Bruno Angelucci
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Bruno Angelucci has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Abdenour Benkrid
Institute for Energy Technology (IFE), HALDEN, Norway, Norway
2 shared publications - An Bielen
Dismantling, Decontamination and Waste, Institute for Environment, Health and Safety, Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK CEN), Belgium
2 shared publications - Ankur Shukla
Institute for Energy Technology
2 shared publications - Giacomo Pinagli
SIGMA INGEGNERIA S.R.L, Via dei Dorini, snc–Sant’Alessio, 55100 Lucca, Italy
2 shared publications - Guillaume Hueber
Flyability SA, Route du Lac 3, 1094 Paudex, Switzerland
2 shared publications - István Szőke
Institute for Energy Technology (IFE), HADRON Laboratory, Os allé 5, NO-1777 Halden, Norway
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
From Single Platforms Towards Coordinated Fleets: Safety- and Security-Bounded Autonomous Multi-Robot Systems for Nuclear Decommissioning in Europe
Europe’s ageing nuclear fleet creates a growing need for repeated radiological characterisation of contaminated, GPS-denied facilities where human access must be kept to a minimum. However, most deployed robotic systems remain limited to a single platform with a narrow task range. Methods: Building on two earlier conference papers by the authors, this article presents the design, safety engineering and initial field evaluation of the EURATOM project XS-ABILITY, tracing how previous European projects shaped its architecture. The system combines legged, wheeled, rail-based and caged aerial robots equipped with gamma/neutron and beta/gamma instruments. The platforms are coordinated through a ROS 2 architecture supporting distributed SLAM, energy-aware task allocation, risk-aware navigation and a radiological digital twin. A safety and conformity framework consolidates machinery, radiation protection, aviation, cybersecurity and AI regulations, with constraints enforced by a supervisory controller. Results: A campaign at the BR1 and BR3 facilities of SCK CEN, Belgium, in April 2026 evaluated a single wheeled ground platform against criteria fixed before deployment. Radiological and pose streams were paired with a median offset of −8.6 ms and no detectable message loss; LiDAR-only localisation was maintained over a 76 m traverse with the accumulated trajectory error bounded at 0.15 m; and repeat passes agreed to a cloud-to-cloud dispersion of 1.1 cm. Fleet-level coordination, communication reliability, radiation endurance and metrological registration accuracy were not evaluated. Conclusions: The demonstrated capability is integrated single-platform operation at TRL 4–5; coordinated fleet operation remains designed but unvalidated. The forthcoming Ignalina campaign is the next validation step, while supervisory human–robot interaction remains a priority for development.
Open AccessFrom Single Platforms Towards Coordinated Fleets: Safety- and Security-Bounded Autonomous Multi-Robot Systems for Nuclear Decommissioning in Europe
Europe’s ageing nuclear fleet creates a growing need for repeated radiological characterisation of contaminated, GPS-denied facilities where human access must be kept to a minimum. However, most deployed robotic systems remain limited to a single platform with a narrow task range. Methods: Building on two earlier conference papers by the authors, this article presents the design, safety engineering and initial field evaluation of the EURATOM project XS-ABILITY, tracing how previous European projects shaped its architecture. The system combines legged, wheeled, rail-based and caged aerial robots equipped with gamma/neutron and beta/gamma instruments. The platforms are coordinated through a ROS 2 architecture supporting distributed SLAM, energy-aware task allocation, risk-aware navigation and a radiological digital twin. A safety and conformity framework consolidates machinery, radiation protection, aviation, cybersecurity and AI regulations, with constraints enforced by a supervisory controller. Results: A campaign at the BR1 and BR3 facilities of SCK CEN, Belgium, in April 2026 evaluated a single wheeled ground platform against criteria fixed before deployment. Radiological and pose streams were paired with a median offset of −8.6 ms and no detectable message loss; LiDAR-only localisation was maintained over a 76 m traverse with the accumulated trajectory error bounded at 0.15 m; and repeat passes agreed to a cloud-to-cloud dispersion of 1.1 cm. Fleet-level coordination, communication reliability, radiation endurance and metrological registration accuracy were not evaluated. Conclusions: The demonstrated capability is integrated single-platform operation at TRL 4–5; coordinated fleet operation remains designed but unvalidated. The forthcoming Ignalina campaign is the next validation step, while supervisory human–robot interaction remains a priority for development.
- Open Access
- 5 August 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
From Single Platforms to Coordinated Fleets: Safety- and Security-Bounded Autonomous Multi-Robot Systems for Nuclear Decommissioning in Europe
Europe’s ageing nuclear fleet creates a growing need for repeated radiological characterisation of contaminated, GPS-denied facilities where human access must be kept to a minimum. However, most deployed robotic systems remain limited to a single platform with a narrow task range. Methods: Building on two earlier conference papers by the authors, this article presents the design, safety engineering and initial field evaluation of the EURATOM project XS-ABILITY, tracing how previous European projects shaped its architecture. The system combines legged, wheeled, rail-based and caged aerial robots equipped with gamma/neutron and beta/gamma instruments. The platforms are coordinated through a ROS 2 architecture supporting distributed SLAM, energy-aware task allocation, risk-aware navigation and a radiological digital twin. A safety and conformity framework consolidates machinery, radiation protection, aviation, cybersecurity and AI regulations, with constraints enforced by a supervisory controller. Results: a campaign at the BR1 and BR3 facilities of SCK CEN, Belgium, in April 2026 demonstrated sensor–robot interoperability, synchronised radiological and odometry acquisition, and GPS-denied navigation under actual radiological conditions. Fleet-level coordination and metrological accuracy were not evaluated. Conclusions: Demonstrated capabilities place the system at TRL 4–5. The forthcoming Ignalina campaign is the next validation step, while supervisory human–robot interaction remains a priority for development.
- 5 August 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
Open AccessFrom Single Platforms to Coordinated Fleets: Safety- and Security-Bounded Autonomous Multi-Robot Systems for Nuclear Decommissioning in Europe
Europe’s ageing nuclear fleet creates a growing need for repeated radiological characterisation of contaminated, GPS-denied facilities where human access must be kept to a minimum. However, most deployed robotic systems remain limited to a single platform with a narrow task range. Methods: Building on two earlier conference papers by the authors, this article presents the design, safety engineering and initial field evaluation of the EURATOM project XS-ABILITY, tracing how previous European projects shaped its architecture. The system combines legged, wheeled, rail-based and caged aerial robots equipped with gamma/neutron and beta/gamma instruments. The platforms are coordinated through a ROS 2 architecture supporting distributed SLAM, energy-aware task allocation, risk-aware navigation and a radiological digital twin. A safety and conformity framework consolidates machinery, radiation protection, aviation, cybersecurity and AI regulations, with constraints enforced by a supervisory controller. Results: a campaign at the BR1 and BR3 facilities of SCK CEN, Belgium, in April 2026 demonstrated sensor–robot interoperability, synchronised radiological and odometry acquisition, and GPS-denied navigation under actual radiological conditions. Fleet-level coordination and metrological accuracy were not evaluated. Conclusions: Demonstrated capabilities place the system at TRL 4–5. The forthcoming Ignalina campaign is the next validation step, while supervisory human–robot interaction remains a priority for development.