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Shanghai 201805, China
1 shared publication - Hang Lei
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, Sichuan, China
1 shared publication - Haozhe Zhou
School of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
1 shared publication - Maolin Yang
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, Sichuan, China
1 shared publication - Nan Deng
Beijing Institute of Computer Technology and Applications, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Tao Li
Beijing Institute of Computer Technology and Applications, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 120-127
SilentDNS: Acoustic Side-Channel-Assisted Inference for Device Fingerprinting and State Detection under Encrypted Network Traffic
The pervasive adoption of Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3, QUIC (UDP-based multiplexed secure transport), and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) renders over 95% of network traffic opaque to deep packet inspection, fundamentally challenging device fingerprinting and state detection in enterprise and home networks. Existing encrypted traffic analysis methods relying solely on network metadata degrade by more than 30% under multi-device concurrency, traffic shaping defenses, and noisy labels, exposing a critical gap: the absence of an orthogonal information source that persists independently of encryption protocol evolution. This paper presents SilentDNS, a cross-modal inference framework that fuses ambient acoustic side-channel signals with encrypted network traffic metadata for device fingerprinting and operational state detection without decryption. Unlike prior acoustic side-channel work that treats sound as an attack vector, SilentDNS is the first to leverage device acoustic emissions as an auxiliary defensive channel, aligned with network observations through a weak-supervision InfoNCE contrastive mechanism requiring only coarse window-level labels. Evaluated across 12 device types in three environments, SilentDNS achieves 96.3% macro-F1 in device fingerprinting (+8.7 pp over the best network-only baseline) and 93.1% in state detection, with gains of up to 22.4 pp on I/O-intensive events. Under state-of-the-art traffic padding defenses, SilentDNS recovers 71% of the accuracy lost by network-only classifiers, demonstrating that cross-modal physical–digital fusion provides an observation channel fundamentally harder for adversaries to suppress than network-layer features alone. SilentDNS, a cross-modal framework that fuses ambient acoustic side-channel signals with encrypted network traffic metadata for device fingerprinting and state detection without decryption. SilentDNS exploits the observation that devices emit characteristic acoustic signatures (fan speed, hard disk drive (HDD) seeks, relay clicks) temporally correlated with network behavior—signals that persist regardless of encryption evolution. A contrastive alignment mechanism operates under weak, window-level supervision, and an integrated explanation engine generates human-readable evidence chains for SOC workflows. Across 12 device types in three environments, SilentDNS achieves 96.3% macro-F1 for fingerprinting (+8.7 pp over the best network-only baseline) and 93.1% for state detection (+22.4 pp on I/O-intensive events). Under traffic padding defenses, SilentDNS recovers 71% of accuracy lost by network-only classifiers.
- 29 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 120-127
Open AccessSilentDNS: Acoustic Side-Channel-Assisted Inference for Device Fingerprinting and State Detection under Encrypted Network Traffic
The pervasive adoption of Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3, QUIC (UDP-based multiplexed secure transport), and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) renders over 95% of network traffic opaque to deep packet inspection, fundamentally challenging device fingerprinting and state detection in enterprise and home networks. Existing encrypted traffic analysis methods relying solely on network metadata degrade by more than 30% under multi-device concurrency, traffic shaping defenses, and noisy labels, exposing a critical gap: the absence of an orthogonal information source that persists independently of encryption protocol evolution. This paper presents SilentDNS, a cross-modal inference framework that fuses ambient acoustic side-channel signals with encrypted network traffic metadata for device fingerprinting and operational state detection without decryption. Unlike prior acoustic side-channel work that treats sound as an attack vector, SilentDNS is the first to leverage device acoustic emissions as an auxiliary defensive channel, aligned with network observations through a weak-supervision InfoNCE contrastive mechanism requiring only coarse window-level labels. Evaluated across 12 device types in three environments, SilentDNS achieves 96.3% macro-F1 in device fingerprinting (+8.7 pp over the best network-only baseline) and 93.1% in state detection, with gains of up to 22.4 pp on I/O-intensive events. Under state-of-the-art traffic padding defenses, SilentDNS recovers 71% of the accuracy lost by network-only classifiers, demonstrating that cross-modal physical–digital fusion provides an observation channel fundamentally harder for adversaries to suppress than network-layer features alone. SilentDNS, a cross-modal framework that fuses ambient acoustic side-channel signals with encrypted network traffic metadata for device fingerprinting and state detection without decryption. SilentDNS exploits the observation that devices emit characteristic acoustic signatures (fan speed, hard disk drive (HDD) seeks, relay clicks) temporally correlated with network behavior—signals that persist regardless of encryption evolution. A contrastive alignment mechanism operates under weak, window-level supervision, and an integrated explanation engine generates human-readable evidence chains for SOC workflows. Across 12 device types in three environments, SilentDNS achieves 96.3% macro-F1 for fingerprinting (+8.7 pp over the best network-only baseline) and 93.1% for state detection (+22.4 pp on I/O-intensive events). Under traffic padding defenses, SilentDNS recovers 71% of accuracy lost by network-only classifiers.