Ryan Bubb
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ryan Bubb has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alex Kaufman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB)
3 shared publicationsPatrick L. Warren
Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics
2 shared publicationsEmiliano Catan
New York University School of Law
1 shared publicationGabriel Cohen
1 shared publicationMarcel Kahan
New York University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute
1 shared publicationOren Bar-Gill
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Splitting Caremark's Atom
Corporate law does more than police managers for investors. Through the fiduciary duty of oversight, it also enlists boards and shareholder plaintiffs in promoting corporate obedience to public law. Delaware has fused those two projects—policing agency costs and facilitating public ordering—into a single standard: an unstable structure we call Caremark’s “atom.” The atom explains a central doctrinal puzzle. Courts generally treat a violation of law as a prerequisite for oversight liability, leaving even catastrophic failures to monitor ordinary business risks beyond Caremark’s reach. Yet they also screen compliance claims by whether the risk was central (or “mission critical”) to the corporation’s business. The illegality prerequisite reflects the doctrine’s public-ordering commitment, rooted in corporate law’s longstanding duty of obedience. The business-centrality screen translates that commitment into shareholder-protective terms: importance to the firm becomes the ordinary basis for inferring culpable inattention. Each purpose thus supplies the limiting principle for the monitoring duty the other would otherwise support, and viable claims concentrate overwhelmingly where public obligations and shareholder interests coincide. This accommodation undermines both projects. It leaves boards virtually unaccountable for failures to monitor core business risks, while inviting them to treat legal sanctions as costs of doing business and to comply only when it pays. That approach is economically inefficient: the state uses sanctions rather than prices where it can specify prohibited conduct more reliably than it can monetize the resulting external harm. We propose splitting the atom. An agency-cost duty, grounded in the duty of care, would require reasonable systems for monitoring business performance and operational risks, subject to gross-negligence review and Section 102(b)(7) exculpation. A public-ordering duty, grounded in the duty of obedience, would require corporate systems oriented toward compliance with sanction law regardless of business centrality; inattention to the monitoring process would be reviewed for gross negligence, and conscious facilitation of noncompliance for bad faith. Each duty, freed from the other, can finally be tailored to the purpose it serves.
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSplitting Caremark's Atom
Corporate law does more than police managers for investors. Through the fiduciary duty of oversight, it also enlists boards and shareholder plaintiffs in promoting corporate obedience to public law. Delaware has fused those two projects—policing agency costs and facilitating public ordering—into a single standard: an unstable structure we call Caremark’s “atom.” The atom explains a central doctrinal puzzle. Courts generally treat a violation of law as a prerequisite for oversight liability, leaving even catastrophic failures to monitor ordinary business risks beyond Caremark’s reach. Yet they also screen compliance claims by whether the risk was central (or “mission critical”) to the corporation’s business. The illegality prerequisite reflects the doctrine’s public-ordering commitment, rooted in corporate law’s longstanding duty of obedience. The business-centrality screen translates that commitment into shareholder-protective terms: importance to the firm becomes the ordinary basis for inferring culpable inattention. Each purpose thus supplies the limiting principle for the monitoring duty the other would otherwise support, and viable claims concentrate overwhelmingly where public obligations and shareholder interests coincide. This accommodation undermines both projects. It leaves boards virtually unaccountable for failures to monitor core business risks, while inviting them to treat legal sanctions as costs of doing business and to comply only when it pays. That approach is economically inefficient: the state uses sanctions rather than prices where it can specify prohibited conduct more reliably than it can monetize the resulting external harm. We propose splitting the atom. An agency-cost duty, grounded in the duty of care, would require reasonable systems for monitoring business performance and operational risks, subject to gross-negligence review and Section 102(b)(7) exculpation. A public-ordering duty, grounded in the duty of obedience, would require corporate systems oriented toward compliance with sanction law regardless of business centrality; inattention to the monitoring process would be reviewed for gross negligence, and conscious facilitation of noncompliance for bad faith. Each duty, freed from the other, can finally be tailored to the purpose it serves.
- Open Access
- 14 February 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Party Structure of Mutual Funds
We show that a parsimonious spatial model with two dimensions can explain the bulk of mutual fund voting. We estimate the model using a comprehensive dataset of the 5,332,353 votes cast on 33,262 proposals from 3,844 portfolio companies from 2010 to 2015 by 3,617 mutual funds that in total hold almost 80% of mutual fund industry assets. The two dimensions of funds’ corporate governance preferences reflect the role of the two leading proxy advisors. Mutual funds are clustered into three ‘parties’ — the Managerialist Party, the Shareholder Intervention Party, and the Shareholder Veto Party — that follow distinctive philosophies of corporate governance and shareholders’ role. We use our methodology in turn to construct measures of the individual distributions of preferences of public companies’ shareholder bases. Our preference measures for mutual funds and for public companies’ shareholder bases generate a range of insights about the broader system of corporate governance.
- 14 February 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Party Structure of Mutual Funds
We show that a parsimonious spatial model with two dimensions can explain the bulk of mutual fund voting. We estimate the model using a comprehensive dataset of the 5,332,353 votes cast on 33,262 proposals from 3,844 portfolio companies from 2010 to 2015 by 3,617 mutual funds that in total hold almost 80% of mutual fund industry assets. The two dimensions of funds’ corporate governance preferences reflect the role of the two leading proxy advisors. Mutual funds are clustered into three ‘parties’ — the Managerialist Party, the Shareholder Intervention Party, and the Shareholder Veto Party — that follow distinctive philosophies of corporate governance and shareholders’ role. We use our methodology in turn to construct measures of the individual distributions of preferences of public companies’ shareholder bases. Our preference measures for mutual funds and for public companies’ shareholder bases generate a range of insights about the broader system of corporate governance.
- Open Access
- 3 August 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the Volcker Rule
The myriad problems with the Dodd-Frank Act’s ban on proprietary trading by banks have led to a rare bipartisan consensus: the Volcker Rule must be pared back or even repealed. At the root of the Rule’s problems is the fundamental definitional challenge posed by the current approach. The definition of banned proprietary trading turns on the motivation underlying a trade, which is difficult for regulators to determine. Regulators must adopt either a hardline approach that risks deterring banks from engaging in core financial intermediation functions or a more permissive approach that risks the continuance of speculative gambles that threaten the financial system. We propose a new paradigm for achieving the Volcker Rule’s objectives that resolves this dilemma. Rather than define and ban proprietary trading, regulators should simply ban banks from paying traders on the basis of trading profits. Our proposal takes advantage of the competition between proprietary trading firms in two markets: they compete in the securities market to identify and exploit trading opportunities and they compete in the labor market to hire and motivate the best traders. Because speculative trading is a zero-sum game, handicapping banks relative to unregulated entities, such as hedge funds, in the labor market for traders would generate powerful incentives for banks to get out of the trading game. Our simple compensation-based approach would likely be more effective at ending speculative trading at banks---and do so at lower cost---than the complex and loophole-ridden current approach.
- 3 August 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRegulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the Volcker Rule
The myriad problems with the Dodd-Frank Act’s ban on proprietary trading by banks have led to a rare bipartisan consensus: the Volcker Rule must be pared back or even repealed. At the root of the Rule’s problems is the fundamental definitional challenge posed by the current approach. The definition of banned proprietary trading turns on the motivation underlying a trade, which is difficult for regulators to determine. Regulators must adopt either a hardline approach that risks deterring banks from engaging in core financial intermediation functions or a more permissive approach that risks the continuance of speculative gambles that threaten the financial system. We propose a new paradigm for achieving the Volcker Rule’s objectives that resolves this dilemma. Rather than define and ban proprietary trading, regulators should simply ban banks from paying traders on the basis of trading profits. Our proposal takes advantage of the competition between proprietary trading firms in two markets: they compete in the securities market to identify and exploit trading opportunities and they compete in the labor market to hire and motivate the best traders. Because speculative trading is a zero-sum game, handicapping banks relative to unregulated entities, such as hedge funds, in the labor market for traders would generate powerful incentives for banks to get out of the trading game. Our simple compensation-based approach would likely be more effective at ending speculative trading at banks---and do so at lower cost---than the complex and loophole-ridden current approach.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2015
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A Behavioral Contract Theory Perspective on Retirement Savings
The primary motivation for retirement savings policy is the view that many of us, if left to our own devices, will not save enough for retirement. Special tax subsidies for employer-sponsored retirement plans — a principal component of the federal policy scheme — have made such plans the predominant vehicle for private savings for retirement. A growing body of evidence shows that the details of plan design can have large effects on savings outcomes. The design of the “choice architecture” of these plans, however, is delegated to employers. We analyze the incentives for employer plan design produced by the labor market. Employers offer retirement plans to attract workers. If those workers make systematic mistakes in their retirement savings decisions, then the labor market will produce incentives for plan designs that generally fail to effectively address the problems. Indeed, the presence of workers who undersave due to myopia results in equilibrium employer plan designs that exploit the myopic by lowering their total compensation. Our analytic framework provides novel explanations for a range of features of plan design, including the high prevalence of matching contributions, the use of low default contribution rates in automatic enrollment plans, the shift away from annuities toward lump sum distributions, and the offering of investment options with excessive fees. The regulation of these plans should be reformed to address the problems with employer incentives that we identify. More fundamentally, our analysis calls for a rethinking of the current scheme’s special subsidies for employer-sponsored plans.
- 1 July 2015
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA Behavioral Contract Theory Perspective on Retirement Savings
The primary motivation for retirement savings policy is the view that many of us, if left to our own devices, will not save enough for retirement. Special tax subsidies for employer-sponsored retirement plans — a principal component of the federal policy scheme — have made such plans the predominant vehicle for private savings for retirement. A growing body of evidence shows that the details of plan design can have large effects on savings outcomes. The design of the “choice architecture” of these plans, however, is delegated to employers. We analyze the incentives for employer plan design produced by the labor market. Employers offer retirement plans to attract workers. If those workers make systematic mistakes in their retirement savings decisions, then the labor market will produce incentives for plan designs that generally fail to effectively address the problems. Indeed, the presence of workers who undersave due to myopia results in equilibrium employer plan designs that exploit the myopic by lowering their total compensation. Our analytic framework provides novel explanations for a range of features of plan design, including the high prevalence of matching contributions, the use of low default contribution rates in automatic enrollment plans, the shift away from annuities toward lump sum distributions, and the offering of investment options with excessive fees. The regulation of these plans should be reformed to address the problems with employer incentives that we identify. More fundamentally, our analysis calls for a rethinking of the current scheme’s special subsidies for employer-sponsored plans.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review
Why do bureaucratic principals appoint agents who hold different policy views from themselves? We posit an explanation based on the interplay between two types
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOptimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review
Why do bureaucratic principals appoint agents who hold different policy views from themselves? We posit an explanation based on the interplay between two types
- Open Access
- 18 October 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Consumer Biases and Firm Ownership
In this paper we show how ownership of the firm by its customers, as well as nonprofit status, can prevent the firm from exploiting consumer biases. By eliminating an outside residual claimant with control over the firm, these alternatives to investor ownership reduce the incentive of the firm to offer contractual terms that exploit the mistakes consumers make. However, customers who are unaware of their behavioral biases, and consequent vulnerability to exploitation, may fail to recognize this advantage of non-investor-owned firms and instead continue to patronize investor-owned firms. We present evidence from the consumer financial services market that supports our theory. Comparing contract terms, we find that mutually owned firms offer lower penalties, such as default interest rates, and higher up-front prices, such as introductory interest rates, than do investor-owned firms. However, consumers most vulnerable to these penalties are no more likely to use mutually owned firms.
- 18 October 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessConsumer Biases and Firm Ownership
In this paper we show how ownership of the firm by its customers, as well as nonprofit status, can prevent the firm from exploiting consumer biases. By eliminating an outside residual claimant with control over the firm, these alternatives to investor ownership reduce the incentive of the firm to offer contractual terms that exploit the mistakes consumers make. However, customers who are unaware of their behavioral biases, and consequent vulnerability to exploitation, may fail to recognize this advantage of non-investor-owned firms and instead continue to patronize investor-owned firms. We present evidence from the consumer financial services market that supports our theory. Comparing contract terms, we find that mutually owned firms offer lower penalties, such as default interest rates, and higher up-front prices, such as introductory interest rates, than do investor-owned firms. However, consumers most vulnerable to these penalties are no more likely to use mutually owned firms.
- Open Access
- 24 August 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Further Investigations into the Origin of Credit Score Cutoff Rules
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) argue that the evidence presented in Bubb and Kaufman (2009) is based on an inappropriate pooling of loans sold to private-label securitizers with loans sold to the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). In this paper we investigate the issues raised by the authors and conclude that they do not change our basic analytical approach or conclusions. We examine samples that do not pool together loans sold to these two types of purchasers - a sample of loans bought by the GSEs, a sample of loans originated in 2008-2009 after the private-label market collapsed, and a sample of jumbo loans - and find discontinuities in the number and default rate of loans at credit score cutoffs in the absence of corresponding discontinuities in the securitization rate. We also examine a key assumption underlying their estimates - that no loans are both at risk of being sold to the GSEs and at risk of being sold to private-label securitizers - and show that the data are inconsistent with that assumption. We find that 18 percent of conforming loans in our sample at some time switched between GSE and private-label ownership, demonstrating that the GSEs and private-label securitizers competed for the same loans. Additionally, we show that lender screening cutoffs grew steadily over the period 1997-2010 during which the private-label market rose and collapsed.
- 24 August 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFurther Investigations into the Origin of Credit Score Cutoff Rules
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) argue that the evidence presented in Bubb and Kaufman (2009) is based on an inappropriate pooling of loans sold to private-label securitizers with loans sold to the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). In this paper we investigate the issues raised by the authors and conclude that they do not change our basic analytical approach or conclusions. We examine samples that do not pool together loans sold to these two types of purchasers - a sample of loans bought by the GSEs, a sample of loans originated in 2008-2009 after the private-label market collapsed, and a sample of jumbo loans - and find discontinuities in the number and default rate of loans at credit score cutoffs in the absence of corresponding discontinuities in the securitization rate. We also examine a key assumption underlying their estimates - that no loans are both at risk of being sold to the GSEs and at risk of being sold to private-label securitizers - and show that the data are inconsistent with that assumption. We find that 18 percent of conforming loans in our sample at some time switched between GSE and private-label ownership, demonstrating that the GSEs and private-label securitizers competed for the same loans. Additionally, we show that lender screening cutoffs grew steadily over the period 1997-2010 during which the private-label market rose and collapsed.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond
We take a fresh look at the concerns about credit card pricing and empirically investigate whether the Credit CARD Act of 2009 has been successful in addressing those concerns. The rational choice theory of credit card pricing, which posits that issuers use back-end fees to adjust the price of credit to reflect new information about borrowers’ credit risk, predicts that issuers will respond to the Act by using alternative ways to price risk. In contrast, the behavioral economics theory, which posits that issuers use back-end fees because they are not salient to consumers, predicts that issuers will respond by increasing unregulated non-salient prices. If the market is competitive, we argue that the CARD Act should also result in increases in some salient, up-front prices. But we show that if issuers have market power, reductions in non-salient fees may not result in concomitant increases in salient charges. We test these predictions using two datasets on credit card contract terms before and after the CARD Act rules went into effect. We find that the rules have substantially reduced the back-end fees directly regulated by the Act, including late fees and over-the-limit fees. However, unregulated contract terms, such as annual fees and purchase interest rates, have changed little. Post-CARD Act, consumers continue to face high long-term prices and low short-term prices, and imperfectly rational consumers still find it difficult to understand the cost of credit card borrowing. We thus consider potential improvements to the regulatory framework. We argue that improved disclosures that present to consumers the aggregate cost of credit under the contract, based on information about the borrower’s likely use of credit, would improve consumer outcomes. Furthermore, we suggest that regulators, rather than focusing on prices that are 'too high,' should consider limiting the ability of issuers to charge introductory teaser interest rates that are in a sense 'too low.'
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCredit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond
We take a fresh look at the concerns about credit card pricing and empirically investigate whether the Credit CARD Act of 2009 has been successful in addressing those concerns. The rational choice theory of credit card pricing, which posits that issuers use back-end fees to adjust the price of credit to reflect new information about borrowers’ credit risk, predicts that issuers will respond to the Act by using alternative ways to price risk. In contrast, the behavioral economics theory, which posits that issuers use back-end fees because they are not salient to consumers, predicts that issuers will respond by increasing unregulated non-salient prices. If the market is competitive, we argue that the CARD Act should also result in increases in some salient, up-front prices. But we show that if issuers have market power, reductions in non-salient fees may not result in concomitant increases in salient charges. We test these predictions using two datasets on credit card contract terms before and after the CARD Act rules went into effect. We find that the rules have substantially reduced the back-end fees directly regulated by the Act, including late fees and over-the-limit fees. However, unregulated contract terms, such as annual fees and purchase interest rates, have changed little. Post-CARD Act, consumers continue to face high long-term prices and low short-term prices, and imperfectly rational consumers still find it difficult to understand the cost of credit card borrowing. We thus consider potential improvements to the regulatory framework. We argue that improved disclosures that present to consumers the aggregate cost of credit under the contract, based on information about the borrower’s likely use of credit, would improve consumer outcomes. Furthermore, we suggest that regulators, rather than focusing on prices that are 'too high,' should consider limiting the ability of issuers to charge introductory teaser interest rates that are in a sense 'too low.'
- Open Access
- 1 July 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Consumer Biases and Firm Ownership
Recent work has explored the implications of behavioral biases among consumers for firm behavior and has documented that profit-maximizing firms exploit consumer biases in the contracts they offer consumers. In this paper we show how ownership of the firm by its customers, as well as nonprofit ownership, can be used as commitment devices to avoid offering contracts that exploit consumer biases. In a model of a market in which for-profit investor-owned firms and mutual firms compete, sophisticated consumers who are biased but aware of their biases patronize mutual firms, while unbiased consumers and naive consumers who underestimate their biases patronize for-profit firms. Mutuals serving sophisticates offer high base prices but low "penalty" prices, while for-profits offer low base prices and high penalty prices, resulting in transfers from naive biased consumers to unbiased consumers. We present evidence from the market for credit cards that supports our theory. Comparing contract terms, we find mutuals do offer higher base prices, such as introductory interest rates, but lower penalty prices, such as default interest rates, than do for-profits. We also present evidence that customers sort into firms according to their perceptions of their biases.
- 1 July 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessConsumer Biases and Firm Ownership
Recent work has explored the implications of behavioral biases among consumers for firm behavior and has documented that profit-maximizing firms exploit consumer biases in the contracts they offer consumers. In this paper we show how ownership of the firm by its customers, as well as nonprofit ownership, can be used as commitment devices to avoid offering contracts that exploit consumer biases. In a model of a market in which for-profit investor-owned firms and mutual firms compete, sophisticated consumers who are biased but aware of their biases patronize mutual firms, while unbiased consumers and naive consumers who underestimate their biases patronize for-profit firms. Mutuals serving sophisticates offer high base prices but low "penalty" prices, while for-profits offer low base prices and high penalty prices, resulting in transfers from naive biased consumers to unbiased consumers. We present evidence from the market for credit cards that supports our theory. Comparing contract terms, we find mutuals do offer higher base prices, such as introductory interest rates, but lower penalty prices, such as default interest rates, than do for-profits. We also present evidence that customers sort into firms according to their perceptions of their biases.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
States, Law, and Property Rights in West Africa
This paper investigates the factors that have shaped the institutions governing property in land in West Africa. Using a regression discontinuity design, I estimate the effects of the divergent de jure property law of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire on de facto property rights institutions. I find that households just on either side of the border between the two states report similar prevalence of rights to transfer their land. My findings provide evidence that formal law has played a limited role in property rights institutions and that instead non-state sources of norms shape the de facto rules governing property in land. Furthermore, I show that part of the substantial within-country variation in property rights institutions is explained by economic factors, as hypothesized by Demsetz (1967). In particular, areas that are more suitable for growing cocoa have a greater prevalence of transfer rights, providing evidence that the commercialization of agriculture has led to more individualized property rights institutions.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStates, Law, and Property Rights in West Africa
This paper investigates the factors that have shaped the institutions governing property in land in West Africa. Using a regression discontinuity design, I estimate the effects of the divergent de jure property law of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire on de facto property rights institutions. I find that households just on either side of the border between the two states report similar prevalence of rights to transfer their land. My findings provide evidence that formal law has played a limited role in property rights institutions and that instead non-state sources of norms shape the de facto rules governing property in land. Furthermore, I show that part of the substantial within-country variation in property rights institutions is explained by economic factors, as hypothesized by Demsetz (1967). In particular, areas that are more suitable for growing cocoa have a greater prevalence of transfer rights, providing evidence that the commercialization of agriculture has led to more individualized property rights institutions.